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VABSTRACT
This dissertation belongs within the held of the philosophy of religion. The thesis 
proposes three basic ideas. First, there is a kind o f religious language and religious 
experience disregarded in philosophy: the kind of religious language that is 
philosophically examined is called “mundane-sacred judgment;” the mental state 
behind that language is called “religious appreciation.” Second, these phenomena are 
relevant to the philosophy of religion and therefore should not be ignored. Third, the 
philosophical model by which these two linguistic and experiential facts of religion 
are explicated is aesthetics.
Just as metaphysics often supplies the concepts and logical problems 
associated with, say, the philosophical study of mystical or prayer experience, so it 
will be shown that the philosophy o f aesthetics provides the ideas and difficulties 
connected with the philosophical study of mundane-sacred judgment and religious 
appreciation. To show this, the dissertation draws analogies between, on the one hand, 
“mundane-sacred judgm ent” and “aesthetic judgment”, and, on the other hand, 
“religious appreciation” and “aesthetic appreciation.” It also shows that, like 
aesthetics, the goals o f the philosophical study of mundane-sacred judgment and 
religious appreciation are (1) to elucidate the meaning of this language and (2) to 
characterize its associated experience.
Because the primary aim of the thesis is to suggest the existence o f a neglected 
religious language and experience, and how they are relevant to philosophy, no single 
interpretation of them is proffered. Accordingly, the thesis looks at a broad
2
constellation of philosophical ideas -  ranging from ancient philosophy, to 
phenomenology, to analytic philosophy -  and how those differing ideas might apply 
to this subject. Throughout, then, the reader is encouraged and challenged to consider 
various philosophical interpretations of mundane-sacred judgment and religious 
appreciation. In this way, the field o f philosophical debate underlying these religious 
issues is delineated.
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INTRODUCTION
Imagine the following. A small boat sails across a pristine lake enclosed between two 
mountains. When it touches the shore, three hikers disembark. Although friends, each 
of the hikers entertains metaphysical beliefs that are incompatible with the others: one 
man is a theist, the second an atheist, while the third is an agnostic. Despite these 
doctrinal differences, they tie up their boat and begin a trek down a mossy trail 
shadowed by soaring trees. A waft o f ponderosa pine permeates the air; a squirrel 
dashes across their path; a deer, on a nearby slope, nibbles on some wild grass. 
Everything is serene and silent and beautiful.
But then the hikers turn a bend -  and a loud, powerful rush of a waterfall 
breaks the tranquil atmosphere, its crashing water surging over a magnificent rocky 
cliff. Awestruck at the stunning view, each o f the men spontaneously says, “The 
waterfall is absolutely divine. ” And, without hesitation, the theist, the atheist and the 
agnostic smile at one another, somehow agreeing in the appropriateness of that 
statement.
But what do they mean by their shared statement?
Albeit a hypothetical situation, this kind of language and “religious” response 
to concrete objects, like waterfalls or sunsets or rivers, is common in our daily life. 
Men and women from various cultures, religions, philosophies, and economic 
backgrounds can be observed utilizing the vocabulary o f religion -  words like 
“sacred” and “divine” and “nirvana” — in order to describe their confrontations with 
mundane situations. This common linguistic fact raises interesting philosophical
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questions. How can men and women, all of widely differing beliefs and history, come 
to agree in the appropriateness of such statements? How can a theist, an atheist and an 
agnostic happen to choose and express the same type of “religious” language when 
describing a mundane situation like a waterfall? More generally, what do such 
“religious” statements mean? Is there indeed a common meaning here? Should we 
postulate a unique experience, a distinct mental state, which is associated with this 
kind of language, an experience that men of wildly dissimilar beliefs can nevertheless 
share and speak about? In short, what makes this commonplace language, these 
“mundane and sacred” statements, meaningful for both the secular and the religious 
man?
These are some o f the basic questions o f this dissertation, which is a 
philosophical investigation into those seemingly paradoxical statements that, 
interestingly, we find both the religious and the secular frequently employing in their 
day-to-day speech. Accordingly, this dissertation concerns religious responses to this 
world, something philosophers of religion are apt to pass over. For reasons provided 
later, I shall be calling this language “mundane-sacred judgment”, and the mental 
state associated with it “religious appreciation” .
However, before delving into an explanation of those ideas, here is another 
example of mundane-sacred judgment, but in this case from the Bible. In 
Lamentations, we read: “The roads of Zion are in mourning for lack of festival 
pilgrims.” 1
How odd. A road can hardly be mourning; so what are we describing when we 
assert that it is — or looks to be as if it is -  mourning? What is the nature o f the 
experience that makes it appropriate to describe this inanimate object in terms o f a
1 Rabbi N osson Scherman, ed., Tanach: The Twenty-Four Books o f  the B ible , The Stone Edition 
(Brooklyn, NY: Mesorah Publications, Ltd., 1996), 1717, 1:4.
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human emotional state, when the inanimate object does not match the description of 
our experience? If the above hypothetical example about the theist, the atheist and the 
agnostic reminded us that non-religious people sometimes employ religious 
vocabulary to describe certain mundane objects of their world, then this example from 
the Bible shows that religious people often enlist ordinary, mundane terms -  such as 
“mourning” -  to describe certain sacred objects of their universe. That symmetrical 
relationship -  o f non-religious people wielding religious words and religious people 
wielding non-religious words in order to express their meaningful experiences of 
sensory objects -  is fascinating and rich in philosophical implications.
As we explore these implications, we shall be ineluctably pulled into a 
discussion about the vague yet routine concepts o f “religious experience” and 
“religious language”. This philosophical discussion, however, will have a somewhat 
different emphasis from that which is typically found in the philosophical literature. 
Ordinarily, philosophers o f religion highlight the most otherworldly kinds o f religious 
experience and statement, such as the language that tells us about mystical or miracle 
experiences; often, too, philosophers will concentrate 011 those areas of religious 
language that speak about the nature of God or the ultimate foundation of existence, 
entities like Nirvana, Brahman, Jesus, Matter, and so on. However, in this 
dissertation, we shall set aside all o f those interesting metaphysical ideas, and instead 
focus on those religious experiences and statements that speak about this world, our 
world, the solid world as revealed by our five-senses. We shall examine statements 
like “The waterfall is absolutely divine” or “The roads to Zion are in mourning”, 
religious statements that describe things existing in our physical life.
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Why have philosophers tended to ignore or understate the significance of mundane- 
sacred judgment and religious appreciation? Is it because these topics are 
philosophically dull? Do they produce shallow questions? Are they easily explained 
by a concept like “metaphor”, and so unworthy of our ratiocination? Perhaps.
However, another explanation, which will be one of the assumptions o f this 
dissertation, suggests that the main reason why philosophers have overlooked this 
language and experience is precisely because, by and large, they have over­
highlighted the transcendental and metaphysical aspects o f religion. Many 
philosophers would no doubt agree with Schopenhauer, no friend o f the “masses”, 
who wrote, “Religion is the metaphysics o f the people.”2 His obvious meaning is that 
religion is primitive metaphysical speculation. Naturally, if  philosophers are armed 
with such an assumption, then their main interest (as far as religion goes) will be 
whether religious claims about metaphysical entities like God, the Self, or Nirvana 
can be justified. Following from that interest, the philosopher will want to know if 
“religious experience” can serve as one o f the means for validating religious beliefs 
about the purported existence of these entities. Consequently, religious experiences 
that do not directly relate to those entities will be ignored or dismissed as irrelevant to 
philosophy qua philosophy. This has been the situation among the philosophical 
intelligentsia o f the Western world for some time. Read any historical study o f the 
philosophy of religion and you will find that the branches of philosophy most often 
called into service to explain and describe religion have been metaphysics and 
epistemology. As a result o f that emphasis, it is no wonder that “religion” comes to be
2 Arthur Schopenhauer, Parerga and P aralipom ena , trans. E .FJ Payne (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2000), 325.
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seen by philosophers as, at heart, little more than a kind o f metaphysical speculation
about the otherworldly, trans-worldly or the miraculous.3
Suppose, when studying religion, we considered only the following kinds of
statement, which stress looking at the world beyond ours:
Learn how to be entirely unreceptive to sensations arising from external forms, 
thereby purging your bodies of receptivity to externals.
Huang Po4
Let a wise man, like a driver of horses, exert diligence in restraint of his senses 
straying among seductive sensual objects.
Manava-dharma-sastra5
Considering only such kinds o f sentences, how could we not deduce that religion 
ought to be explicated by metaphysical concepts? If our attention spotlights those and 
only those kinds o f statement, which speak about “the beyond”, it is perfectly logical 
that we would reach the conclusion that religion, at the end of the day, is a narration 
of something that goes beyond our sense organs. It must be about the metaphysical; it 
must be some kind of primitive attempt to explain what is.
Yet this conclusion follows only i f  we focus on those kinds o f otherworldly, 
anti-sensory, religious statements. Any fair survey o f the language of religion, 
however, demonstrates that religio-linguistic practice is much broader and richer, 
including far more than descriptions about otherworldly speculations, inward 
contemplation, reactions to alleged miracles, or mystical flights into the timeless. As 
important as those aspects o f religion no doubt are, religious speech, nevertheless, 
directs attention toward human responses that are often as much about this world as 
about any other.
J A notable exception is N icholas Lash’s groundbreaking theoretical work. See his Easter in O rdinary: 
Reflections on Human Experience and the K now ledge o f  G od  (Britain: SCM Press Ltd, 1988). Another 
noteworthy exception is F.B. Brown, Religious Aesthetics (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 
1989), published the follow ing year.
4 John Blofed, trans., The Zen Teaching o f  Huang Po (London: Rider, 1958), 119.
5 Arthur Coke Burnell, trans., The O rdinances ofM anu  (London: Trubner, 1884), 88.
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Who would deny that religious language describes reactions of awe at the 
physical world; talks of the partaking of sacraments; speaks about the observance of 
certain rituals; outlines the performances of sacrifices and purifications; contemplates 
war and violence; evokes feelings of romance and sexuality; ponders wine and song? 
Clearly religion is not just about the metaphysical, about “the great beyond”. It is 
about this world in which we live. Religious language often means obeying 
commandments, beseeching and helping others, participating in dances and 
pilgrimages, as well as meditating on and interacting with the natural world. It refers 
to man’s eyes, ears, nose, hands and taste, not just his supernatural senses. It includes 
this world.
O f course, it may be wondered whether those aspects of religion have any 
philosophical significance. We might reasonably argue that, yes, the above are 
certainly features o f the wider concept o f religion, and any generalization about 
religion would be wise to take them into account; however, those aspects are to be 
studied by sociologists, comparative religionists, and anthropologists -  and not by 
philosophers, because the only concern for the philosopher qua philosopher (as far as 
religion goes) is the truth-value o f religion’s metaphysical claims. That, in a nutshell, 
is the business o f the philosopher when it comes to religion. He is here to assess 
claims about what is. So, when religion makes claims about what is, the philosopher 
examines those claims, but ignores those other aspects of religion mentioned above.
In response, we might question if the philosopher’s only business in regard to 
religion is to assess its metaphysical claims. For, as happens in virtually any 
intellectual area, it is often only when our philosophical concerns cease to focus 
specifically on metaphysics and epistemology that other entities, other human 
experiences and other problems begin to emerge as discernable concepts before our
14
consciousness (which, of course, in turn provide new data upon which metaphysical 
and epistemological questions and theories can be applied). And that, so I shall argue, 
is precisely the case with regard to mundane-sacred judgment and religious 
appreciation.
Only by putting aside the metaphysical paradigm in the philosophy of religion 
does this religious experience and language manifest itself before our mind’s eye. As 
we shall see, what emerges is that this experience and language has more in common 
with the issues found in philosophical aesthetics than with those perennial and 
insufferable problems that torment us in metaphysics and epistemology.
Accordingly, the explanatory model bequeathed to us by those 
philosophers known as aestheticians, rather than the models from those 
known as metaphysicians, serves better to illuminate these aspects of religion. 
M undane-sacred judgm ent and religious appreciation relate to the sensory 
w orld that you and I inhabit, just as art, however transcendent it may feel, 
and however many metaphysical and epistemological ideas it may 
presuppose, nevertheless first plays upon our very real sensory experience. 
By applying the aesthetic model -  its questions and concerns - to this area of 
religion, our subject remains within the broad field of philosophy. For 
philosophy, obviously, is not limited to the field of metaphysics, and so the 
business of the philosophy of religion includes more than religion's 
metaphysical ideas.6 This will become clearer when, in the following pages,
6 This, o f  course, is not to argue that metaphysics and epistem ology do not play a seminal role in our 
specific topic within religion. In every intellectual field, however remote from philosophy, loom  the 
dark silhouettes o f  the great epistem ological and metaphysical problems, and in that regard our subject 
is no different from any other. However, such concerns slip into the background when exploring our 
topic, just as they slip into the background when we examine intellectual areas like man's language and 
responses to art.
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we exploit the aesthetic paradigm  in order to explicate the subject of religious 
appreciation and m undane-sacred judgment.
This dissertation is divided into two parts. In Part /, I shall show that the concepts of 
religious appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment emerge when we apply a 
method analogous to the aesthetic branch of philosophy to a certain class of religious 
statements. In this part of the thesis, no argument will be offered for the truth o f any 
one solution to the questions that will be raised about these inchoate topics. Rather the 
purpose o f this part will be to indicate the potential fie ld  o f  philosophical discussion 
and debate surrounding the concepts in this area o f  religious studies. It is a way of 
starting the philosophical conversation.
Part II, a specific study of mundane-sacred judgment and religious 
appreciation, is a related and more detailed argument in favour o f one interpretation. 
This part, it should be noted, is only meant to provide examples o f what a more robust 
and meticulous philosophical argument might look like regarding some of the issues 
raised earlier in Part I. So, again, no dogmatic philosophy is proffered. Rather it is 
intended that Part II  demonstrate that the ideas and problems introduced in Part I  can 
indeed sustain a deeper and more rigorous philosophical analysis. It therefore must be 
emphasized that the primary aim of my dissertation is not to unbendingly assert any 
single point of view. Instead, I wish to open up the idea that there is something here -  
a neglected religious language and religious experience — worthy o f philosophical 
attention, whatever the interpretation any given philosopher ultimately feels is the 
most defensible on these issues. In light of that, the reader is encouraged to 
contemplate alternative ideas throughout this dissertation.
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PARTI
AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PHILOSOPHICAL 
ISSUES OF MUNDANE-SACRED JUDGMENT 
AND RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION
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CHAPTER 1 
RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION AND 
MUNDANE-SACRED JUDGMENT
Demarcating Religious Language and Experience
Precisely because of its striking resemblance to aesthetic responses, the religious 
experience examined herein is called “religious appreciation”. This label is 
deliberately named after the idea o f “aesthetic appreciation” . In due course it will 
become evident why we would wish to draw the analogy.
The wider concept o f “religious experience” is, o f course, notoriously difficult 
to define. Any theoretical definition of it is highly contentious. In order then to 
sidestep this definitional quagmire, I shall simply present instances of religious 
experiences, rather than directly try to define them. It is hoped that by presenting 
various examples of religious experience, we will begin to see the distinctions 
between them, and thus in turn will soon come to see religious appreciation as a 
species category within the genus category of religious experience. For my purposes, 
such a definitional strategy will serve just as well as a means of beginning the 
discussion about our subject, although it may be unwelcome for theoretical 
perfectionists. So, as distinguished economist Thomas Sowell rightly put it, we can 
expect that: “If I say that the sky is blue, the average reader will understand what I 
mean, but clever sophisticates will point out that the sky is reddish at sunset, black at 
midnight and grey 011 an overcast day”.7 The same is probably true with the concepts 
o f religious experience that are presented later in this chapter. But most ordinary
7 Thomas Sow ell, B arbarians Inside the G ates A nd O ther C ontroversial Essay  (Stanford: Hoover 
Institution Press, 1999), IX.
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language users will have a basic understanding of the ordinary meaning of these 
religious experiences, and for our purpose that is all we need.
At the outset, what ought to be highlighted is one o f the basic theses of this 
dissertation: religious appreciation is a philosophical category different from  the
more fam iliar philosophical categories o f  religious experience. To obtain an initial 
grasp o f the concept of religious appreciation, it is helpful to begin by identifying 
what the experience and its language are not.
For example, the experience of religious appreciation is not properly classified 
in the category of mystical experience because the man o f religious appreciation does 
not necessarily feel, encounter or experience “union”, “knowledge”, or “pure 
consciousness” with an Absolute or some other divinity, as is typically the case in 
mysticism. And, the language of religious appreciation is also distinct from the types 
of religious statements out of which our concept of mystical experience derives. That 
is, the language o f religious appreciation -  mundane-sacred judgm ent -  is not like 
mystical language, such as these mystical statements by Plotinus, Isaiah, and Chuang- 
tse:
Often when I  awaken from  the body to m yself and step from  otherness into 
m yself I  behold a most wondrous beauty. It is then that I believe most strongly 
in my belonging to a higher destiny, and in my strength enact the perfect life, 
and have become One Thing with the Divine, and since I  am founded in that, I  
attain that might and soar above all that is knowable.
Plotinus
In the year o f  King UzzialTs death, I saw the Lord sitting upon a high and 
lofty throne, and its legs f i l e d  the Temple. Seraphim were standing above, at 
his service. Each one had six wings: with two it would cover its face, with two 
it would cover its legs, and with two it would fly. And one would call to 
another and say, “Holy, holy, holy is Hashem, Master o f  Legions; the whole 
world- is filled with His glory. ”
Isaiah9
s Martin Buber, collected and introduced, E cstatic Confessions (Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 
1996), 32.
y Isaiah  6:1 in N osson Scherman, ed„ Tanach, 963.
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While keeping my physical fram e I  lost sight o f  my real s e lf Gazing at muddy 
water, I  lost sight o f  the clear abyss.
Chuang-tse10
It is from passages such as these that we -  who have never had a mystical experience 
-  develop a concept of mystical experience. We read such statements and, whether we 
believe in their veracity or not, come to conclude that these people were experiencing 
something. That something is what comparative religion scholars and philosophers 
have categorized as “mystical experience” . But, as we shall see, mundane-sacred 
judgment is not like those kinds of statement from which the category of mystical 
experience derives; so it is probably inaccurate to classify it among the experiences of 
mysticism.
Moreover, if religious appreciation is an experience unlike those mystical
experiences, it also is not accurately classified as a conversion experience, since the
man o f religious appreciation does not necessarily undergo a drastic alteration in his
moral, cognitive or social universe, as is usually the case in conversion. Sometimes
he has the experience only for a brief moment, only to be completely forgotten later.
Accordingly, a mundane-sacred judgment is not a description out which we can
assume the experience o f religious conversion. The following, for example, is not a
mundane-sacred judgment.
Worldly interests encompassed me on every side. Even my work as a teacher — 
the best thing I was engaged in — seemed unimportant and useless in view o f  
the life hereafter. When I considered the inten tion o f  my teaching, I  perceived 
that instead o f  doing it fo r  G od’s sake alone I  had no motive but the desire fo r  
glory and reputation. I  realized that I stood on the edge o f  a precipice and 
would fa ll into Hell-fire unless I set about to mend my ways. ... God answered 
my prayer and made it easy to turn my back on reputation and wealth and wife 
and children and friends.u
10 Lin Yutang, The Im portance o f  L iving  (N ew  York: The John Day Company, Inc., 1937), 86.
11 “A l-G hazali’s Conversion to Sufism ”, quoted in Mircea Eliade, ed., E ssential Sacred Writings From  
A round the W orld (N ew  York: HarperCollins Publishers, 1967), 526.
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From such a passage, we are justified in delineating the concept of conversion; but,
1 ^again, we would not be right to derive from it the concept of religious appreciation. “
Similarly, religious appreciation does not seem to belong to the category of
prayer and meditative experiences, since the man o f religious appreciation need not
necessarily feel such psychological pleasures as forgiveness, love, clarity of mind, or
such psychological pains as shame, terror, or cosmic loneliness, or such physiological
responses as a lowered heart-rate, skin sensations, or convulsions, as is often the case
in prayer experiences. So the language of religious appreciation is not the language of
petitionary prayers. It is not the language o f forgiveness prayers. And, it is not the
language of mystical prayers and meditations. Thus, mundane-sacred judgment does
not describe an experience like this petitionary prayer to Imana, the Great Creator of
the Rwanda-Urundi:
O Imana o f  pity, Imana o f  my fa th e r ’s house (or country), i f  only you would 
help me! O Imana o f  the countiy o f  the Hutu and the Tutsi, i f  only you would 
help me ju s t this once! O Imana, i f  only you would give me rugo and 
children/ /j
Nor does mundane-sacred judgment narrate an experience like this Sumero-Akkadian 
forgiveness prayer:
May the f w y  o f  my lord's heart be quieted toward me. May the god who is not 
hiown be quieted toward me. May the goddess who is not known be quieted 
toward m e...O  Lord, my transgressions are many; great are my sins.14
And mundane-sacred judgment is not like this description of Jain mystical 
prayer/meditation:
With the knees high and the head low, in deep meditation, he reached Nirvana, 
the complete and full, the unobstructed, unimpeded, infinite and supreme, best 
knowledge and intuition, called Kevala...he was a Kevalin, omniscient and 
comprehending all objects, he laiew all conditions o f  the world, o f  gods, men 
and demons; whence they come, where they go, whether they are born as men
12 W e are referring here to religious appreciation as defined in this dissertation. This is not to posit, 
however, that a religious convert does not also appreciate religion.
13 Eliade, E ssential Sacred Writings From A round the World, 268-9.
14 Ibid., 272-273.
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or animals, or become gods or hell-beings; their food, clrink, doings, desires, 
open and secret deeds, their conversation and gossip, and the thoughts o f  their 
minds; he saw and knew all conditions in the whole world o f  all living 
beings.15
Finally, let us also note that religious appreciation is not a miracle experience, since 
the man o f religious appreciation does not necessarily encounter anything 
supernatural. Nor is it a before-life or after-death experience because the man of 
religious appreciation need not necessarily have any beliefs about or experiences of 
immortality, resurrection, interconnection, or reincarnation. And it is not a theological 
experience, since the man of religious appreciation is not necessarily involved in a 
cognitive experience in which the rationality or coherence of religion is debated. In 
short, the language o f religious appreciation does not appear to suggest a mental state 
that is identifiable with any of those familiar categories of “religious experience”.
Nevertheless, as with these other classifications of religious experience, the 
category o f religious appreciation derives, or can be inferred or interpreted, from 
empirical information; that is, it can be deduced, as we have said, from its own 
distinct species of religious language, the sentences which the man of religious 
appreciation is inclined to assert, those sentences we are calling mundane-sacred 
judgment. The language indicating this experience is, to be sure, less spectacular and 
less dramatic than the assertions which we find in the literature o f mysticism, 
conversion, prayer, life-after-death, miracles, or theology. But, as we shall soon see, it 
is no less interesting and no less important to our general concept of religion.
Three Basic Characteristics o f Mundane-Sacred Judgment
What are the features o f this allegedly distinct religious language? Without indulging 
in a complicated theory, mundane-sacred judgment can be seen to possess, at least,
15 Herman Jacobi, trans.,./«//?« Sutras , II., (N ew  York: Dover Publications, 1962), 201-202.
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three immediate characteristics, which distinguish it from those other kinds of 
religious language just described.
First: mundane-sacred judgm ent speaks about objects that are perceptible to 
any human being who possesses the ordinary five  sense organs (or the requisite sense 
organ needed to perceive the particular kind o f  physical object denoted in the 
sentence).
That is, these kinds of sentence refer to objects in the solid world that you and 
I can see, hear, feel, smell or taste. For this reason, the objects can be perceived by 
people who do not necessarily view them as sacred or out o f the ordinary. For 
example, a Christian might say the following mundane-sacred judgment: “The 
Western Wall in Jerusalem is the holy Wailing Wall.” Now even an atheist or 
agnostic can perceive in part what this judgment talks about because his very eyes can 
see the physical wall should he visit Jerusalem. Furthermore, this has nothing to do 
with whether or not he thinks the object is actually wailing or holy. A mundane- 
sacred judgment is a judgment about perceivable entities, and anyone who can 
perceive with his ordinary sense organs can understand these sentences -  at least in 
part.
A mundane-sacred judgment is about things such as: books; theatre and dance 
performances; buildings; walls; artworks; times of the day, week and year; seasonal 
changes; lands; music; planets; stones; stars; the sky; water; fire; vegetation; cultural 
traditions; rituals; even suicide bombings. All of these, at times, are or may be viewed 
as sacred objects within the various world religions; all of these objects can be viewed 
through our sensory faculties. Hence, in terms of their raw physicality, such sacred 
objects are, by definition, unlike otherworldly or transcendent sacred objects. 
Conceptually, they are radically different from things such as gods, or Brahman, or
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Nibbana, or any other sacred object that seems to require some kind o f metaphysical 
sixth sense for humans to apprehend, if they can apprehend them at all. Because o f 
that, we begin to see why mundane-sacred judgment connotes a different kind of 
experience than those described in mystical, miracle, and prayer language. For in 
mundane-sacred judgment, the sacred object is in the mundane world; it is in the 
perceivable world; it is tangible and it is concrete.
Let us call this kind of sacred object a “mundane-sacred object”, so as to 
distinguish it from a “transcendent-sacred object”, like a god, Nirvana, an angel, and 
so forth. Also, this term “mundane-sacred object” should be understood analogously 
to the way the term “aesthetic object” is understood in aesthetics, which is simply a 
way of grouping the various objects — from sculptures to mountains -  that stimulate 
aesthetic responses.
Second: mundane-sacred judgm ent sometimes involves predicates that are 
gleaned from  ordinary, day-to-day language.
A mundane-sacred judgment may employ terms denoting human emotions, 
weight, depth, slang, taste, color, action, as well as a whole variety of comparative 
language taken from mundane, ordinary experience. All of these kinds of predicate 
can and are often utilized to portray the qualities o f mundane-sacred objects. For 
example, when the Christian says, “The Western Wall in Jerusalem is wailing", he is 
borrowing the commonly understood term “wailing” in order to describe the Western 
Wall, a mundane-sacred object. Again, this is a term that even non-believers 
understand and use in their own practice of speech; for example, in the sentence “My 
child is wailing”, the same term is used.
In a mundane-sacred judgment, the grammatical subject can therefore possess 
predicates used in the ordinary talk of both religious and non-religious people. Hence,
24
in this branch of religious language, the sacred object while being in the perceivable 
mundane world is also sometimes described by the terms o f  the mundane world. 
Because o f this, let us call any predicate that describes a mundane-sacred object a 
“mundane-sacred predicate” .
Third: mundane-sacred judgment is uttered by different kinds o f  speakers from  
different ideological or metaphysical traditions and orientations.
These strange judgments are voiced by devoutly religious people; by priests; 
and by religious heroes such as saints, prophets, mystics, medicine men, and even 
gods (whether or not they in fact exist outside of the texts that mention them). They 
are even uttered by people who are not typically classified, either by themselves or by 
others, as “religious” . For example, a peripatetic surfer, with furrowed brow, once 
assured me that: “The waves in Hawaii are sacred and sw ee t” Here the young man 
referred to an object that is perceptible: the ocean’s waves in Hawaii. And he 
described that object with an ordinary predicate: he called it “sweet” . And, though 
not religious, he also employed a religious term “sacred”. So this was a mundane- 
sacred judgment voiced by a person, a “beach bum”, as it were, who would not be 
typically described as a “religious man”. Now, as in our hypothetical example in the 
Introduction, it is common to find people who do not see themselves as religious, 
nevertheless, employing religious language to describe things and events in their 
world which, for some reason or another, they regard as ultimate. It is an interesting 
question why this is so, just as it is fascinating why “religious people” so often 
employ “mundane vocabulary” to describe sacred things.
Other Examples o f Mwulane-Sacred Judgment
Here are some further examples of mundane-sacred judgment. Notice that each of 
these judgments -  unlike those religious texts quoted earlier -  talks about objects we
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can perceive with our senses, and that these judgments often use ordinary language to
describe those objects.
Whenever, in the course of the daily hunt, the red hunter comes upon a scene 
that is strikingly beautiful or sublime -  a black thundercloud with the 
rainbow’s glowing arch above the mountain; a white waterfall in the heart of a 
green gorge; a vast prairie tinged with the blood-red of sunset — he pauses for 
an instant in the attitude of worship.
Ohiyesa16
Your alter is your sacred work space, a place imbued with your personal pagan 
power.
Witch Bree, a.lca. Brenda Knight, in W itch’s 
Brew: Good Spells For Healing77
The world is a mirror of infinite beauty, yet no man sees it. It is a Temple of 
Majesty, yet no man regards it. It is a region of Light and Peace, did not men 
disquiet it. It is the Paradise o f God.
Thomas Traherne18
The world is a playground, and death Is the night.
Rumi19
Perhaps you have noticed that even in the very lightest breeze you can hear the 
voice o f the cottonwood tree; this we understand is its prayer to the Great 
Spirit, for not only men, but all things and all beings pray to Him continually 
in differing ways.
Black Elk20
Man is a holy temple of God.
John Tauler21
1(1 Charles Alexander Eastman, The Soul o f  the Indian (Boston & N ew  York: Houghton & Mifflin, 
1911), 46.
l7W itch  Bree, a.k .a. B renda K night, W itch 's Brew: Good Spells For H ealing  (San F rancisco, CA; 
C h ron ic le  B ook s, 2001) 15.
usBertram D obell, ed., Centuries o f  M editations I (London: P.J. and A.E. D obell, 1958), 31.
19 Reynold A. N icholson, trans., The M athnawi o f  Jalalu'ddin Rumi (London: Luzac, 1934) II., 2600.
20 Joseph Epes Brown, recorded and ed., The Sacred Pipe, B lack Elk's A ccount o f  the Seven R ites o f  the 
O glala Sioux (University o f  Oklahoma Press, 1953), 75.
21 Susanna Winkworth, trans., Life and Serm ons o f  Dr. John Tauler (N ew  York, 1858), 287.
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There are two things in this world which delight me: women and perfumes. 
These two things rejoice my eyes, and render me more fervent in devotion.
Muhammad22
Hail, O cross, yea be glad indeed!... Well done, O cross, that has bound down 
the mobility of the world! Well done, O shape o f understanding that hast 
shaped the shapeless!
The Martyrdom of St Andrew23
All that is sweet, delightful, and amiable in this world, in the serenity of the 
air, the fineness o f seasons, the joy of light, the melody o f sounds, the beauty 
of colours, the fragrancy o f smells, the splendour o f precious stones, is nothing 
else but Heaven breaking through the veil of this world, manifesting itself in 
such a degree and darting forth in such variety so much o f its nature.
William Law24
One of these buildings climbs up bold, massive in projection, up-piled in the 
greatness of & forceful but sure ascent, preserving its range and line to the last, 
the other soars from the strength of its base, in the grace and emotion o f a 
curving mass to a rounded summit and crowning symbol.
7 SSri Aurobindo"
Four General Features o f Religious Appreciation 
and Mundane-Sacred Judgment
Before discussing some of the particular features o f the experience o f religious
appreciation, let us begin by noting some general characteristics that it shares with
other kinds o f religious experience. Below are four general features of religious
experience and language that are also found in religious appreciation and mundane-
sacred judgment.
First: mundane-sacred judgment -  the language o f  religious appreciation -  is 
a linguistic practice that even non-religious people can recognize and talk about. Just
22 W ashington liv ing, Life o f  M ahom et (London & New York: Everyman’s Library, 1944), 231.
23 Montague Rhodes James, trans., The A pocryphal New Testam ent (London: Oxford University Press, 
1953), 359-360.
24Stephen Hobhouse, ed., Selected  M ystical Writings o f  William L aw  (London: R ockliff, 1949), 44.
25“The Meaning o f  Indian Temple Architecture,” Summer 2002, online at: 
www.hindunet.org/srh hom e/ 1996 1 l/m sg00034.htm l.
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as an agnostic like David Hume could identify and discuss religious language 
describing miracles, and the experience o f miracles, even though he thought them 
utter balderdash, so too can a man -  independent o f the status o f his religious faith -  
locate and distinguish mundane-sacred judgment within the overall speech of 
religious language.
Second: the purported content o f  religious appreciation and mundane-sacred 
judgm ent will alter depending on any given interpreter's philosophical assumptions, 
deductions, and intuitions. It can be confidently predicted in advance that feminist 
theories, logical-positivist theories, constructivist theories, Buddhist theories, or what 
have you will bestow diverse significance and meaning upon mundane-sacred 
judgment and religious appreciation. Nevertheless, as with all such theories about the 
nature of religious experience, none of these competing theories need doubt, on 
logical grounds, that there is the experience o f religious appreciation in our human 
world, and that this experience in turn finds expression in a particular form of 
language.
To be sure, the proponents of the sundry theories purporting to explain 
religion can agree that the occurrences of mundane-sacred judgment and religious 
appreciation are linguistic and phenomenal facts, even if  they profoundly disagree 
about their ontological causes, just as a Freudian, a Wittgensteinian, or logical 
positivist can all agree that, say, people undergo mystical experiences, even though 
they each, for different reasons, viscerally repudiate the veracity o f one another’s 
explanations regarding the causes and meaning of mysticism. In the same way, the 
many schools in the theory of religion can admit the existence of religious 
appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment, all the while rejecting this or that 
contending theory.
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Third: A man can voice a mundane-sacred judgm ent without belonging to any 
formal religious tradition or institution. In addition, a person can enjoy the 
experience o f  religious appreciation without having undergone any o f  the other types 
o f  religious experience — ju s t as a person can have, say, a prayer experience without 
ever having had a mystical or miracle experience. We need to remember that, despite 
the potential diversity o f conclusions from the various explanatory approaches in the 
philosophy o f religion, it can be agreed by each of them that a person need not have 
experienced and voiced all of the different types of religious experience to count as a 
“religious person” or to satisfy our basic criteria that a person has some initial 
acquaintance with religion. A person need undergo only one kind of religious 
experience, and that only for a brief moment, in order to be classified as “religious” 
or, at least, to be familiar with the religious. So, too, this is the case with mundane- 
sacred judgment and religious appreciation.
Fourth: A man can identify the language o f  religious appreciation without ever 
having experienced what it communicates, ju s t as a man can identify a description o f  
a miracle without ever having seen the miracle or even believing in it.
Mundane-Sacred Judgment and A esthetic Judgment 
What is noteworthy about mundane-sacred judgments is their similarity to aesthetic 
judgments. The analogies are hard to dispute. Just as aesthetic judgment has a 
distinctive set o f predicates, which are used primarily in aesthetic appraisal, so too 
does mundane-sacred judgment enjoy its own unique vocabulary. In aesthetic 
judgment there are such predicates as “beautiful” , “elegant” , “graceful”, or “ugly” , 
and these terms indicate to us that aesthetic language makes up a part of our wider use 
of language. Indeed that is how we come to believe that aesthetics comprises a 
distinct discourse in our use of words. But, in a similar way, mundane-sacred
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judgment has its own distinctive predicates -  words like “holy”, “sacred”, “Dhamma”, 
and so on. These terms likewise indicate we are speaking specifically of religious 
things, thereby suggesting there is a branch or discourse within our wider use of 
speech that can be reasonably called “religious language”. Indeed, so similar are the 
two kinds of judgment that mundane-sacred judgments often employ aesthetic 
predicates to describe mundane-sacred objects. The words of a holy man might be 
called “beautiful”; an enlightened monk’s quiet walk through the grove, “graceful” ; or 
the logic of the Kalaam argument for the existence of God, “elegant” . Such usage of 
language would seem to promote the idea that, if there is such a thing as aesthetic 
experience, something like it must surely be present in religion as well.
This idea of a relation between aesthetics and religion is further fortified by 
other linguistic similarities, for just as in aesthetic judgment we have descriptions 
referring to the form al achievement o f artworks, so too do we find these kinds of 
predicate applied to mundane-sacred objects. For instance, both aesthetic and 
mundane-sacred judgment at times describe their objects as “advanced”, “well done”, 
“disciplined” , “balanced”, “rough”, and so on. These kinds o f “technical 
accomplishment” predicates are thus shared in aesthetic and religious discourse. They 
are employed in both aesthetic and religious descriptions of experience. And so where 
an aesthete might describe a particular dance pose as “disciplined”, so might a 
religious man express a particular yogic exercise as “disciplined” , both men thus 
exploiting the same ordinary language to depict and explain their own particular 
phenomena.
But that is not the only similarity. There are at least four other interesting 
resemblances. One is that, just as aesthetic judgment often utilizes predicates 
normally reserved to describe human emotions, mundane-sacred judgment sometimes
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describes its own objects under concepts typically associated with human mental life. 
When under the sway o f an aesthetic experience, we might describe a piece o f music 
as “sad” , or as “melancholy”, or as “joyful”, or as “intelligent” . Similarly, when we 
are experiencing religious appreciation, we might use these same kinds o f predicates 
to depict the mundane-sacred object. For instance, the cast o f the Buddha’s footprint 
has been described as “joy”. Or, we saw the example of the road to Zion described as 
“mourning”. Such examples tell us that, just as in aesthetics, nearly any mental 
predicate can be applied to a mundane-sacred object, no matter how inanimate that 
object is.
Another similarity is that both aesthetic and mundane-sacred judgments often 
describe their objects in terms o f the feelings they evoke. The Buddhist story about 
Prince Gotama’s compassion for the insects slaughtered beneath the farmer’s plow 
might be called “moving”, just as one might call a play by Ibsen “moving” . The 
biblical depiction o f the flight of the Hebrews from their Egyptian slave-masters 
might be called “exciting”, just as we might describe a powerful work of Beethoven 
as “exciting”. The Christian Sabbath might be described as “tranquil”, similar to the 
way we describe a painting o f an autumn evening as “tranquil” . All these terms, used 
both in mundane-sacred judgment and aesthetic judgment, appear to project our 
human responses and concepts onto worldly objects we encounter.
Still another similarity is that both mundane-sacred judgm ent and aesthetic 
descriptions often refer to the expressive features o f objects. A work of art can be said 
to express emotion, thought, character, or attitude; so also can a mundane-sacred 
judgment suggest that, for example, a certain passage in a scripture or a piece of 
sacred music expresses a concept like “the impermanence o f life” or the “oneness of 
things” . This is similar to the way artworks are often claimed to express certain kind
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of truths, or to represent the world, or to give us an insight into characters and genres 
and otherwise ineffable things.
Lastly, both aesthetic and mundane sacred judgments often use predicates 
describing comparisons, analogies or metaphors. In a mundane-sacred judgment we 
might describe a particular sermon as heavy, or the waves in Hawaii as sweet, or the 
look in the eye of a holy man as warm. This kind of language-use is not unlike the 
way terms are applied in certain kinds o f aesthetic judgment, as when metaphor or 
analogy is used to describe, say, a fashion style as heavy, or an architectural structure 
as light, or a shade o f color as warm.
In short, when speaking about mundane-sacred judgment, it is worthwhile to 
keep in mind that it shares a variety of predicates with aesthetic language. We might 
ask ourselves why this is so. Most likely, this similarity in language offers us a clue 
about the nature of the experience of religious appreciation. That is, seeing these 
resemblances may well be our first step toward elucidating our subject, suggesting as 
it does the possibility that the religious experience associated with mundane-sacred 
judgment is analogous to our aesthetic responses to life, a religious experience 
connecting man to objects o f this world, in all its concreteness, in all its earthiness, in 
all its presentness, not unlike the way artworks stimulate aesthetic experiences -  by 
playing upon our senses.
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CHAPTER 2 
DEFINING THE MUNDANE-SACRED OBJECT
The earthiness o f the experience of religious appreciation coheres with what we have 
previously said: that among the prominent features o f a mundane-sacred object are its 
sensory qualities - its ability to be touched, seen, heard, tasted, smelled. These 
properties distinguish it from transcendent-sacred objects, which, unlike a mundane- 
sacred object, are not typically open to the sense organs of the thoroughly unreligious 
man. We also hinted that the word “mundane-sacred object” is a kind o f umbrella 
term incorporating a staggeringly wide variety of phenomena -  from written texts to 
music to mountains. Naturally this raises the question about how we define a 
mundane-sacred object. On what basis do we distinguish it from, say, an artwork? 
And what unites all these different phenomena under one term?
There are, at least, four potential ways of addressing these questions. They 
are: essentialist definitions, sceptical definitions, institutional definitions, and 
experiential definitions of the mundane-sacred object.
An essentialist definition would undertake the Herculean task of discovering 
and asserting that there is a feature, or group of features, that all and only mundane- 
sacred objects possess. For instance, theologians of the Paul Tillich variety might 
wish to contend that the essence of the mundane-sacred object is its symbolic function. 
To substantiate this claim, they might cite a mundane-sacred judgment such as 
Hermes’ remark about the Sun: “The Sun... is an image o f the Maker who is above
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the heavens.”26 Or they might cite this mundane-sacred judgment by St. Basil, “The
27respect that is paid to the image passes over to its archetype.” These seem to 
suggest that a mundane-sacred object is primarily symbolic. When we perceive an 
object, be it a text or a tree, as a mundane-sacred object, what we are doing is seeing it 
as a symbol for a transcendent of some kind. In this regard, the mundane-sacred 
object is a way o f injecting something o f the sacred-beyond into our mundane here- 
and-now. Against this, artists of the Leo Tolstoy variety might instead see the essence 
o f the mundane-sacred object in the way they see the essence of art, as a way of 
communicating feeling.^  Meanwhile, philosophers o f the R.B. Braithwaite variety 
might rather argue that its essence resides in the mundane-sacred object’s ability to 
convey moral attitudes.29 And others would offer still other essentialist definitions.
Now there are obvious difficulties with this definitional approach to the 
mundane-sacred object. Essentialist definitions, as in so many intellectual fields, are 
often vulnerable to a broad variety of counter-examples. And the same is true, to be 
sure, with respect to essentialist definitions o f mundane-sacred objects. For example, 
it is undeniable that some mundane-sacred objects are symbols, as those who follow 
Tillich might say -  yet many mundane-sacred objects cannot be said to serve that 
purpose. Consider the Buddha’s tooth in Sri Lanka. It is sacred in itself, not because 
it represents or symbolizes something else. Moreover, many objects of the world 
express feelings but they are still not mundane-sacred objects. Witness certain 
artworks, journalism, or propaganda, all of which express feelings but are not 
necessarily regarded as sacred objects. Further, there are mundane-sacred objects that
26 Whitall N. Perry, A Treasury o f  Traditional Wisdom  (Louisville, KY: Fons Vitae, 2000), 318.
27 Ibid, 321.
2S See Leo Tolstoy, What is Art?, trans. Alniyer Maude (N ew  York: M acmillan Publishing Company, 
1985).
29 See Richard Bevan Braithwaite, An E m piricist's Eiew o f  the N ature o f  R eligious B elief  (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 1955).
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do not seem to convey any moral attitude whatsoever — for instance, the beaches of 
Hawaii, which surfers worldwide see as sacred. How could a statement about the 
ocean’s waves be construed as a moral assertion? In short, none o f the above 
essentialist definitions -  of the Tillich, Tolstoy or Braithwaite variety -  seems to 
capture the “essence” of the mundane-sacred object. It remains questionable whether 
any others can as well.
A typical response to the failure of essentialist definitions, in any area of 
intellectual discourse, is scepticism. Here it is argued that, if no necessary and 
sufficient features can be found for a word, then it follows there simply is nothing 
common to define all items brought under the heading of that word. The logic behind 
this thinking seems to be: if it cannot be found, it therefore is not. We have not found 
an essence to the mundane-sacred object, so there is none.
That deduction of course is fallacious. Many have remarked that this kind of 
reasoning is tantamount to saying that the American Indians did not exist until 
Columbus discovered them, and vice versa, which is nonsense. Nevertheless, those 
who are attracted to such sceptical ratiocination might plausibly appeal to 
Wittgenstein’s notion o f “family resemblances” in order to give their scepticism a 
more positive explanatory twist, as well as to confer upon it the authority of a great 
thinker. Thus, proffering a Wittgensteinian sceptical definition, one might argue that 
there is not one feature, or set of features, that all mundane-sacred objects share. 
Rather, there is a nexus of loose resemblances between the objects, a wide collection 
of features that the various mundane-sacred objects draw upon in diverse ways, like 
the variety o f DNA available within a family line, which gives each member of the 
family a certain similarity but not a rigid identity. Likewise, one might understand the 
concept o f a mundane-sacred object as a deliberately vague but usable term, a kind of
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broad fishnet that captures a wide range o f different physical things, mountains, trees, 
paintings, men.
Closely connected with the Wittgensteinian sceptical definition is the 
institutional definition. This approach would not define a mundane-sacred object in 
terms of anything intrinsic to its nature. Instead it would delineate the mundane- 
sacred object in terms o f the external situations in which it is found: that is, its social 
and historical context. According to this definition, something is a mundane-sacred 
object if and only if it has that status bestowed upon it by members of the religious 
world. And the “religious world” could be defined deliberately vague, so as to include 
recognized religious institutions like the Roman Catholic Church to not so recognized 
entities like a new-age hippy group in Two Guns, Arizona. Anyone, in other words, 
involved in anything “spiritual” could be classified as members o f the “religious 
world” . And by being members of this religious world, they have the legitimacy to 
bestow upon any object the title of “mundane-sacred object” . In accordance with the 
institutional view, the identification of something as a mundane-sacred object would 
confer upon it a certain status but it would not serve to identify its essence. Thus, 
“mundane-sacred object” is a kind of honorific term, and does not denote anything 
that can be recognized from the mere basis of a sensory or conceptual examination of 
its nature. As for the reason why this term is bestowed will depend 011 the 
circumstances -  the social, cultural and historical features surrounding that object. 
Accordingly, all that the institutional definition tells us is that a mundane-sacred 
object happens, and that certain people recommend these kinds o f object for religious 
appreciation. But, significantly, it does not tell us why they happen, or why people 
recommend them to be appreciated as sacred.
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As for those — particularly philosophers — interested in why there are mundane- 
sacred objects, the experiential definition may prove the best strategy for grasping the 
concept. For the philosopher, the major failing of the institutional theory is that it 
confuses a sociological definition for a philosophical one. Unlike the sociologist or 
anthropologist, what the philosopher wants to know is the reason that explains why so 
many human beings have a marked propensity to call certain physical things “sacred”. 
Certainly, says the philosopher, people confer the status o f the sacred on material 
things, but why do they do so? What is it that prompts people to bestow such ultimacy 
on some things, but then not on others, within the field of their ordinary sensory 
contact?
An experiential definition o f a mundane-sacred object will most likely appeal
to the Kantian notion of the ends/means distinction (just as in aesthetics). This in
effect was what Eliade drew upon when he famously insisted:
A religious phenomenon will only be recognized as such if it is grasped at its 
own level, that is to say, if it is studied as something religious. To try to grasp 
the essence of such a phenomena by means o f physiology, psychology, 
sociology, economics, linguistics, art, 01* any other study is false; it misses the 
one unique and irreducible element in it -  the element o f the sacred.30
If we were to reduce the sacred -  or, in our case, the mundane-sacred -  to, say, class,
racial or gender exploitation, 01* to a mere totem for social organization, then we
would be forced to understand the object as a means to something else — that is, to the
goals of exploitation or socialization. Yet, if there is one nearly universally recognized
feature attributed to sacred objects, it is that they are, from the religious perspective,
perceived as ends in themselves. The value of a mundane-sacred object resides
precisely in the fact that it is not instrumental, as if the sacred were no different from
pornography, heroin or slot machines. Such objects are deemed “sacred” because they
3t> Mircea Eliade, P atterns in C om parative R eligion , trans. Rosemary Sheed (N ew  York: Meridian 
Books, 1963), xiii.
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have an inherent dignity, no matter what effects they may have on us, even when the
effects are great. As Wittgenstein pointed out, in his celebrated criticism o f Frazer, the
ritual of rain dances occur when rain is due in any case. Clearly the object of
performing such rituals goes beyond merely wanting rain because, if those who
practiced rain dances genuinely believed that performing such rituals were a viable
means for bringing rain, then they would perform them whenever the people needed
that effect, in the diy seasons as w ell.31 But plainly that is not what is done.
The point of the ritual therefore lies in itself, not in what it can do. In the
words of one of W ittgenstein’s disciples, a ritual such as:
The greeting o f the sun at the coming of day can be seen as a celebration o f its 
coming. It is not that people who, say, raise their aims at the dawning of day 
think that unless they raise their hands, the dawn will not break, but, rather, 
knowing that the dawning of the day is at hand, they want to express a
TOgreeting to it in this way.
That absence o f instrumentalism -  that desire to “celebrate” -  is a clue to the way 
these lands of object are experienced', as well as to why they are valued. It is their 
uniqueness, their end-in-itself quality that gives mundane-sacred objects the valued 
status they enjoy. Such objects prompt or express reactions like celebration, not 
weather alteration. In this way, they become demarcated from other kinds o f physical 
things.
Some, however, may contend that aesthetic and moral objects are also valued 
and experienced as ends. So what distinguishes a mundane-sacred object from, say, an 
esteemed work of secular art? They are both said to be unique; they are both said to 
be ends in themselves. So why not call these rituals “art” instead of “religion”?
31 Ludwig W ittgenstein, Remarks on F razer's Golden Bough, trans. A.C. M iles {Doncaster: Brynmill 
Press, 1979), 12.
j2 D.Z. Phillips, Religion Without Explanation  (Oxford: Basil Blackw ell, 1976), 35,
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There are, at least, two potential philosophical answers to this objection. One 
is to bite the bullet and accept that artworks and mundane-sacred objects are indeed 
no different at all. This would require that the “beautiful” and the “sacred” be 
recognized as synonymous concepts. A person who has, say, an aesthetic experience 
is really also having a religious experience, whether or not that person is aware of it.
Another way to meet this challenge is to argue that there is what might be 
called a “hierarchy o f ends” . This could mean, for example, that, a la Kierkegaard, 
mundane-sacred objects stand at the top of the hierarchy of ultimately valued entities: 
religious objects are the end, while aesthetic and moral objects reside beneath, as an 
end. In other words, those valued objects beneath religious objects, under certain 
circumstances, might be subject to what Kierkegaard called a teleological suspension 
of value, if religion should so dictate. Other philosophers, of course, may rearrange 
the placement o f the entities in the hierarchy: for example, arguing a la Plato that the 
Good is at the top, while artworks are far below, and so on.
Be that as it may, an experiential definition will appeal to the notion that a 
mundane-sacred object is defined as some kind o f end in itself, and it is this critical 
fact that confers its status as an object deserving special consideration. It is this 
criterion, in other words, that gives the object the religious status that it has.
Against this, it may be replied that so long as a mundane-sacred object has 
value it can always be re-defined as a means to whatever value it actualizes. So, for 
example, to say that the Koran is holy is only to say that it is a means to holiness; or 
to say the Ten Commandments are moral is only to say that they are a means to 
virtue; or to say that a rain dance expresses celebration is only to say it is a means to 
festivity; and so on.
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But this kind of semantic objection can be easily met by pointing out that, 
when we say that a mundane-sacred object is “not simply a means”, we are not 
intending to convey the notion that its value cannot be realized in any other way. 
Rather, we mean that the value o f the mundane-sacred object cannot be realized in the 
same way by any other thing. Furthermore, this idea coheres with the commonplace 
observation that religious people vehemently reject the notion that their mundane- 
sacred object can be substituted by something else without loss. When the Taliban 
blew apart the ancient Buddhist statues in Afghanistan, no rebuilding of another 
Buddhist statue, no matter how faithful it may be fashioned to look like the original, 
will ever stand in “just as well” for what was lost. This was because the original statue 
enjoyed an inbuilt stateliness, a uniqueness, which cannot be replaced. It was, in 
short, an end in itself - a mundane-sacred object.
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CHAPTER 3
PHILOSOPHICAL GOALS FOR ANALYZING 
RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION AND MUNDANE 
SACRED JUDGMENT
Given the similarities between aesthetics and religious appreciation in both their 
language and their treatment of objects as ends, it is clear that the kind of 
philosophical aims normally associated with the concepts o f religious experience and 
religious language are not fundamental to an analysis o f religious appreciation and 
mundane-sacred judgment. In this experience and language, we are not interested in 
an analysis which aims to prove or disprove God’s existence (or the existence o f some 
other such unearthly entity). We also are not interested in finding an argument that 
establishes the truth, relativity, or falsity of religion as such. Thus, we are not 
concerned with the typical aims in the philosophy of religion. Rather, as in aesthetics, 
questions o f epistemology and ontology, although important, recede into the distance 
as we explore two other basic goals.
First, we want philosophers to give us an account o f the unique form  o f  the 
experience that is common to the religious appreciation o f a mundane-sacred object. 
As a consequence of this request, the primary question o f a philosophical study of 
religious appreciation is not what causes this experience, but what is it like to have it. 
We want to know how we can describe this religious response to the world. What is 
the concept here? What are its phenomenological features?
Because of these kinds o f question, the philosophy o f religious appreciation is, 
as we said, like philosophical aesthetics. Just as philosophers o f art seek to explain
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what it is to have an aesthetic experience -  usually independently of whatever causes 
it -  so too we want philosophers to explain how it feels to undergo religious 
appreciation. How does it appear to consciousness? Can it be described to someone 
who has never enjoyed it?
As we shall see, religious appreciation often appears to have a pleasantly 
stimulating and contemplative character about it. It seems to involve a sense of release 
from the practical or instrumental demands of life. And it appears to prompt people to 
describe their experiences in a distinctive vocabulary. Given all that, religious 
appreciation is a religious experience rather different from the more commonly 
discussed types, like those mentioned in Chapter 1. Religious appreciation is, what 
might be called, the aesthetic dimension o f religious experience, focusing the 
religious mind on the physical dimensions of life. It imbues a man’s ordinary 
perception of the concrete world with a sense of the sacred and sublime, just as 
aesthetic experiences fill our mundane life with beauty, adventure and imagination. A 
wall, a mountain, a book — any o f these kinds of physical thing, when viewed as a 
mundane-sacred object, can have the power to exert a profound influence over a 
m an’s feelings and reactions to his sensoiy world. He becomes suffused, as it were, 
with a unique, even beautiful, kind of relation to the objects of physical existence.
The second goal o f the philosophy of religious appreciation is a philosophical 
determination, of whether there is an essence or unity to mundane-sacred objects, as 
our brief discussion about the definition of these objects hinted. Even though the 
various mundane-sacred objects around the world -  the sculptures, music, paintings, 
mountains, and so on -  are all, at one level, very different, human beings, 
nevertheless, seem to apply very similar language to them. This common application 
o f words occurs too often to be a fluke, and it is too uncontrolled to be a plot. There is
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a linguistic pattern here. Accordingly, such diction does not seem to be arbitrary. 
Religious people often choose their words carefully when describing their holy 
objects. Such curious linguistic facts raise a number o f questions, among which are 
the following:
• How can a mundane-sacred judgment -  which says, for example, that a 
physical object is sacred -  both express a fact about that object as well 
as express a feeling of the man who voices it?
• What makes a physical object o f the world “sacred” in the first place?
• Why do religious people worry and debate over the appropriate 
description of mundane-sacred objects, when evidently there is no way 
to adjudicate such disputes?
• How can a mundane-sacred object put a man in touch with the mind of 
its creator?
• How can a mundane-sacred object, which is non-sentient, express 
human feeling?
• Why do people attach value and significance to mundane-sacred 
objects that they refuse to attach to, say, athletic objects or 
gastronomy?
These kinds of question advise us that the goal of this branch of the philosophy of 
religion is partly to provide an explanation regarding the nature o f religious 
appreciation, the nature o f mundane-sacred judgment, and the unity of mundane- 
sacred objects — and not to prove God’s existence or provide a justification or 
refutation o f religion. There is, then, more to the philosophy of religion than those 
endeavours.
Now, because there has been little or no discussion o f religious appreciation 
and mundane-sacred judgment within philosophy, it is difficult to know where to 
begin when approaching this subject. Where does one start?
Perhaps, the answer is this.
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One ought to borrow the model provided by philosophical aesthetics, an 
accumulated wisdom about a feature o f the human condition spanning more than two 
thousand years. By looking at what philosophers have said about art, aesthetic 
experience, aesthetic objects, and aesthetic language, we shall fairly well anticipate 
the problems, debates, and theories that a philosophical discussion will dig up 
concerning religious appreciation, the mundane-sacred object, and mundane-sacred 
judgment. Following that model, the potential field o f philosophical debate will divide 
into three sections, which mirrors the typical aims o f aesthetics. Put concisely, those 
aims are:
(I) to explain the salient issues surrounding the nature of religious 
appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment;
(II) to identify the concepts and questions that are fundamental to a 
philosophical understanding of mundane-sacred objects; and
(III) to examine some general theories that might further explain the 
essence of religious appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment.
By pursuing those three goals, we will be well on our way to delineating the general 
philosophical field of religious appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment. To that 
end, we now turn.
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CHAPTER 4
SALIENT ISSUES IN RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION 
AND MUNDANE-SACRED JUDGMENT
The Distinct Experience o f Religious Appreciation and Its Language
Let us begin by considering the first philosophical goal in the philosophy of religious 
appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment, which is to elucidate the prominent 
aspects o f this experience and language. As we saw, there are eye-catching analogies 
between aesthetic judgment and mundane-sacred judgment. Accordingly, the kind of 
analysis we find in philosophical aesthetics proves, so it would seem, the most fruitful 
means by which to understand this rather earthy religious experience. In this chapter, 
we shall start by borrowing ideas from David Hume’s and Immanuel Kant’s great 
works in aesthetics, applying their ideas to our own subject -  and then developing our 
discussion from there.33
A Humean-Kantian paradigm for religious appreciation entails two
fundamental claims: first, this explanatory model suggests that mundane-sacred
judgments presuppose a special mental faculty, what we have been calling “religious
appreciation”; and second, the model suggests that the qualities that a mundane-sacred
judgment attributes to a mundane-sacred object are, ultimately, subjective. That is to
say, any mundane-sacred judgment — for example The cast o f  the Buddha ’s footprint
is jo y  -  includes two basic features: first, the man who sincerely voices the statement
is exercising the mental faculty of religious appreciation, that is, he is activating a
particular mental inclination which allows him to appreciate, using our example, the
33 See any publication o f  David Hum e’s “O f the Standard o f  Taste” (1756) and Immanuel Kant’s “The 
Critique o f  Aesthetic Judgment”, part I o f  The Critique o f  Judgm ent (1790).
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jo y  in the footprint; second, his attribution of the quality o f “joy” to the cast is not the 
result of seeing that quality as an objective property of that object. In accordance with 
this model, the quality is as subjective an attribution as the beauty Don Quixote 
ascribes to the shabby Dulcinea.
Now why do we say that mundane-sacred judgment involves “religious 
appreciation”? For what reason should we postulate a distinct “experience” alongside 
this language?
One reason is that a mundane-sacred judgment appears to result from a fe lt  
response to an object o f the sensory world; it stems from a personal encounter with 
and appreciation o f a particular thing. We noted that this physical thing can be a road, 
a mountain, a scripture, a tree, or anything else of the terrestrial world which is, for 
whatever reason, deemed sacred and worthy of reverence, and which in turn sparks a 
certain kind o f verbal comment. Importantly, this felt response may be authentic or it 
may be inauthentic. That is, a mundane-sacred judgment may be voiced sincerely, in 
the way that Don Quixote’s declaration o f love for Dulcinea is genuine; or it may be 
asserted insincerely, like Don Juan’s sham avowals o f devotion for his female prey. 
Now this capacity for authentic versus inauthentic assertions helps bolster the claim 
that there is a kind o f personal experience that is present when a mundane-sacred 
judgment is sincerely uttered about an object. Otherwise, without the possibility of an 
authentic appreciation for a particular thing, how do we explain the possibility to 
speak with forked-tongues about mundane-sacred objects? How would we be able to 
assent to a judgment without actually believing or feeling what it expresses? 
Obviously, because we can do this -  and because we can and do have radically 
different mental states associated with such religious statements -  it suggests the 
existence of particular psychological experiences potentially associated with certain
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mundane-sacred judgments. It is for this reason that we are inclined to believe that the 
sincere mental state, as against the insincere one, is the “experience” to be described 
within the wider category o f “religious experience”. It is a special kind of religious 
relation to the world.
A second reason to say mundane-sacred judgment involves religious 
appreciation is related to the fact that there does not appear to be any universal criteria 
by which people voice this kind of language. If there were such global rules for the 
assertion of a mundane-sacred judgment, then there would be general propositions 
from which we could infer a mundane-sacred judgment. On the mere basis of the 
sensory and non-religious properties of a mundane-sacred object, the most 
thoroughgoing atheist would be able to deduce logically that the road to Zion has the 
quality of mourning from the premise that the road is leading to Zion. He could 
simply look at the road’s sensory qualities and thence come to the understanding that 
it is mourning.
But that is nonsense. Clearly, no such rules are universally accepted. 
Accordingly, we say that religious taste or appreciation is present in this religious 
language because no general propositions on their own can be adduced to justify  a 
mundane-sacred judgment, or to validate a particular reaction to that object. Rather 
some kind of personal experience is needed to explain these sentences. Hence we 
need to posit some mental state — and not something in the external world — to make 
sense o f this language. That mental state we are calling religious appreciation.
O f course, the absence of general rules does not mean there are simply no 
respectable generalizations we can offer. Psychology, sociology, history, and 
anthropology — all o f these, to be sure, recommend cogent causal explanations as to 
why a man voices a mundane-sacred judgment about some physical object.
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Undoubtedly, there are also legitimate generalizations to be made about the historical 
causes and reactions to mundane-sacred objects. But these kinds of historical and 
social explanations are proffered from a different experiential plane than a religious 
man’s spontaneous mundane-sacred judgment about a particular thing of which he is 
in direct contact. The religious man’s language stems from an immediate experience, 
welling up inside him from his unswerving confrontation with an object he regards as 
an end in itself. And that is a very different kind of relation than any historian’s or 
sociologist’s statements and responses about that object. The absence of rules, then, 
only means that we cannot give necessary reasons why any given man, from any 
psychological or sociological background, must utter a particular mundane-sacred 
judgment about a particular mundane-sacred object.
Having said that, though, this does not imply that there are no justifications for 
these religious assertions. Certainly it remains plausible that mundane-sacred 
judgments are justified on a basis other than universal criteria: for example, a 
mundane-sacred judgment might be justified on the existentialist ground that it 
enlivens one’s personal experience o f things, making the world more interesting, 
adventuresome and poetic.
Let us return to one o f our basic questions. What is the nature of religious 
appreciation? What is its essence? How does it differ from other religious 
experiences? Has it been spoken of before, or are we just inventing a religious 
experience, pulling a rabbit out o f a magic hat, as it were? Surely any answer to these 
questions will be controversial. Even so, that should not deter us from giving it an 
initial shot. Indeed it is only from the presentation o f rough theories that better 
theories are born.
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So, in order to press forward, let us assume -  for now -  that religious 
appreciation involves something akin to what philosophers have regarded as the basic 
nature of aesthetic experience. That is, religious appreciation entails a direct 
confrontation with a sensory object that is valued as an end itself. From this, we can 
also deduce that the experience of religious appreciation is a non-practical or non- 
utilitarian state of mind, since the mundane-sacred object is not a means toward some 
other end. Moreover, we noted that this religious experience involves a fe lt response. 
We also said that this felt response can be experienced by people that are ordinarily 
classified as religious as well as by people that are typically judged to be secular. It is, 
as it were, an equal opportunity experience. Furthermore, religious appreciation 
consists of a certain kind of excitement, craving, awe or pleasure in a physical object; 
it arouses our emotions, and somehow this is intimately connected to our sensory 
experience.
Hence, at its minimum, religious appreciation is a sincere, non-cognitive, 
non-practical, emotion raising, not necessarily sectarian, sensoiy response to a 
terrestrial object regarded as an end itself.
That is a rough definition.
Now, having roughly defined religious appreciation, the other pressing 
question we need to face is whether something like this experience has been spoken of 
before within philosophy. We already gave two arguments as to why we ought to 
surmise the presence of an “experience” associated with mundane-sacred judgment. 
Now we need to ask whether this experience is a category made up out o f nowhere. Is 
the concept just pure speculation without any prior philosophical discussion?
In answer to this, three brief descriptions — from three notable philosophers -  
about a kind of experience that can be fairly interpreted as the experience of religious
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appreciation, even if for no other reason than their discussions do not seem to fit into 
any of the other more recognized categories of religious experience, are presented 
below.
The eminent philosopher Ludwig Wittgenstein appears to have been
susceptible to the experience of religious appreciation. Wittgenstein once “said that he
sometimes had. a certain experience which could best be described by saying that
‘when I have it, /  wonder at the existence o f  the world. I am then inclined to use such
phrases as ‘How extraordinary that anything should exist!’ or ‘How extraordinary that
the world should exist!’”34 Wittgenstein also remarked elsewhere:
If the believer in God looks around & asks “Where does everything I see come 
from?” “Where does all that come from?”, what he hankers after is not a 
(causal) explanation; and the point of his question is that it is the expression of
3 5this hankering. He is expressing, then, a stance towards all explanations.
“A stance towards all explanations”, - in this passage, Wittgenstein does not spell out 
the nature of this “stance”. He simply calls it a “hankering” (Verlangen). But is it too 
much of a stretch to call it instead, “religious appreciation”? Does Wittgenstein’s 
“wonderment at the existence o f the world” not sound like the experience we have 
been describing? If not, in which other category should it be classified? When 
Wittgenstein said “I am not a religious man but I cannot help seeing every problem 
from a religious point of view”,36 it seems plausible that what he was getting at was 
something like the experience that we are describing. That religious appreciation is an 
experience capable of being enjoyed by people who are not “religious men” 
recommends this interpretation. In short, Wittgenstein seemed not only to have
34 Norman M alcolm, L udwig Wittgenstein; A M em oir (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2001), 59.
35 Ludwig W ittgenstein, Culture and  Value, trans. Peter Winch (Oxford: B lackw ell Publishers, 1998), 
97e.
36 Quoted in Norman M alcolm, Wittgenstein: A R eligious P oin t o f  View? (London: Routledge, 1997), 
I .
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mentioned an experience very much like religious appreciation; he also seems to have 
experienced it.
Something o f this sentiment was also reflected in the words of the Australian 
philosopher, J.J.C. Smart, who said, " ... my mind often seems to reel under the 
immense significance this question [about the origin o f existence] has for me. That 
anything exists at all does seem to be a matter of the deepest awe.” Like 
Wittgenstein, the experience to which Smart is pointing seems to involve many of the 
basic elements we said comprise the concept o f religious appreciation; for, like 
Wittgenstein, Smart’s experience appears to be a non-practical, felt response of awe 
before an object of the world -  the universe -  that was deemed an end in itself or the 
ultimate question, something that caused his discursive mind to spin out. To speak of 
awe and wonderment at the universe, as Smart and Wittgenstein do, or to speak of 
breathtaking amazement at particular objects within the universe, is a common 
religious experience. But do we have a philosophical concept for it? Many of us are 
prone to this kind o f felt reaction to the material world. Moreover, this attitude, 
expressed by both the religious and the secular, seems to be a kind of mental state in 
itself, or at least capable o f being demarcated from other kinds of religious mental 
state. That perhaps is another reason to believe that religious appreciation is not only a 
phenomenal fact of human life, but also a useful concept to explicate that fact of 
human life.
The dialogical philosopher Martin Buber provides a third example o f this 
experience. Buber also acutely recognized the way religion attributed value to 
concrete, sensory experience. Throughout his career, Buber recommended to his
37 J.J.C. Smart, “The Existence o f  God”, Church Q uarterly R eview  156 (1955): 194, quoted in W illiam  
Lane Craig, “Philosophical and Scientific Pointers to Creatio ex N ih ilo '\ in R. Douglas Geivett, et. al„ 
eds., C ontem porary P erspectives on Religious E pistem ologv  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 
185.
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readers -  whether they were theists, like his friend Franz Rosenzweig, or atheists, like
his admirer Albert Camus -  the need to look for fulfilment in the here-and-now,
among the ordinary things of life. As an example, consider the passage below, which,
like W ittgenstein’s and Smart’s statements, can plausibly be interpreted as suggesting
the salient role religious appreciation (although not Buber’s term) plays in the wider
experience of religion.
Most of us achieve only at rare moments a clear realization of the fact that 
they have never tasted the fulfilment o f existence.... We nevertheless feel the 
deficiency at every moment, and in some measure strive to find -  somewhere 
-  what we are seeking. Somewhere, in some province o f the world or o f the 
mind, except where we stand, where we have been set -  but it is there and 
nowhere else that the treasure can be found. The environment which I feel to 
be the natural one, the situation which has been assigned to me as my fate, the 
things that claim me day after day — these contain my essential task and such 
fulfilment o f existence as is open to me. It is said of a certain Talmudic master 
that the paths of heaven were as bright to him as the streets of his native town. 
Flasidism inverts the order: It is a greater thing if the streets of a m an’s native 
town are as bright to him as the paths of heaven. For it is here, where we 
stand, that we should try to make shine the light of the hidden divine life.
If we had power over the ends of the earth, it would not give us that fulfilment 
of existence which a quiet devoted relationship to nearby life can give us. If 
we knew the secrets of the upper worlds, they would not allow us so much 
actual participation in true existence as we can achieve by performing, with 
holy intent, a task belonging to our daily duties. Our treasure is hidden beneath 
the hearth o f our own home.38
Flere Buber talks about the “fulfilment of existence” and the “treasure” which is given 
to us by “a quiet devoted relationship to nearby life”. These are, to be sure, vague 
terms, as indeed is the passage as a whole. However, what Buber describes -  this 
religious encounter with “nearby life” -  could very well be understood by those ideas 
we are associating with religious appreciation. What Buber is saying sounds like a 
direct, non-cognitive, non-utilitarian, fulfilling confrontation with objects of the
Martin Buber, H asidism  and Modern Man (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 
1988), 164-165.
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sensory world, which are in turn deemed as ends in them selves,39 indeed so much so 
that it is as if they possessed the “hidden divine life”, as if they “fulfilled existence”. 
This way of experiencing mundane things is certainly not mysticism, or prayer, or 
conversion, or any of the ordinarily discussed religious experiences. So what religious
experience is it? Let us at least consider that it is a possible example o f religious
appreciation, as perhaps were the examples gleaned from Wittgenstein and Smart.
It is philosophically fruitful to stop at this experience o f wonderment, awe, and 
fulfilment of existence, pausing to contemplate its widespread appearance in human 
responses, especially in religion. It raises a number of philosophical questions.
• Why do people have this experience?
• What must be true about the world that human beings should react in 
such a way?
• How should the experience be described?
• With what might the experience be compared?
Perhaps because this experience so often appears before consciousness as a non- 
cognitive state, philosophers quickly jump past it, assuming it to be nothing more than 
the emotional motive behind the more serious discursive business of proving or 
disproving the existence of God. However, this experience is something in its own 
right, deserving its own philosophical analysis, and that is a primary reason why the 
concept of religious appreciation is valuable -  and the subject o f a doctoral 
dissertation.
O f course, the citation of a passage does not conclusively demonstrate that its 
author experienced the mental phenomena which we are calling religious 
appreciation, or that he would even wish to describe it as such. Any description of
jt> See Buber’s /  and Thou, an extended essay on these psychological attributes o f  the “I-Thou 
relationship”.
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another’s experience will be open to interpretation. Nevertheless, even if only one 
man concurs that religious appreciation is a phenomenal fact in his life, if  only one 
man agrees with the suggestion of this thesis, that he has experienced a mental state 
like that which we have described as religious appreciation, then we do indeed appear 
to have, in this world, a religious experience that exists (at least, in phenomenological 
appearance), and so is worthy o f our philosophical contemplation. Moreover, it cannot 
be denied that the examples cited from Wittgenstein, Smart and Buber are open to an 
interpretation that is, at the very least, sympathetic to the idea of religious 
appreciation. Even that weaker claim still helps make the case that there is such an 
experience as religious appreciation within the wider concept of religious experience.
Religious appreciation is no rabbit pulled out o f the philosopher’s box of 
tricks. It may very well be an experience that has been around some time, but just has 
not been named and philosophically studied. We should also state that what we have 
cited as the basic features o f religious appreciation does not mean that we cannot add 
more features to it. A Buddhist, for example, might add that the experience ought to 
be identified as a state distinct from the metaphysical liberation from the flawed idea 
o f selfhood. Other religions, with a differing background of metaphysical 
assumptions, will obviously incorporate other features to the experience, describing it 
in different ways. Philosophers, too, will no doubt insert their own ideas into their 
interpretation of the experience, just as they have with respect to their various 
descriptions of, say, aesthetic experience or mystical experience. One can imagine, for 
example, a Heideggerian suggesting that the experience of religious appreciation has 
the ultimate effect o f “disclosing being”, or whatever.
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In any case, whatever else may be added or subtracted, we now at least have a 
rudimentary theory of the nature of religious appreciation, and we also have some 
reason to believe that others may have described it and experienced it.
Objectivism and Subjectivism
Return now to mundane sacred predicates and ask the question whether mundane- 
sacred predicates refer to properties that are objective or subjective. That is, let us ask 
whether the qualities we attribute to mundane-sacred objects are properties inhering in 
those objects separate from our minds. If we entrust ourselves to the doctrine of 
objectivism, then we are committed to the view that mundane-sacred predicates 
signify external properties which dwell in objects independently o f our consciousness. 
In contradistinction, if we entrust ourselves to subjectivism  then we believe that an 
object can be described under a mundane-sacred predicate because it produces in us a 
certain kind of response. For the subjectivist, the cast o f the Buddha’s footprint does 
not really have the property o f joy; the road to Zion does not really mourn; Gregorian 
chant is not really sad. Rather, such material objects prompt us to have an experience 
which in turn inspires us to voice mundane-sacred judgments. What divides the 
objectivist from the subjectivist is a metaphysical orientation, a radically different 
view of the ultimate nature of things.
The objectivist will argue that religious appreciation consists o f obtaining 
knowledge about a mundane-sacred object’s qualities through the application of 
perception. Depending on the metaphysical theory, the perception o f the object’s 
qualities may be said to be a result o f our sensory organs coming into contact with the 
object, with our sensory faculties somehow apprehending the “mourning” of a road, 
the “sweetness” of the ocean, the “joy” in a footprint. Or, under a different 
metaphysical theory, the perception of these qualities may be said to be the product of
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a “sixth sense” , a supernatural perceptual capacity that an elect few enjoy, such as 
Buddhas, Arhats, Mystics and Prophets. This objectivist theory, although unlikely to 
be widely adopted in contemporary secular academia, need not seem terribly 
implausible or grossly superstitious. Conceivably, an epistemology based on 
rationalism, rather than empiricism, might be able to construct a reasonable idealist 
argument in its favour. Since if, as some versions of rationalism hold, all mental ideas 
are cognitions, and if an idea such as “joy” is a cognition of a real property shared by 
all joyful objects, then it stands to reason that, if a mundane-sacred object is a 
potential species of joyful objects, then we are perceiving the species of joy in that 
object, as our mundane-sacred judgment literally asserts.
A subjectivist, o f course, will think all this is sheer sophistry. According to 
subjectivism, in religious appreciation the subject is the only thing affected; the object 
itself is not in a state of mourning or joy or any other psychological state. Moreover 
the subject’s response — the effect that the object produces in him — is not the result o f 
perceiving the object’s properties. A subjectivist may concede that the response of 
religious appreciation is a result of encountering the object, which includes any 
features the object has. But to the subjectivist these features are merely part o f the 
cause o f the psychological response o f the subject, not the “religious” properties that 
the mundane-sacred predicates signify. Those religious qualities attributed to an 
object by a mundane-sacred judgment exist purely in the mind that contemplates 
them. Ironically, subjectivist interpretations o f religious appreciation may be more 
consistent with an empiricist epistemology because empiricism — crudely put — 
conceives the human mind as a kind of reactive container of ideas that are gleaned, 
developed and combined from our sensory contact with the perceptual features of the 
world, and, in this view, the religious qualities of a mundane-sacred object are “semi-
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sensory”, combining the ideas which our sense organs pick up from the world with 
our innate emotional and imaginative powers that are projected outward.
Arguments in Favour o f Subjectivism
Several arguments can be adduced in support of a subjectivist theory of religious 
appreciation. One argument provides that, as Hume emphasized with regard to 
miracles and aesthetic taste,40 there is substantial variation between what different 
individuals and cultures religiously appreciate. The range and disparities in judgment 
about mundane-sacred objects and the apparent absence of any agreed rules as to what 
counts as a correct judgment together fortify the idea that mundane-sacred predicates 
do not denote features inherent in objects. These judgments simply reflect personal, 
subjective or cultural points of view.
An objectivist, however, would quickly counter that differences o f  opinion are 
present in all types of discourse, even scientific discourse, so this standard cannot 
justify singling out only mundane-sacred judgment as subjective. Furthermore, an 
objectivist also might argue that the qualities of mundane-sacred objects are 
mysterious, and therefore they are available only to a chosen few who meet the 
special conditions necessary for discerning the object’s esoteric qualities. An observer 
o f a mundane-sacred object might, for example, have to be free  from  sin or negative 
karma in order to apprehend its religious features.
But a subjectivist could well respond that those conditions may be necessary 
for other kinds o f religious experience, such as mysticism or prophesy, but mundane- 
sacred judgments are uttered by millions of people, even by those who are not 
religious practitioners; such statements are even asserted by those who are
40 David Hume, “O f the Standard o f  Taste”, in O f the Standard o f  Taste, and O ther Essays, ed. John W. 
Lenz (Indianapolis: Bobbs-Merrill, 1965).
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presumably fraught with sin and negative karma. So, whatever the nature of this 
experience, it is certainly not an elitist religious experience, as is mysticism or 
prophesy. Accordingly, in this case, we cannot postulate some type o f religious 
aristocracy, as it were.
Another argument substantiating subjectivism is that religious appreciation 
often includes sensations o f pleasure. And pleasure, being a felt response, is not a 
cognitive state o f mind; it is not a proposition about the way things are. A feeling, as 
Kant pointed out, assigns nothing at all to the make up o f an object; it is a reaction to 
an object.41 So if a felt response is a necessary condition for a sincere mundane- 
sacred judgment, how does the objectivist explain that objective properties necessarily 
produce these responses? The objectivist seems to want to say that mundane-sacred 
judgments merely result from a cool observation o f the properties of a mundane- 
sacred object. But religious appreciation is not always, if ever, such a dispassionate 
inspection of an object. It is full offe lt response, which means it has emotion and thus 
may not be cognitive at all.
A related argument, which one suspects neo-Wittgensteinian and dialogical 
philosophers might put forward, is that objectivism confuses the point of religious 
appreciation. Objectivism argues that a mundane-sacred judgment aims to mirror 
reality; a “correct” judgment will therefore reflect the way things are about an object. 
But the point of religious appreciation has nothing to do with whether a mundane- 
sacred judgment connects us with an impersonalised world; that is, as it really is. 
After all, in religious appreciation what we want -  and indeed what we express -  are 
the rewarding I-Thou relationships that we enjoy with sacred objects, like the kind of
41 “Every reference o f  representations”, thought Kant, “is capable o f  being objective, even that o f  
sensations (in which case it signifies the real in an empirical representation). The one exception to this 
is the feeling o f  pleasure or displeasure. This denotes nothing in the object, but is a feeling which the 
Subject has o f  itself and o f  the manner in which it is affected by the representation”. The Critique o f  
Judgement* trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952), 42.
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gratifying relations we have with our fellow man or with God. Under these 
circumstances, notions o f “objective reality” versus “subjective appearance” are 
simply irrelevant conceptual distinctions, since the subjective relation is why we 
cherish this experience in the first place.
Problems with Subjectivism 
Having said all that, there is a potentially unappealing consequence to an unqualified 
subjectivist interpretation of religious appreciation. It would seem that a mundane- 
sacred judgment offers us no more than a testimony o f one’s own mental state. It is, at 
best, narcissism, at worst, solipsism. Consequently, you might describe some scripture 
as “holy”, while I might describe it as “evil”, but there would be no means to 
differentiate between who is correct. Each of us would be living in our own little 
private world, speaking our own little private language. Thus religious appreciation 
would be something that we could not rationally debate. And so, all the disagreements 
that we do find between various mundane-sacred judgments would need to be 
explained as sheer human folly, as yet another futile exercise in disagreement.
Subjectivism then would, it seems, help vindicate the much-maligned logical - 
positivist view o f religion. If subjectivism is true, mundane-sacred predicates are 
employed not in order to make statements of fact, but to express certain feelings and 
induce certain human responses. As a result, there is no sense in ascribing logical 
soundness to mundane-sacred judgments, or to bother arguing about them because 
this kind o f language is, in the end, logically equivalent to exclamations like “wow” 
and “yuck”, words that merely express personal likes and dislikes. If I say the wall is 
holy, then this mundane-sacred judgment logically means nothing more than an 
exclamation such as: “The wall -  yippee!”
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Yet, as in aesthetics and ethics, the logical-positivist theory of mundane-sacred 
judgment conflicts with common sense. A phrase like “The wall is holy” does not 
seem to translate logically into “I like the wall”. The former undoubtedly means more 
than my feelings. What is more, religious people by and large certainly do not use 
their mundane-sacred judgments to point merely to themselves, to their own mind-set, 
to their own emotional joyrides. Whether we agree with them or not, religious people 
frequently regard their mundane-sacred judgments as accurate assertions, which 
others may dispute. Accordingly, they proffer reasons other than their likes and 
dislikes when they justify their inclination to call, say, a wall “holy” or an ocean 
“sacred”.
The plain fact is most of us do believe that a judgment about the sacred nature 
of a wall or an ocean is incompatible with another judgment that would call them 
“evil” . As the bare grammatical structure of these sentences implies, we wish to say 
something about the mundane-sacred object itself and, hence, not something about 
ourselves. When a man advances a mundane-sacred judgment he will presume that 
others will, or perhaps ought to, agree with him. Should they not, he may feel that this 
merely indicates an absence of religious appreciation or religious taste on their part, a 
kind o f blindness to the holiness of things. Or he may think that through further 
discussion he will be able to persuade them to see the object as he does, or perhaps be 
persuaded by them to change his mind, language and reactions.
Because our use of language suggests that a mundane-sacred predicate is more 
than a subjective grunt, more than an avowal o f personal likes or dislikes, the 
philosophical question then becomes: how, if we are to remain committed to the 
ordinary practice o f language, do we maintain the subjective character o f religious
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appreciation without falling into raw subjective scepticism of the logical-positivist 
variety?
To answer this, there are a number o f proposals.
One of those proposals we might call the Humean Theory because it is 
borrowed from David Hume’s ideas on aesthetic standards.42 Here we would argue 
that the standard for accepting some mundane-sacred judgments — like “The Western 
Wall wails” — while rejecting others -  like “The Western Wall smiles” — results not 
from something inherent in the mundane-sacred object itself, but from something in 
the sensibility o f the human being who makes that statement. Under this view, nature 
or God or something has placed certain relations between the form o f mundane-sacred 
objects and human reactions. Some particular objects are calculated or arranged in 
such a way so as to spark our religious appreciation, while others are designed to 
remain neutral, or even to displease or frighten us 43 Furthermore, some people have 
greater sensibilities with respect to these objects than do others; those with wide and 
broad sensitivity react energetically, enjoying deep religious appreciation of things, 
while those o f dull and tired sensibilities remain lethargic and bored even in the face 
of the most glorious mundane-sacred object. For this reason, a “correct” mundane- 
sacred judgment is one that comes from a delicate sensibility working within ideal 
conditions. This also means that a correct mundane-sacred judgm ent will not identify 
properties inhering in objects, nor will they merely declare a m an’s subjective 
experience. Rather a mundane-sacred judgment conveys that some given object
42 See, again, “O f the Standard o f  Taste”.
43 One thinks o f  Edgar Allan P oe’s terrified protagonist in The Fall o f  the House o f  Usher, when he 
writes o f  his reactions to the ghoulish appearance o f  the house: “I was forced to fall back upon the 
unsatisfactory conclusion, that w hile, beyond doubt, there are  com binations o f  very simple natural 
objects which have the power o f  thus affecting us, still the analysis o f  this power lies among 
considerations beyond our depths. It was possible, I reflected, that a mere different arrangement o f  the 
particulars o f  the scene, o f  the details o f  the picture, would be sufficient to m odify, or perhaps to 
annihilate its capacity for sorrowful im pression ...” The F all o f  the H ouse o f  Usher, and Other Tales 
(N ew  York: Signet Classic, 1998), 110.
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possesses a certain quality that uniquely counts it among those objects of the world 
that are calculated -  by God or nature -  to evoke a certain kind o f response in some of 
us.
Thus, on the Humean theory of religious appreciation, we have before us a 
kind o f spiritual elitism. A mundane-sacred judgment is correct when it is uttered by 
the most sensitive among us, when it is said by those most attuned to the qualities of 
mundane-sacred objects. The rest of us, meanwhile, ought to conform to the 
judgments of our betters should we desire our mundane-sacred judgments to be 
“correct”.
All this no doubt raises the questions about who is the most sensitive, what 
qualities does he have, and how can we agree on this. Even if  we concede that there 
are psychological differences between our own minds and others, and even if we grant 
that there are sociological differences and social hierarchies between members o f our 
society -  even if we concede all that, why should we defer to the judgment of others? 
What establishes their authority? Why should we regard someone else’s judgment as 
having a more compelling claim to correctness than our own? The Humean theory 
may offer us causal, sociological or psychological reasons as to why we do often 
defer to the mundane-sacred judgments o f others; but this theory fails to explain why 
we ought to do so.
This theoretical affliction we might call, “the nonnative problem of mundane- 
sacred judgment” . In confronting this problem, we might begin by looking to Kantian 
philosophy for an answer 44 If we follow Kant’s theory of aesthetic judgment by 
applying it to mundane-sacred judgment, we come up with a potential strategy for 
dealing with the normative quandary. To see this, we need to take seriously, as Kant
44 Immanuel Kant, The Critique o f  Judgment.
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most certainly would have, the idea that implicit in mundane-sacred judgment is the 
demand fo r  agreement. When one voices a mundane-sacred judgment there is a 
transcendental supposition that all other people, without exception, ought to concur 
with one’s appraisal o f the mundane-sacred object.
Suppose when making a mundane-sacred judgment that we divorce everything 
that might relate to our contingent, individually varying constitutions, so as to base 
our judgment entirely on conditions that are universal. This would ground our 
mundane-sacred judgment on things about the mundane-sacred object that are 
necessarily accessible and common to the consciousness o f all persons. Now what are 
those things that all o f us, from whatever culture or time, have in common when 
confronting a mundane-sacred object? Those commonalities according to a Kantian 
would be, one, the bare perceptible form  o f  the mundane-sacred object; and, two, the 
mundane-sacred object's relationship to our basic and universally shared capacities 
o f  perception and understanding.
Before we dispute this, and it is indeed a contentious claim, at least let us 
follow the Kantian theory, whose philosophical originator was nobody’s fool.
To ascertain the correct mundane-sacred judgment, then, the first step is to 
focus on the above two basic features of the object and our minds, stripping away all 
that is not universal in both. This makes way for the second step, which is the freeing 
of our awareness o f the object from our desires and practical concerns, as well as 
freeing us from our conceptual -  and often grossly prejudiced — scheme for 
understanding the objects o f the world. By focusing 011 the common perceptual 
properties o f the object under our common perceptual understanding, we attain in the 
third step a “universal” or “disinterested” standpoint out o f which we can apprehend 
the mundane-sacred object. From here, we could say that we now see the mundane-
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sacred object as a “Thou”, to borrow Buber’s term. The object, as it were, steps up to 
us in its singularity, liberated from our own petty and narcissistic wants and uses and 
concepts. When these strict stipulations are satisfied, when we become free from our 
own contingency, the judgment we make of the mundane-sacred object is valid for 
everyone. And thus we have what might be termed a “pure mundane-sacred 
judgment” o f religious appreciation. This is what we can call a “correct” judgment, 
thus rendering impotent the normative problem that has been upsetting us.
Such an argument, o f course, rests on the dubious Enlightenment supposition 
that we all share a “common sense”, and that our abilities for the felt response of 
religious appreciation are the same. In that regard, it is interesting to note that where 
the Humean theory for overcoming the normative problem of mundane-sacred 
judgment is aristocratic and elitist, the Kantian theory is radically egalitarian. The 
question then becomes: is this Kantian egalitarianism supported empirically?
Clearly, a sceptic of the Bertrand Russell type, even if he aims for the Kantian 
“universal standpoint”, will most likely never respond to a Russian Orthodox icon in 
the way that, say, Dostoevsky would have. Moreover, this account o f mundane-sacred 
judgment necessitates that everything except the form  o f a mundane-sacred object be 
stripped away, whereas in nearly all religious objects content is essential for our felt 
response and judgment. So the Kantian theory seems to leave us with a rather 
impoverished view of the nature of religious appreciation, focusing our attention on 
features that may not be what makes this experience emotion raising and valuable in 
the first place.
Whatever their particular flaws, the Kantian and Humean theories at least offer 
us the basic strategy for dealing with mundane-sacred judgment. However we 
ultimately flesh it out, its bare bones will resemble something like what has been set
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forth in aesthetics: first, we compromise with the subjectivist, agreeing that mundane- 
sacred judgments are in some way dependent on mental states of liking and disliking; 
but, second, we deny that mundane-sacred judgments are logically reducible to 
judgments of liking and disliking; so that, third, we maintain that mundane-sacred 
judgments also transcend judgments o f pure personal liking and disliking. From here, 
to be sure, the Humean and Kantian theories will send us into two different theoretical 
directions. If we follow the Humean path, we will -  somehow — arrive at a 
philosophical position that grounds religious appreciation on the contingent and 
natural features of our minds. If we follow the Kantian path, we will — somehow -  
arrive at the philosophical position that grounds religious appreciation on the 
necessary and universal dimensions of the human mind. The chief advantage of the 
Humean theory is that it avoids a radical subjectivism, but the trade off is that it 
generates the normative problem. While the chief advantage o f the Kantian theory is 
that it successfully meets the nonnative problem, it does so at the unwelcome cost of 
excluding many o f the important psychological and cultural ingredients that make our 
subjective responses to mundane-sacred objects less than universal.
Against the backdrop of the Humean-Kantian framework, are a number of 
other theories that could be inspired by Wittgenstein’s Lectures and Conversations on 
Aesthetics, Psychology and Religious B elief45 Some of these other ways of 
conceiving the meaning of mundane-sacred judgment and the degree to which it is 
subjective are briefly presented below.
45 Ludwig W ittgenstein, Lectures and C onversations on A esthetics, P sych ology and Religious Belief, 
com piled from notes taken by Yorick Smythies, Rush Rhees and James Taylor, ed. Cyril Barrett 
(Oxford: Basil Blackw ell, 1997).
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One theory could be borrowed from Scruton’s “affective theory”,46 which 
owes much to Kant and Wittgenstein. Notable about this theory is its denial of 
mundane-sacred judgments as descriptions, an idea we shall be exploring in fuller 
detail in later pages. Under this view, although mundane-sacred judgments share the 
grammatical form of ordinary declarative sentences, they do not make statements of 
fact. The mundane-sacred predicate attributes no property whatsoever to the 
mundane-sacred object. So, pace  their grammatical form, the deeper logical structure 
of these sentences is closer to the practice of gestures and exclamations. Hence, such 
sentences convey or express a certain kind of personal experience, rather than an 
assertion about the nature o f a thing. Nor are these sentences instrumental. In the 
words o f Beattie: “Instrumental activity is directed to bringing about some desired 
state o f affairs; it is oriented towards an end. Expressive activity is a way o f saying or 
expressing something; usually some idea or state o f mind.”47 In light of the 
application of that idea to mundane-sacred judgment, it is incorrect to speak about the 
“religious qualities” of a mundane-sacred object. Instead it is more profitable to 
describe the experiences and responses of religious appreciation, which are expressed 
by mundane-sacred judgments. Our philosophical goal, then, is to elucidate what this 
experience is like, how mundane-sacred objects affect us — and not to investigate the 
alleged properties of these objects or how we must agree on a correct judgment about 
them. To justify these statements is to elucidate their “acceptance conditions” as 
opposed to their “truth-conditions” .
The “affective theory” contrasts with Ruby Meager’s theory of aesthetic 
judgment, another theory we can try to apply to mundane-sacred judgments.48 Unlike
46 See Roger Scruton, A rt and Im agination: A Study in the P hilosophy o f  M ind  (South Bend, Indiana: 
St. A ugustine’s Press, 1998).
47 J.H.M. Beattie, O ther Cultures (London: Routledge & ICegan Paul, 1966), 71.
4S See Ruby Meager, “Aesthetic Concepts”, British Journal o f  A esthetics  10 (1970), 303-22.
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the affective theory, if we borrow Meager’s proposals, we will contend that a 
mundane-sacred judgment does indeed have the logical role o f a description about the 
qualities of an object. However, the function o f these sentences is to assign powers to 
certain objects. In other words, it is a way o f stating that an object has the ability to 
spark certain kinds of experiences in a person. Thus religious appreciation will be 
defined as an interest in an object that promotes particular types of responses. The 
mundane-sacred object itself, meanwhile, does not have any special “religious 
qualities” such as sacredness or holiness, nor does it have expressive features like 
sadness, mourning or joy. Instead these are only our subjective responses. Even so, 
the object does have the ability to promote these kinds o f predication.
For those who are unhappy with the Meager theory, thinking it perhaps too 
subjective, we might try to develop another theory, which suggests that the qualities 
attributed to mundane-sacred objects have roughly the same degree of subjectivity as 
colours. This indeed would salvage us from an extreme subjectivism; for, just as 
perception o f colours seems to subsist somewhere between the Self and the Other, so 
too perhaps does a quality like sacredness or an expressive feature like sadness reside 
neither wholly in me nor wholly in the mundane-sacred object. This idea would 
probably be the least subjective analogy we could draw, if it can be drawn at all. 
After all, there is certainly a severe disparity between the passions in our 
disagreements over the colour o f a thing versus the broadness and harshness in our 
disagreements over whether something is sacred. If we are going to say that the 
qualities attributed to a mundane-sacred object are like colours, then we need to 
explain why debates over colour are fewer and less contentious than debates over the 
application o f mundane-sacred predicates. Perhaps, as an answer to this problem, a 
proposal that only those people who have the special kind of perception required for
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the apprehension o f these qualities will be satisfying. But that proposal returns us to 
the troubles found in the elitist point of view.
Another proposal could be to deny that these qualities are like colours that 
necessitate a special perception. Instead the qualities are like aspects, like our 
experiences o f Gestalt ambiguous figures. Like aspects, these appearances found in 
the mundane-sacred object, and denoted by mundane-sacred predicates, seem to exist 
neither wholly in the subject nor wholly in the object. Under this view, then, we 
escape unqualified subjectivism by denying any talk o f the “qualities” of mundane- 
sacred objects in favour o f talk about their “aspects” . This would make better sense 
than seeing an analogy with colours, because, in order to perceive an aspect, you do 
need some cognitive background, supplied by prior conceptual and, possibly, cultural 
frameworks. Such features are perhaps more congruent with what is involved when 
people assert mundane-sacred judgments, hinging as they do on a wider network of 
linguistic and cultural assumptions. A man who has never heard o f or seen a duck 
would most likely never recognize the duck-aspect in a Gestalt figure. Similarly, a 
man who has never heard of the Buddha would most likely never begin to see the 
“joy” in a sculpted cast of the Buddha’s footprint. And so on.
To conclude, all of these theories -  be they derived from Kant, Hume or 
Wittgenstein — have their merits and demerits. Still, it would be philosophically 
worthwhile to see how contemporary philosophers would develop these proposals -  
and others of their own.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCEPTS IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF 
MUNDANE-SACRED OBJECTS
Return now to the issues surrounding the qualities and nature o f mundane-sacred 
objects. O f the many conceptual problems afflicting the philosophy o f art, there are 
several that easily transfer to a philosophical discussion o f the concept of a mundane- 
sacred object. For example, there are the perennial questions surrounding the aesthetic 
notions o f representation, expression, interpretation and intention, and all these 
concepts have direct applicability to the objects o f religious appreciation. Since 
mundane-sacred objects include paintings and sculptures, the concept of 
representation becomes crucial for our understanding of religious reactions to these 
phenomena. Similarly, since mundane-sacred objects include music and chant, the 
concept of expression also becomes fundamental, as do the concepts of interpretation 
and intention, since, after all, a significant category of mundane-sacred object is the 
literature known as “scripture”. How scripture -  perhaps the most significant 
mundane-sacred object — is interpreted is undoubtedly a basic question of religious 
appreciation. As with aesthetics, there are also questions concerning the priority of 
mundane-sacred objects, as well problems surrounding their ontological make up.
All of these questions taken from the philosophy o f art will be briefly 
surveyed below, before we consider some o f the general theories that may answer 
them.
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The Problem o f Representation 
Turn first to the potential philosophical question surrounding the concept of 
representation within the concept of the mundane-sacred object. Among the most 
prevalent mundane-sacred objects within the world religions are pictorial 
representations and sculptures, visual phenomena that depict sacred things and sacred 
people. When a pious Christian looks at a painting of Jesus, for instance, he does not 
merely see splashes of colours and random geometrical figures on a two-dimensional 
canvas. Rather he has a very particular visual experience. Out o f the colours and 
Euclidean shapes, he sees Jesus nailed to the cross.
But how?
How can a painted canvas present a man with a visual object such as the 
suffering of Jesus? More generally, how do paintings represent things? This question, 
fundamental to the philosophy o f art, is even more basic than the issue about the 
iconographic and religious meanings of such images. Prior to confronting a painting’s 
symbolic and sacred meaning, we might wonder first about how this more basic 
ingredient of representation fits into religious appreciation.
There are a number of conceivable solutions, borrowed once again from the 
philosophy of art. Intuitively, we say that pictorial representation consists of 
resemblance. The painting o f Jesus on the cross looks like Jesus on the cross. Its 
realism is dependent on the extent to which the painting actually is similar in looks to 
Jesus -  or, if barring that, then it looks similar to how any man nailed to a cross would 
look.
However, such a theory, although commonsensical, hardly does justice to the 
religious experience. For one thing, dots o f colour spread out on a two-dimensional 
surface have nothing like the physical proportions of an actual man hammered to a
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cross. For another thing, few Christians ever sincerely claim that some painting of 
Jesus looks like the real Jesus, knowing full well that we do not know what he 
actually looked like. So this theory, if it is to be persuasive, needs some more 
development.
Another explanation, a rather radical one, is that pictorial representation has 
nothing whatsoever to do with perception. Instead, the seeing o f Jesus in the picture is 
entirely conventional, like the understanding of a sentence in a natural language. 
Representation is a kind of linguistic denotation; and understanding and seeing what a 
picture depicts is nothing other than an issue of interpretation. For instance, to see 
Jesus in the painting requires a prior understanding of the “symbol system” of 
Christianity. Only by knowing this system do we come to understand what the 
painting is imparting to us. Under this view, the religious appreciation o f a mundane- 
sacred object demands prior familiarity with the religious institution in which it is 
found.49
This explanation, however, as with all philosophical explanations, is 
questionable. Road signs, prose narratives, and maps also denote scenes. But, unlike a 
painting, they do not produce the kind o f visual experience that we seem to have when 
we look at a painting. By negating its visual image, the forgoing theory seems to blur 
this distinction, prompting us to conclude erroneously that reading a prose description 
of Jesus nailed to the Cross is the same kind of experience as actually seeing it on 
canvas. Moreover, it appears quite evident that even someone who has never heard of 
Jesus or the institution of Christianity can, if he has eyes, perceive a painting of Jesus 
(and perhaps come to see it as a sacred object). At its most basic level, religious 
appreciation is open to anyone with functioning sense organs. Indeed this was one of
49 N elson Goodman, Languages o f  A rt (Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing Company, 1976).
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the features that we said distinguished a mundane-sacred object from a transcendent- 
sacred object like a God or Nirvana. So this “ linguistic/convention theory” seems to 
be rather weak in explaining the sensoiy feature of religious appreciation.
Another potential theory o f representation is that the visual experience of 
seeing Jesus on the Cross is a kind of illusion.50 True, it is a visual experience. But it 
is one produced through the painting’s power to create an illusory image. Now how 
does it have this capacity? One answer might be that our ability to see the illusion is 
based on an historic process of visual “schemata” that we have inherited throughout 
the history of art. In other words, we see the illusion of Jesus on the Cross because the 
particular arrangement of geometrical shapes before our eyes has, over the years, 
come to represent, though not resemble, the object o f Jesus. This is why we are able 
to identify an image o f Jesus whether he is depicted like a pale Scandinavian or a 
darker skinned Native American.
This is an attractive idea. But, again, there are some problems with it. One is 
that, if  the visual experience of seeing Jesus on the canvas is an illusion, would we not 
then mistake the image for a reality, as the ordinary concept o f an illusion would 
suggest? Yet, when looking at a painting of Jesus, we do not ordinarily make that kind 
o f mistake. There is never any question that what we are seeing is the real Jesus really 
nailed to the real Cross. So, concerning the representation o f Jesus, our experience 
cannot be some kind o f an illusion, at least not as that term is usually understood. A 
second problem is that, when looking at a painted canvas, we do not always lose 
awareness of the canvas when we see the picture.51 Indeed, the artistry of its brush 
strokes can itself, at times, become an object o f reverence and religious admiration, as
50 Emst. H. Gombrich, A rt and Illusion  (London; Phaidon, 1977).
51 See Richard W ollheim , On A rt and the M ind  (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974); 
The M ind and its D epths (C am bridge , M ass.: H arvard U niversity P ress , 1983); Painting as an A rt 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1990).
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is the case with masterful Islamic calligraphy or the images found in Japanese Zen 
paintings. We must deduce from this that religious appreciation may involve a 
simultaneous awareness of both the material out of which the mundane-sacred object 
is made and its representational content.
One o f today’s greatest philosophers of art, the recently departed Richard 
Wollheim, has suggested that pictorial representation comes about through the 
activation of a special mental capacity that is tied to man’s organic ability to imagine. 
When asked how do we see a portrait in a painting, the simple answer is that we do 
so because innate imaginative perception gives us the power to see Jesus in the 
painting. Wollheim entitles this special kind of imaginative perception -  “seeing-in”. 
To make the case for this idea, he first noted that one o f the features o f pictorial 
representation is that it depicts objects that are either not present (as in the case of 
Jesus) or non-existent (as in the case of, say, a surreal Salvador Dali painting). But 
these alternatives -  between what is not present and what is non-existent -  are 
something we also experience when hallucinating, dreaming, and daydreaming. So 
can it be, asked Wollheim, that our power to perceive pictorial representation derives 
from the same mental capacity that allows us to see dreams, daydreams, and 
hallucinations? Evidently, the human mind possesses a peculiar capacity to produce 
visual experiences out o f  itself Given that, it seems plausible that, when we see the 
picture of Jesus on the canvas, what we are doing is imaginatively seeing  Jesus in the 
external world of a mundane-sacred object. It is a kind o f projection of our 
imaginative minds onto a canvas whose dots of colour possess just the right properties 
and arrangements that allow the image to manifest before our eyes. Thus, the visual 
experience of seeing a man nailed to a cross is mingled with the perception of an 
exterior, physical object made out o f dotted colours and shapes. Under this view,
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religious appreciation suffuses the material world with our innate, organic imaginative 
abilities.
As interesting as all these ideas are, let us leave them for other philosophers to 
consider, and now turn to another potential question in the analysis of religious 
appreciation, the problem of expression.
The Problem o f Expression 
As we noted, throughout the world’s religions we find inanimate mundane-sacred 
objects -  like musical works, paintings, plays, sculptures, scriptures, mountains, trees, 
and so on -  described by words such as sad, joyful, happy, blissful, calm, and so forth. 
The employment of such terms to describe physical, inanimate things is intellectually 
curious. Why do religious (as well as secular) people describe these inanimate objects 
by terms we normally use to describe human emotional and psychological states? 
Apparently, there are expressive features inherent in mundane-sacred objects. But, in 
what way are they integral to the physical object? And, how are these features related 
to our experience o f religious appreciation? The philosophical problem here is that 
religious people, provided, of course, they are not under a metaphysical belief in some 
kind of pantheism or animism, apply emotional terms to mundane-sacred objects 
without contending that these objects actually have emotions. To say, for example, 
that “the road to Zion mourns ” makes no literal sense: a road cannot have an emotion 
or any other psychological state for that matter. Nevertheless, it is said to be 
“mourning”.
How is it possible for such an object to express that kind o f emotion? Why do 
religious people show a repeated tendency, across culture, space and time, to describe 
their inanimate sacred objects in such emotional ways? What kind o f experience 
makes it appropriate to use such language?
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There are at least three answers.
One answer, which we shall largely ignore in this dissertation, is that the 
objects themselves do in fact feel emotions and other human mental states. This 
would cohere with certain pantheistic beliefs.
Another reply might be that mundane-sacred objects possess these features 
because such objects act as instruments for expressing the emotions o f their author, be 
that author a god, an angel, a demon, a man, a spirit, or whatever. Here the mind of 
the author, the object’s creator, explains why people might be tempted to describe, for 
instance, a road as mourning or a sculpture as joy. The sculpture is called joy because 
its creator was striving to express his own joy, his own mental experience. The road is 
said to be mourning because its developer is or would be in mourning should he see 
what is happening to his creation.
However, this theory still does not settle the issue because it fails to answer 
the question as to how this alleged author, however powerful this author might be, is 
able to use raw matter, or paints, or rocks, or patterns of sound, or anything that has 
no mind, to express mind. This theory requires an immensely elaborate metaphysical 
explanation, one that many may be disinclined to concede, and quite reasonably.
A final theory suggests that these sacred objects have the power to stimulate 
emotions in the religious observer. Somehow the objects emotionally move us as we 
face them. For instance, we call a mundane-sacred object “sad” because it arouses a 
melancholy feeling in us. So when I say, “the road to Zion mourns”, what I mean is 
that something about that road makes me mourn. Under this theory, it is my mind, it 
is /  the onlooker, which explains the psychological use o f these terms. Hence, unlike 
the two previous theories, it is not the mind of the road or the mind of its author that 
bestows sense on our choice of expressive language. It is the self.
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But this cannot be right either; for it does not follow that because I describe 
some sacred music as “sad”, I therefore feel sad myself. I can listen to a sacred chant 
and call it “melancholy” -  and yet not feel the slightest bit melancholy. The plain fact 
is that a man does not necessarily experience the emotion expressed by the mundane- 
sacred object, at least not in the same way as he does in daily life.
It seems, then, that the emotional or psychological term cannot be attributed to 
either the author o f the mundane-sacred object or to its spectator, or to the object 
itself. Does this mean that it floats somehow between the three? If so, how?
To avoid this conundrum, we may wish to deny that mundane-sacred objects 
express emotion at all, but nevertheless argue that they continue to produce emotional 
effects on their spectators. ~ That is, perhaps, what is happening in this use of 
language is that such objects cause emotions in some people, but to be susceptible to 
this causal power is an entirely personal or cultural association that has nothing to do 
with the actual physical properties o f the object. Accordingly, when religious people 
describe their inanimate mundane-sacred objects with emotional terms, they are under 
a kind of subjective or communal illusion. And, as a result o f this illusion, the 
appropriate object of appreciation might be the illusory form  o f these sacred objects, 
and not the particular emotion that we think it expresses. It is doubtful, though, that 
this theory will satisfy those who experience religious appreciation, since expressive 
descriptions might be felt to be essential for the religious value and meaning of the 
experience.
Another suggestion, then, is that the expressive qualities o f mundane-sacred 
objects should be understood in light o f our ordinaiy practice of language.53 
According to this view, then, the application of these terms would be metaphorical.
52 Eduard Hanslick, On the M usically Beautiful, trans. Geoffrey Payzant (Indianapolis: Hackett, 1986).
N elson Goodman, Languages o f  Art.
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Now this, the idea of metaphor, is an intuitive explanation that most of us are 
probably inclined to advance. However, the experience o f religious appreciation 
seems to involve more than a metaphorical explanation allows. When listening, for 
example, to a Gregorian chant or to the sound of a melancholy Yom Kippur service, 
our descriptions of “sadness” are not merely metaphorical. After all, our experience o f 
these objects can be highly emotionally stimulating, which makes our use o f 
emotional language under these circumstances always more than an abstract 
association of unlike things. Moreover, the appeal to the concept of metaphor hardly 
mollifies our philosophical worries, since the concept is itself an intransigent 
philosophical problem.54 Unfortunately, when appealing to metaphor as a way out of 
this expressivist problem, we are simply trading one conundrum for another.
Perhaps another theory is that we describe our mundane-sacred objects using 
emotional and psychological terms because we see analogies between these objects 
and human behaviour. We recognize emotional features in both phenomena and, 
consequently, describe them with similar language. For example, when we say a Yom 
Kippur chant is “sad” what we mean is that the music resembles the emotionally 
expressive qualities o f humans when they are sad -  their bodily movements, their 
speech patterns, their facial expressions, and so on. In other words, there is a 
phenomenologically similar experience between, on the one hand, seeing and hearing 
sadness in your neighbour’s bodily movements or sound o f voice, and, on the other 
hand, hearing the sadness o f a Yom Kippur chant.
Nonetheless, like so many arguments from analogy, this theory has problems 
in establishing precise resemblances. What, for example, are the features that music, 
bodily behaviour and voice inflections all share? Which qualities, moreover, does a
34 What is metaphor? What is its nature?
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man in mourning have in common with a road in mourning? Or, if there are analogies 
between human behaviour and inanimate sacred objects, why am I inclined to call the 
slow beat o f a Yom Kippur chant “sad” rather than “cautious”? It would seem we 
would need to first experience the mundane-sacred object as expressive before we can 
imaginatively see it like the human form.
Yet another theory of expression is that the human mind has a tendency to 
extend itself across the world.55 Some objects o f the world -  somehow — are fixed by 
nature to receive these emotional terms. There is a natural correspondence between 
human emotions and physical objects. Our minds are pre-established to think that 
some inanimate objects “fit with” psychological language. In this way, religious 
people can describe their mundane-sacred objects in emotional terms because these 
objects are among those items of the universe that are amenable to our emotional 
states.
Perhaps.
The Problems o f Interpretation and Intention
Now, even if one o f the above theories can answer the problems surrounding the 
representational and expressive features of mundane-sacred objects, there is the wider 
question of their meaning, which we have yet to consider. What is the significance of 
any given mundane-sacred object? What is it trying to convey? And, how can we 
appropriately interpret its meaning?
Take any of the world’s scriptures. Any one o f them has been subject over the 
centuries to innumerable interpretations, both within and without the religious 
traditions in which they are found. It is not always clear how we might successfully 
adjudicate between these various and often-contradictory interpretations. Are the
’5 On one interpretation this seem s to be, in part, David Hume’s point o f  view  in “O f the Standard o f  
Taste".
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Gospels truly written by Mathew, Mark, John and Luke, the actual disciples of Jesus, 
or were they composed at a later date by unknown authors? Is the Pali Canon the true 
and only word o f the Buddhist teaching, or do the later Mahayana scriptures also 
enjoy legitimacy? Is the Song o f  Songs a collection of poetiy about man’s loving 
relationship to God, or is it merely ancient erotic literature?
Such divergent interpretations of mundane-sacred objects naturally raise two 
basic questions: Does biographical information about the author o f a mundane-sacred 
object provide sufficient evidence for or against a particular interpretation? And, is it 
philosophically legitimate to speak about the correct interpretation?
Modem philosophy offers us two competing positions for the first question: 
anti-intentionalism and intentionalism.56 Anti-intentionalism contends that it is a 
fallacy to suppose that information about the author of a work -  or, indeed, any 
external information such as the culture in which it is produced -  can provide us with 
the mundane-sacred object’s meaning.57 Under the anti-intentionalist persuasion, the 
only information that is relevant to its meaning is found in the mundane-sacred object 
itself. Meaning dwells objectively in the sacred object. Careful attention to the words 
of a scripture, assiduous meditation on the sounds of holy music, or vigilant 
observance of an icon -  all this kind of devoted behaviour - is the strategy which will 
provide us with what we need to determine the mundane-sacred object’s meaning and 
value. According to anti-intentionalism, then, we cannot legitimately infer a fact 
about a mundane-sacred object from a psychological fact about its creator. The two 
are independent; for what is most important is that there is an inherent dignity to the
5f1 The discussion o f  intentionalism versus anti-intentionalism o f  the mundane-sacred is m odelled after 
Sabastian Gardner’s excellent introductory essay “A esthetics”, in Philosophy 1: A Guide Through the 
Subject, ed., A.C. Grayling (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001), 607-609.
57 See W.K. Wmsatt and Monroe C. Beardsiey’s classic essay, “The Intentional Fallacy”, in David 
N ewton-De Molina, ed., On Literary Intention (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1976).
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mundane-sacred object. And, therefore, its meaning transcends any information we 
might glean about its author.
Intentionalism, by contrast, contends that the meaning o f any mundane-sacred 
object must take into account what the author of the work intended. Ultimately, the 
meaning is what its creator meant. So, where anti-intentionalism holds that the 
mundane-sacred object enjoys autonomy, a kind of sacredness in itself, intentionalism 
would have us believe that the meaning of a sacred object is dependent on its point of 
origin. If somehow it turns out that Mathew, Mark, John and Luke were written in fact 
by, shall we say, Marcus Aurelius then this fact will have an overwhelming bearing 
011 the meaning of Christian scripture, decisively altering how we should understand it 
because, for the intentionalist, textual meaning is authorial meaning. And, so 
whatever Emperor Marcus Aurelius might have meant when writing the Gospels is 
what we ourselves should understand today as its correct sense.
An anti-intentionalist, on the other hand, argues that an object, if it is to be 
interpreted as sacred, ought to be judged in terms of the experience one has when 
interacting with it, no matter who wrote it. To call some book a “scripture” rests 
primarily on our relationship with that text, that singular thing before us which elicits 
the kind o f experience that prompts us to call it a scripture. And, its status as a 
scripture, therefore, stands or falls depending 011 its capacity to produce particular 
kinds of religious experience in people. Today, for instance, 110 one regards Homer’s 
Iliad  as a scripture. It is considered a “classic”. And this is because the text no longer 
generates the kind of experiences that would need to be present for it to earn that 
special religious status known as scripture. Hence, whatever Homer may have meant, 
or wanted his epic to mean, is completely irrelevant today in interpreting its
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significance. We need to look to the living situation surrounding the text in the here 
and now, if we are to grasp its religious implications.
The intentionalist may counter that, when a work is regarded as scripture, then 
the author’s meaning is indeed relevant. When such conditions are present -  when we 
actually do hold a certain text as a scripture -  then consideration and awareness of the 
intentions o f its author are fundamental. The intentions carry pertinent information 
about how we are to understand the sacred words. To say that Jesus’ intentions 
underlying the Sermon on the Mount are inconsequential to that mundane-sacred 
object’s meaning is potentially to misunderstand the will o f  God, a mistake that could 
very well have profound consequences. Indeed, according to some versions of 
Christianity, we could suffer eternal damnation if we misconstrue the author’s 
intentions. We also cannot forget that, when mundane-sacred objects like scriptures 
are interpreted, we very often describe them by way o f concepts like sincerity, 
eloquence and wisdom., concepts that seem to imply attributes o f an author, which are 
now manifested in the scripture. Given these facts, it is simply not the case for the 
intentionalist that we can ignore the creator of an object and, in so doing, elucidate its 
meaning by simply attending to its inherent texture. It is not so subjective. We will 
have to look beyond our own experience in order to glean the text’s import; we will 
have to look to its biographical, historical and cultural surroundings.
In plainer language, if you agree with intentionalism, then you will believe 
that the meaning of mundane-sacred objects includes an investigation into the 
disciplines of biography, psychology, history and anthropology, and any other factors, 
conscious or otherwise, which add to the production o f sacred objects. But, if you 
agree with anti-intentionalism, then none o f these offer important information for their
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significance. You will feel that your direct experience with the object is all you 
require for uncovering its value and importance.
Turn now to the second question, which is whether we can say there is a correct 
interpretation of a mundane-sacred object. Again, we seem to be faced with a two­
fold response to this question. One response is that there is for every mundane-sacred 
object -  for every scripture, for every holy song, for eveiy mantra, for every sacred 
tree -  one and only one correct interpretation. And this is true quite independent of 
whether or not we can identify that unique meaning. For convenience, call this the
c q
Monist Theory of Interpretation.
The other view, o f course, is that there are several justifiable interpretations, 
maybe even an infinite number of valid points of view. Each one o f them, no matter 
how contradictory or inconsistent with any other, can enjoy legitimacy, and thus 
prompt compelling religious experiences. Under this view, the mundane-sacred object 
is a kind o f vehicle for stimulating an explosion of views, ideas, emotions and 
creativity. Let us call this the Pluralist Theory o f Interpretation.59
The monist idea o f a “correct interpretation” presupposes that mundane-sacred 
objects possess objective and determinate meanings. That assumption, though, is far 
from obvious. After all, from where does this determinacy derive? Even if we make 
the supposition that every individual word in some given scripture has a determinate 
meaning -  and this is dubious because of the prevalence o f metaphor in religious 
discourse -  then we still would be left with the question o f its overall meaning. What 
do the words all together signify? When we approach the text as a whole -  for 
instance, by comparing the Gospels of Mathew, Mark, John and Luke -  surely there
58 Again, from Sebastian Gardner’s essay, “Aesthetics” .
5<) Ibid.
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will be a variety o f potential meanings which go beyond, as it were, the dictionary 
meanings o f the individual words comprising the individual Gospels. Indeed, the 
whole scripture may be deemed greater than the sum of its parts, and thus when we 
confront a mundane-sacred object as a totality, we face the possibility o f several valid 
interpretations. That fact, according to the pluralist, proves that we cannot speak of 
the correct interpretation.
A monist might reply to this with two arguments. First, he could contend it is a 
fallacy to conclude that, because there are competing interpretations, it therefore 
follows that there simply is no correct interpretation. At best, the pluralist argument 
justifies a kind o f interpretative agnosticism. We simply do not know if there is a 
single right point of view. Consequently, the pluralist is deducing more than the 
evidence warrants. Second, assuming intentionalism is true, then the meaning o f a 
scripture -  or any other mundane-sacred object -  will be determined by the intentions 
of its author. Accordingly, the correct interpretation can be said to be the one that 
mirrors those intentions.
O f course, the pluralist may wish to dispute the assumption that authorial 
intention supplies the determinate meaning, as we discussed earlier. He may also 
counter-argue that part o f the concept of scripture -  or any other mundane-sacred 
object for that matter -  is that it is a text whose purpose is to elicit religious responses 
in its readers. An individual scripture is valued as scripture because it communicates 
something to us as individuals. It has personal meaning. And, since persons differ 
widely from one another, we ought not to expect one singular importance to be given 
to any mundane-sacred object. Each man, each one of us, will construe the text as his 
own unique nature sees fit. There is simply 110 reason to say that there is an accurate 
interpretation, which we should all embrace. Such a postulation closes a man off
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from the wonderful possibilities inherent in the religious appreciation of mundane- 
sacred objects.
Perhaps some, when reading the above statement, will think of Jacques 
Derrida and his celebrated philosophy of deconstructionism, a form of anti- 
intentionalist pluralism M) Something o f this theory, of course, is also found in the 
literary and post-colonial theories of Edward Said.61 According to such postmodern 
thinkers, there is no absolute determinate meaning in any context. We have nothing 
that could act as an objective criterion that would help us decipher appropriate or 
“true” interpretations from inappropriate and false ones. Ultimately, this is because 
meaning is created rather than discovered through such traditionally philosophical 
methods as analysis and logic. According to this view, not only the mundane-sacred 
object but also life itself is comprised o f a plethora of “narratives”. What is more, the 
narrative that happens to be received as true is merely opinion backed by the 
maximum power structure, as Nietzsche and Foucault point out.62 In reality, a 
mundane-sacred object will exist for the sake o f interpretation, not the other way 
around. And thus, contrary to Enlightenment assumptions, when we interpret 
something like a mundane-sacred object, we are not uncovering its hidden meaning. 
Like gods, we are making it.
Nowadays, many will find the anti-intentionalist pluralist position liberating, a 
way o f freeing man from the shackles o f orthodoxy, convention, and conservatism, a 
way of deepening our tolerance for one another’s different points o f view, a way of
60 Terms, again, taken from Sebastian Gardner’s “A esthetics”.
61 Edward W. Said, O rientalism  (N ew  York: Vintage Books, 1979).
62 Friedriche N ietzsche, “The Will to Power as Art”, in The Will to P ow er, trans. Walter Kaufmann, et. 
al, (N ew  York: Vintage Books, 1968); M ichel Foucault, The Archaeology> o f  K now ledge and the 
D iscourse on Language, trans. A. M. Sheridan Smith (N ew  York: Pantheon Books, 1972); Language, 
Counter-M emory, P ractice - Selected  Essays and Interviews, trans. Donald F. Bouchard, et. al., ed. 
Donald F. Bouchard (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1977); P ow er/K now ledge: Selected  Interviews 
and O ther Writings, trans. Colin Gordon, et. al., ed. Colin Gordon (N ew  York: Pantheon Books, 1980); 
Politics Philosophy Culture - Interviews and O ther Writings, trans. Alan Sheridan, et. al., ed. Lawrence 
D. ICritzman (N ew  York: Routledge, 1988).
84
welcoming in the marginalized, the occupied, and the oppressed. On the other hand, 
others, particularly if they are o f a monist inclination, might find the pluralist view 
preposterous, perhaps even dangerous, as it seems to strip us o f objective criteria, 
leaving us, as it were, with an “anything goes” attitude. The monist will contend that, 
as a consequence of anti-intentionalist pluralism, Saint Francis’ interpretation of and 
reaction to the Song o f  Songs would be no more valid than if, say, a paedophile were 
to read it as a work about child seduction that justifies child rape. Taken to its logical 
conclusion, says the monist, anti-intentionalist pluralism ceases to be a mere academic 
theory and becomes abjectly obnoxious and depraved.
Further P roblem s w ith  Scripture, M y th  and  R elig ious D ram a  
Let us leave the ongoing Monist/Pluralist debate, and turn to another potential dispute 
in the analysis of mundane-sacred objects. This one concerns how we are to 
understand non-literal statements in scriptures, myths and religious dramas. Historical 
criticism o f the Jewish and Christian scriptures, for example, has famously called into 
question their authorship and dates of composition. Many modern Christians and Jews 
no longer believe these works were written as they have traditionally been conceived, 
as directly produced by God or God’s disciples and prophets. Interestingly, though, 
this fact has not managed to alter the scriptural status of these books. Many devout 
Jews and Christians, nevertheless, deeply embrace these texts as scripture, rather than 
as classics like Homer’s Iliad. Why?
How is it that these religious people can continue to see these historically 
inaccurate works as scripture? If you discover that your own beloved scripture is not 
the direct work o f the deity you believe in, but instead was written at some later point 
by some unknown authors, would you not then be inclined to reject it as a scripture, 
perhaps downgrading it to the status o f a classic, or maybe even worse? Yet, if you
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did not demote it, if you, nonetheless, continued to see it as a scripture, a number of 
questions are raised. Such as:
• Why do scriptures use language in such a way as to make deliberately fictional 
or mythological statements?63
• Do these assertions make authentic statements about a world that happens to 
be mythological? Or, do they only appear to make such statements?
• Are there mythological worlds, and, if so, how do they relate to our own?
• What does it mean to make statements about those worlds? To what does this 
language refer?
• Why are some people able to regard mythological statements, as scripture, as 
sacred truth, while others cannot?
• How can events and characters in scriptures emotionally move religious 
people, when they believe that these events and characters are not real, that 
they never actually happened as the stories depict?
In short, how do some devout Jews and Christians continue to have religious
experiences with texts they regard as fictional? A basic contention in phenomenology
and cognitive psychology is that, in order to have emotional responses, we must first
have beliefs out o f which those responses can arise. To feel envious, a man must first
believe someone else possesses something desirable that he does not have; to feel
anger, he must first believe he has been affronted; to feel fear, he must first believe
something is threatening him. Without these beliefs, a man’s emotional responses
would not occur. Emotions grow out o f what one believes about the nature of things.
But, here is the rub. If I am reading the Torah, or if I am watching a play re-enacting
the events o f the Bhagavad-Gita, I know that what is before me is not a set o f true
(>J W ittgenstein had an interesting answer to this with regard to the Gospels. He remarked: “Queer as it 
sounds: the historical accounts o f  the Gospels might, in the historical sense, be demonstrably false, & 
yet b elief would lose nothing through this: but not because it has to do with ‘universal truths o f  
reason’! rather, because historical proof (the historical proof-game) is irrelevant to belief. This message 
(the G ospels) is seized on by a human being believingly (i.e., lovingly): that is the certainty o f  this 
“taking-for-true”, nothing else. The believer’s relation to these m essages is neither a relation to 
historical truth (probability) nor y e t  that to a doctrine consisting o f ‘truths o f  reason.’ There is such a 
thing. -  (W e have quite different attitudes even to different species o f  what w e call fiction)!” Culture 
anti Value, 37e-38e.
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historical statements. How then do I continue to feel emotion, to experience religious 
appreciation, when confronting these fictional mundane-sacred objects? Should not 
my knowledge, my lack o f belief in its actuality, prevent my emotional and religious 
reactions? For many it does not. Why?
Because many o f us do respond emotionally to mythological statements, even 
though we know that the events are not true or have not actually happened, it appears 
to follow that the experience of religious appreciation that manifests when 
confronting mythological stories includes the same kind o f mental state of belief that 
is found when we encounter objects of the actual world. It is perhaps, as Coleridge 
famously put it when describing the psychological state of the average theatre patron, 
a “willing suspension o f d isbelief’. Or, if what Coleridge suggests is not the case, 
then it seems to follow that, in experiencing the religious appreciation o f these 
mythological objects, we are not genuinely feeling emotion.
But neither o f these alternatives -  Coleridge’s suggestion or the idea that we 
are not sincerely feeling emotion -  seems acceptable. The first is negated by the fact 
that religious appreciation is not a pathological disorder; the second, by the fact that 
common sense and introspection verily that we are indeed experiencing emotions and 
reactions. So the question remains: how can 1 have the experience of religious
appreciation, exhibiting emotional responses, about things and events that I believe 
have never actually happened? This is a question for philosophers of religious 
appreciation to pursue.
A related issue concerns the role of tragedy in certain mundane-sacred objects, 
such as scripture, mythology, religious artworks, and religious drama. The concept of 
tragedy is, o f course, an important category in the philosophy of literature and art, but 
it is also very much present in various religious traditions. Events of a terrible and
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unpleasant nature are repeatedly represented and invoiced by the world’s religions. 
Think of the savage nailing of Jesus to the Cross, the tales o f the brutal Sikh wars, the 
many revered testaments relating the butchery of martyrs, the torturing o f innocent 
Job. Never mind how we can be moved by these gruesome stories. Let us ask instead 
why mundane-sacred objects should be representing them at all! What draws us to 
these harrowing narratives, these frightening depictions about things we would 
ordinarily want to avoid and ignore in real life? Why do so many religious traditions 
have what might be called “tragic” mundane-sacred objects? How is it that so many 
religious groups use mundane-sacred objects to draw our attention to the macabre?
A Platonist, and perhaps even some Buddhists, might answer that the 
emphasis on religious tragedy is actually a kind o f mental sickness. Religious 
traditions, which emphasize tragic mundane-sacred objects, do us a disservice. For 
they nurture those irrational parts of our soul that rejoices in fierce and feverish 
emotions, which is a most unphilosophical way to lead the good life. For a Platonist, 
such mundane-sacred objects distract us from dispassionate contemplation of the 
Good; for some Buddhists, from the Calm.64
In contrast, an Aristotelian might argue that religious tragedy indeed inspires 
visceral horror and pity, but this has a healthy cathartic effect on us. It frees us from 
our deep-seated, turbulent, and violent emotions. It provides a kind o f therapeutic 
venting of our own real worries. And, it stays the hand of our impieties and 
murderous impulses. Without these stories, mankind would be even more brutal, 
inasmuch as we would be compelled to emit these primitive cravings into reality — 
rather than into story, into myth and into intellectual contemplation.
64 “Corpse meditation” in som e Buddhist traditions, however, might accurately be interpreted as tragic 
mundane-sacred objects.
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Readers of Nietzsche’s masterpiece, The Birth o f  Tragedy,63 might contend 
otherwise, arguing that we are attracted to mundane-sacred objects depicting 
revulsion and violence because such objects unite the terrifying aspect o f our world 
with the divine and sublime which underlies it. To paraphrase Nietzsche, religious 
tragedy is the taming of the horrible; it “reminds us of another existence and a higher 
pleasure”.66 When we voluntarily read about the martyrdom o f a saint, the butchery of 
a god, the slaughter of the innocent, the enslavement of our ancestors, what we are 
doing is recalling that despite the awfulness and absurdity o f our world, despite our 
individual mortality and vulnerability, and despite the losses and betrayals of our 
loved ones, despite all this, there is nevertheless a life-saving force permeating 
existence, penetrating our worst experiences, promising a more elevated way o f being.
Naturally, this view contrasts sharply with Nietzsche’s predecessor 
Schopenhauer, whose followers might argue that religious tragedy is, in fact, the only 
true thing to be found in religion.67 Tragic mundane-sacred objects expose the sheer 
nothingness o f life, its futility, its vanity, its wretchedness. The value of religious 
tragedy therefore lies in its painful honesty, which prepares us for our own inevitable 
annihilation. Thus, the lesson of any tragic mundane-sacred object is that we should 
resign from life and detach from this world. Somehow we know that we should cease 
our clinging, stop our pointless striving after the transient objects of our world; and, it 
is this unconscious understanding about the pointlessness of things that explains our
Friedrich N ietzsche, The Birth o f  Tragedy , trans. Walter Kaufmann (N ew  York: Vintage Press,
1966).
66 Ibid.
67 See, e.g., Arthur Schopenhauer, “Additional Remarks on the Doctrine o f  the Suffering o f  the World”, 
in Parerga and Paralipom ena, Vol. 2, trans. E.F.J. Payne (Oxford: Claredon Press, 2000), 302. Therein 
he says, “Nothing is more certain than that, speaking generally, it is the great sin o f  the w orld ; and here 
1 refer not to the physical empirical connection, but to the metaphysical. According to this view , it is 
only the story o f  the Fall o f  Man that reconciles me to the Old Testament. In fact, in my eyes, it is the 
only metaphysical truth that appears in the b o o k ...”.
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voluntary choice to read about and contemplate religious tragedies -  according to 
those o f a Schopenhauerian disposition.
A more sunny interpretation might be that tragic mundane-sacred objects serve 
to remind us o f the suffering o f others, of the struggles of our forebears. They are 
instruments which teach us to rejoice in the goods and blessings we have been given 
today, in the present moment. And, so it is that we return to depictions of religious 
tragedy year after year, day after day, as they underline the brightness in our own life 
in the here and now. Just as a candle burns brightest when surrounded by a starless 
night, so a tragic mundane-sacred object serves as a kind of darkness highlighting 
those fragile beauties o f life that are too often take for granted.
At any rate, these are some of the approaches — dependent no doubt on 
whether one has a pessimistic, optimistic or ironical disposition — for understanding 
tragic mundane-sacred objects. The emphasis on tragedy within religion is 
prominent, and its role in religious appreciation is something worth pursuing.
The Problem o f Priority 
Given that the experience of religious appreciation manifests in the presence 
of man-made objects (such as a piece of music) as well as in the presence of 
works of nature (such as a mountain, the river Ganges, or the ocean's waves), 
a question arises as to which should enjoy precedence in our analysis of 
religious appreciation. Does a m an's reaction toward mundane-sacred objects 
of nature -  like his awe that "anytiring should exist at all" -  have conceptual 
priority over man-made sacred objects such as music? Is the former a more 
raw  and immediate experience, or is it the other way around? Perhaps, using 
a Kantian interpretation of religious appreciation, we could argue that
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reactions to mundane-sacred objects, like paintings of saints or religious 
music, are merely special cases of religious appreciation more generally. 
Consequently, we should bestow greater significance on the religious 
appreciation of nature, wherein the experience transpires in a purer variety, 
perhaps instinctually. On the other hand, a Hegelian interpretation might 
argue that our reactions to man-made mundane-sacred objects, like music, are 
w hat provide us w ith the necessary concepts that allow us to respond fully to 
the sacredness of nature. W ithout music, scripture and icons, we would never 
be able to perceive the sacredness of a particular tree or the movement of the 
heavens. Priority should therefore be afforded to the music, the artworks, and 
the literature of religious men, since these are w hat immediately inform our 
religious appreciation of the natural world.
The Problem of Ontology 
To settle the above dispute, we need to address another, more immediate problem. 
Namely, what kind of thing is a mundane-sacred object? O f what kind of being does a 
mundane-sacred object consist? To answer this, notions o f identity and individuation 
become crucial. What criteria do we employ to distinguish mundane-sacred objects 
from one another, as well as from transcendent-sacred objects? How does a mundane- 
sacred object count as one and the same thing across different contexts and times?
Make 110 mistake about it. These are no small questions. Your copy of the 
Qur’an, for example, is not the same as my copy. Yet they are both copies of the same 
scripture. So, evidently, a mundane-sacred object such as a scripture cannot be 
identified with a specific physical thing. But, if that is so, then what is it? O f what
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entity are your Qur’an and my Qur’an both copies? In short, what is scripture, as 
Cantwell-Smith rightly asked?68 It really is a peculiar thing.
Similarly, a work of religious music cannot be identified with a particular 
succession o f sounds, because, if it were so identified, the music could never be 
performed twice, which is absurd. Obviously if that were true, religious rituals that 
rely on the repetition of music year after year, day after day, would become 
impossible to perform. And that is manifestly not the case. Therefore religious music, 
like scripture, also cannot be identified with a specific physical thing, with one and 
only one sequence of sounds. So how does each specific sound, each rendition of 
Gregorian chant, become instances o f the same sacred music? If we cannot identify 
the sacred music with any particular rendition, what then is its nature?
Does all this mean that, similar to Plato’s belief, we can say real mundane- 
sacred objects are independent of their physical manifestation? Does their real form 
subsist somewhere outside our world?
Well, perhaps this is so for some mundane-sacred objects -  such as scripture 
and holy song. But that cannot be the case as a general point. Some mundane-sacred 
objects, such as the alleged tooth of the Buddha Shalcyamuni in Sri Lanka, or the 
strand of hair o f a deceased holy man in Jerusalem, are veiy much identified -  as a 
matter o f necessity and not contingency -  with particular physical objects. These 
kinds of mundane-sacred object, quite unlike a scripture or a holy song, are 
unrepeatable. Their sacredness is bound up essentially with a physical item o f the 
sensory world. Indeed, because of this, the notion of forgery  enters the discourse of 
religion. We can dispute, for instance, if the tooth is really the Buddha’s tooth. We
fuS Wilfred Cantwell Smith, What is Scripture: a com parative approach  (Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1993).
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can wonder if someone stole the real tooth. And this is because one and only one set 
o f teeth will belong to the Buddha Shakyamuni. Any others will be bogus.
It seems, then, that we do not have an obvious comprehensive answer as to 
what kind of being a mundane-sacred object consists. Some appear to be contingent 
manifestations o f an almost Platonic form, while others appear to have a necesscuy 
physical existence. How this dual nature o f the mundane-sacred object might be 
spelled out is a question worth pursuing.
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CHAPTER 6 
GENERAL PHILOSOPHICAL THEORIES
The qualities and nature of mundane sacred objects presented in the last chapter raise, 
once again, the question of essence. We, for example, specifically considered such 
matters as the meaning of representation, the role of interpretation and the nature of 
the tragic within religion. But a general philosophical theory of the mundane-sacred 
object qua mundane-sacred object will aim to answer those specific questions along 
with eveiy other question we have so fa r  considered.
There are two basic approaches a philosopher might try to advance such a 
general theory. One way is to think systematically through each of the fundamental 
concepts involved in mundane-sacred objects: to think analytically about ideas like 
representation, expression, interpretation, and so on. Then, after vigorously 
contemplating each of these concepts, the theoretician might attempt to amalgamate 
his analyses into a whole, thus providing a general theory o f the mundane-sacred. 
This approach, o f course, would cohere with what is today called the Anglo-American 
analytic tradition of philosophy. But another way to proceed is to aim immediately 
and more speculatively for one broad concept, which would have the explanatory 
power to elucidate the essence of all and any mundane-sacred object. This second 
method would cohere perhaps with the more ambitious approach typically found in 
contemporary Continental philosophy.
Whatever the approach, however, we can expect to see at least four kinds of 
general theory emerge, which correspond to the general theories in philosophical
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aesthetics. We shall briefly describe these four general theories in this chapter, so as 
to further suggest where the philosophy of religious appreciation might develop.
The Mundane-Sacred Object as Mimesis 
One o f those general theories, borrowed from Plato’s and Aristotle’s ideas about art69 
and more recently from Gadamer,70 holds that at the very essence of the mundane- 
sacred is the concept o f representation or imitation. In accordance with this theory, the 
object that is imitated by a mundane-sacred object may be identified with nature, God, 
atman or some other transcendent, depending on one’s metaphysical orientation. 
Sacred music, for example, might be explained as imitating the sacred harmony of the 
cosmos and the soul, while scripture may be said to imitate the will of God or 
Enlightenment. Here, the value of the mundane-sacred relies on connecting man, 
through representation, with something above and beyond his world.
This representational theory, however, could be open to the charge that 
it mistakenly renders mundane-sacred objects as mere means to some other 
goal, as simply vehicles for delivering us to something else. Whereas the truth 
is that some, if not all, mundane-sacred objects seem to enjoy a value in 
themselves. We cannot replace them with some other tiling that would do 
"just as well". To do so w ould destroy its very status as sacred. If we could 
replace our m undane-sacred objects with other things, then our sacred objects 
would structurally be no better than the way some hum ans use pornography; 
these sacred objects w ould be one means among many for satisfying our
69 See Books 2, 3, and 10 o f  Plato’s Republic, trans. Benjamin Jowett (N ew  York: P.F. Collier & Son, 
1995); and Aristotle, P oetics  in The Com plete Works o f  A ristotle, Vol. 2, ed. Jonathan Barnes 
(Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984), 2316-2340.
70 Hans Georg Gadamer, The R elevance o f  the Beautiful and O ther Essays, trans. N icholas Walker 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991).
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a rousa l an d  resp o n ses/ ju s t m ere in s tru m en ts  to som e o ther, m ore  em otional 
end . But sacred  objects are  not like that. T hey are v a lu ed  no  m a tte r w h a t they 
bring , even  if they  do  n o t b rin g  us m uch.
The Mundane-Sacred as Form 
If the instrumentality inherent in the representational theory does not satisfy us, then 
perhaps we could construct a theory along the formalist lines o f Hanslick’s and Bell’s 
work in aesthetics.71 Borrowing their ideas, we could argue that only the form  of the 
mundane-sacred object -  that is, the complex and unique arrangement of its 
constituent parts -  enjoys religious worth. So, whereas the representational theory 
looked to external factors in order to confer value on the mundane-sacred, the 
formalist theory will see the object’s significance residing in the mundane-sacred’s 
internal structure, a la Eliade’s ideas perhaps.72 Mundane-sacred objects are 
“autonomous”. They have an inherent dignity, an intrinsic sacredness, and, therefore, 
they answer only to themselves. Anything external to the mundane-sacred is irrelevant 
to its appreciation.
What are these structural forms that have such sacred integrity? The formalist 
might confidently reply: no general answer can be given because the formal and non- 
formal features will be demarcated differently for each specific mundane-sacred 
object we confront. The formal properties of a scripture will differ from the formal 
properties of, say, the Buddha’s tooth; the formal properties o f the Buddha’s tooth 
will differ from the formal properties of Gregorian chant; the formal properties o f 
Gregorian chant will differ from Mel Gibson’s movie about the crucifixion of Christ; 
and so on. But, what is important to recognize is that each of these mundane-sacred
71 Eduard Hanslick, On the M usically Beautiful; C live Bell, A rt (London: Chatto and Windus, 1914).
72 See P atterns in C om parative Religion , xiii.
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objects have formal properties, conferring on them autonomy and sacredness. Yet, it 
is not necessary that they have the same formal properties.
A potential drawback to this theory is that, if we cannot identify a general 
notion of formal properties, then the formalist position may become too indefinite to 
serve as an explanatory theory of the mundane-sacred. When the theory does attempt 
to spell out the kind of form that is central to the mundane-sacred, it will need to 
employ notions like “sacred”, “ends”, and “uniqueness” . However, if we cannot 
define what we mean by these notions — and it is difficult -  then we might end up 
applying them to anything and everything. Thus, we may very well end up having to 
conclude that the sacred form is indefinable, thereby plummeting this theory into 
vacuousness. We might also criticize this theory by pointing out that some mundane- 
sacred objects are valued for their content and not just their form; for example, 
scriptures, while valued as ends in themselves, also often serve as means for making 
sense o f our lives when we are not involved directly in religious activities; they seem 
to give us moral codes and heroes to emulate. So a formalist theory may have the 
unwelcome consequence of excluding an important ingredient of religious
* 71appreciation o f the mundane-sacred.
The Mundane-Sacred as Expression
The expression theory offers another means for addressing the mundane-sacred. This 
theory accounts for the content o f the mundane-sacred. The notion o f “expression” , as 
we saw, is connected with the idea o f emotion or feeling. The idea o f a central role of 
emotion in religion has exerted an influence on thinkers as diverse as Tolstoy, Freud 
and the logical-positivists. Yet, we saw earlier that the idea o f “feelings” is not
7j On pages 31-34, where we summarized the experiential definition o f  the mundane-sacred object, we 
have indicated, however, how this objection could be answered.
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sufficient to define the mundane-sacred object. Any expression theory, therefore, will 
need to fill out this definition, so as to provide us with a more refined, robust and 
convincing explanation regarding the essential function of feeling and passion within 
the concept o f the mundane-sacred.
To this end, we might make use o f Collingwood’s famous expression theory 
o f art.74 When applied to our subject, the theory would likely divide the topic o f the 
mundane-sacred into two parts. First, it would consider the mundane-sacred object 
from the viewpoint of its creator -  be that creator a man, a god, an angel, a devil, 
nature itself, or whatever. Second, it would consider the mundane-sacred object from 
the perspective of the spectator, of you and of me.
The first part, then, will interpret the mundane-sacred object as a unique 
manifestation o f self-expression. The motive behind this desire for self-expression 
will consist, on the one hand, of an affective component: the creator o f the mundane- 
sacred object seeks reprieve from the strain of emotion or energy. On the other hand, 
the motive will also contain a cognitive component: the creator o f the mundane-sacred 
object seeks self-understanding. The process of creating a mundane-sacred object, 
therefore, will begin with the creator’s indistinct and formless emotional and 
cognitive state -  like a feeling o f love or loneliness perhaps, or even just the raw 
organic impulse to create, as when for atheists the unconscious universe, exploding 
out o f itself in the Big Bang, somehow came to create all conscious beings. So, when 
the pressure of this feeling or energy impinging on the creator becomes 
overwhelming, it will search out or explode into the most appropriate physical 
articulation o f this feeling or energy. In this way, it ends up transforming a mental 
state, or an initial state of physical energy, into something distinct, definite, concrete
74 R.G. C ollingw ood, The Principles o f  A rt (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1958).
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and intelligible -  into scriptures, mountains and men. Such created objects will not so 
much describe the initial mental state or basic physical energy as much as express it. 
The mental/energetic state will be incorporated, as it were, into the mundane-sacred 
object itself, possibly like the way a smile can embody a strand o f mental life like 
happiness. Now, because the mundane-sacred object has not been created for any 
further goal than its very expression, it will be an end in itself, a unique and valuable 
being that can be contrasted with the notion of instrumental entities. This, in turn, will 
explain why a mundane-sacred object, from the perspective o f the spectator, is 
appreciated as an end and not a means.
The second part of this theory will involve not the creator of the mundane- 
sacred object but its spectator, you and me. We, the audience o f the mundane-sacred 
object, when we are under the sway of religious appreciation, and, if we are not 
simply overcome by feelings of awe, may try to retrace the steps previously pursued 
by the creator o f the sacred object, and by doing so hopefully recover something of 
the initial emotional or energetic state underlying the origin o f the mundane-sacred 
object. If, for instance, we are monotheists, then we shall perceive the entire universe 
as a mundane-sacred object, as a physical expression o f the divine will, and so, when 
we contemplate the world around us, we will, in fact, be hoping to appreciate the 
feelings and love o f the creator God as expressed in the here and now, as expressed in 
the mundane-sacred object.
This -  rather metaphysical -  idea might explain why religious appreciation so 
often seems to involve the quality of enjoyment, that religious ecstasy Hasidic Jews 
call hitlahavut, “the inflaming”, because, if we use the above theory, we could say 
that when under the experience of religious appreciation, the habitual and mundane 
appear new and fresh. Buber tells the story of a zaddik, an Hasidic saint, who “stood
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at the window in the early morning light and trembling cried, ‘A few hours ago it was 
night and now it is day — God brings up the day!” And he was full of fear and 
trembling. [This zaddik] also said, ‘Every creature should be ashamed before the 
Creator: were he perfect, as he was destined to be, then he would be astonished and 
awakened and inflamed because of the renewal o f the creature at each time and in 
each moment.’”75 That statement of ardour for the physical world is about as perfect 
an example of the experience of religious appreciation as we are likely to find, and it 
may best be explained by the expression theory, as it seems to postulate a physical 
world expressing the mind o f its creator.
O f course, it is important to note that, in the expression theory, we do not have 
to be monotheists (much less Hasidic Jews) in order to experience religious 
appreciation of the physical universe. If, for a contrast, we are naturalists — like an 
atheist surfer who sees sacredness in the oceans’ waves, or like Bertrand Russell’s 
“free man’s worship” of nature — then our religious appreciation can just as well be 
interpreted as nature’s consciousness appreciating itself, a somewhat Hegelian view 
perhaps, wherein the mind o f nature as expressed through man “recognizes itse lf’ as 
creative nature. Thus, under both metaphysical views, whether it be monotheism or 
atheism, an expression theory can contend that we, the audience of the mundane- 
sacred object, participate in a relation with the object that is symmetrical with the 
creator’s relation to its own mind, consciousness, or initial state of energy.
The Mundane-Sacred as Language
If the expression theory strikes us as too metaphysical, then there is at least one more 
comprehensive theory o f the mundane-sacred we can explore, a kind of 
semiotic/linguistic theory o f the mundane-sacred, we might say. This type of
75 Martin Buber, H asidism and M odern Man, 107-108.
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explanation might be more welcomed by philosophers who emphasize the structures 
of language to explain phenomena. The semiotic/linguistic theory will analyze 
mundane-sacred objects solely in terms of their logical and linguistic categories, such 
as their signification, reference, denotation, “traces”, or syntactic and semantic rules. 
It, therefore, will ignore psychology or metaphysics as an explanation. Like natural 
language, the mundane-sacred object will be literally a symbol system , and so we shall 
explicate it in the way we explain other languages.76
It is important to note that, when the semiotic/linguistic theory calls the 
mundane-sacred a “language”, it is not speaking metaphorically, nor is it speaking of 
an analogy between language and the mundane-sacred. It is genuinely defining it as a 
language, as sharing the basic properties that comprise our day-to-day talk. Such 
linguistic properties moreover are autonomous, which means the mundane-sacred 
needs to be comprehended and explained independently from our psychological, 
subjective or experiential concepts. Conceptual primacy thus resides in how these 
objects fit within a community o f language speakers. The chief significance of any 
given mundane-sacred object, accordingly, will depend on its logico-Iinguistic role, 
and not on any o f our personal experiences.
However, we may feel that this semiotic/linguistic theory amounts to an 
unacceptable kind o f linguistic determinism of the mundane-sacred, as if our 
experiences o f it are irrelevant to an analysis of religious appreciation. Those who are 
sympathetic to the Humean-Kantian model, cited earlier, will most likely find that this 
kind of theory robs us of our treasured subjective experiences, the very experiences 
we feel are most fundamental to an understanding o f religious appreciation. Indeed, to 
reduce the experience to its bare logico-Iinguistic categories may have the advantage
76 Whether this strategy is derived from logical positivist view s o f  language, Donald D avidson’s 
theories, or Derrida’s, or som e other philosophy that strongly em phasizes the role o f  language.
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of precision, but at the cost o f an impoverished approach to experiencing this 
experience, for it leaves out its most significant component — the subjective. Indeed, 
that was what made this topic philosophically interesting in the first place.
These four general theories -  the theory of the mundane-sacred as mimesis, as 
form, as expression, and as language — are inspired by those theories already found in 
the philosophy o f art. Naturally, given the breadth and depth o f the many writings 
within aesthetics, as well as the word limitations imposed on this dissertation, what is 
offered here, to be sure, is a framework of what a general explanation, along with its 
attendant problems, might be. Nevertheless, it is hoped that the reader will see that 
such theories can be reasonably, and perhaps interestingly, borrowed and applied to 
the idea o f the mundane-sacred. Should a philosopher find these theories compelling 
or interesting, he would soon discover that they could be developed into whole books, 
as they are in aesthetics. It is something to consider.
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CHAPTER 7 
CONCLUSION
This brings to a close the first part of this dissertation. So far, a wide landscape of 
philosophical issues and problems has been traversed. We have demarcated religious 
appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment from other kinds o f religious experiences 
and language. We have shown that the mundane-sacred object is distinguishable from 
transcendent sacred-objects. We have noted a remarkable similarity between 
mundane-sacred judgment and aesthetic judgment, as well as striking likenesses 
between religious appreciation and aesthetic appreciation. In light o f such similarities, 
we suggested the common goals of aesthetics and the study o f religious appreciation, 
such as the need to spell out the nature and unity of mundane-sacred judgment, 
religious appreciation and the mundane-sacred object, just as in aesthetics the goal is 
not to prove that people experience aesthetic reactions, but to describe what such 
experiences and its language mean. Similarly, in this branch of the philosophy of 
religion we noted that we were not so concerned with metaphysics and epistemology, 
or with the goal o f justifying religion. By ignoring this traditional approach to the 
philosophy o f religion, we found resemblances between the problems and ideas that 
arise when analyzing aesthetics and those that manifest when looking at religious 
appreciation -  such as the potential controversies over subjectivism and objectivism, 
priority and ontology, interpretation and theory, or the application of concepts like 
representation, expression, form, and language to the mundane-sacred object, the 
mundane-sacred judgment and religious appreciation.
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If all or any o f these ideas, problems and theories were to spark the interest of 
philosophers, with religious appreciation thus becoming a legitimized subject within 
the philosophy of religion, then each and every problem and solution we have hitherto 
reviewed is without doubt capable of sustaining whole doctoral dissertations on their 
own. Hence, what has been presented thus far is simply an overview o f the seminal 
issues awaiting more detailed discussion.
What would a more detailed discussion look like? Sometimes we need an 
example to help us get on with our own thinking on a new subject.
That is why the remainder of this dissertation will be a more thorough analysis 
o f some of the issues we have been discussing. What follows in the next part, then, is 
simply meant as an example. I shall present you with a sustained argument about the 
meaning of the mundane-sacred object, about the non-descriptive nature of mundane- 
sacred judgment, and the Kantian-like aesthetic nature of religious appreciation. Let 
the reader not conclude, therefore, that what follows is the only plausible 
interpretation of these subjects. The next couple hundred pages are not a dogmatic 
theory, but merely an example o f a theory.
Indeed, the real thesis o f this dissertation is the suggestion that there is an 
experience of religious appreciation in our human world, and other philosophers of 
religion might find it interesting to investigate that experience. How others ultimately 
do investigate the mundane-sacred is something this author looks forward to reading -  
or, at any rate, hopes to read and learn from.
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PART II
AN EXAMPLE OF A PHILOSOPHICAL 
ANALYSIS OF MUNDANE-SACRED JUDGMENT 
AND RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION
MUNDANE-SACRED JUDGMENT AS EXPRESSION, NOT 
DESCRIPTION, AND RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION AS AN  
AESTHETIC, NOT METAPHYSICAL, EXPERIENCE
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CHAPTER 8
WHAT IS A “SACRED OBJECT”?
Before anything profitable can be said about mundane-sacred judgment and religious 
appreciation, we need some theory that will help elucidate the general concept of a 
“sacred object”, whether this object is something in the world, such as a river, or 
whether it is beyond our world, such as a god. There is an idea -  particularly among 
post-Kantian and neo-Wittgensteinian philosophers who are sympathetic toward 
religion -  that if we are to avoid reductionism then the concepts o f religious judgment 
and religious experience need to be defined in terms o f the “unique” or “value in 
itse lf’ quality of the sacred object.77 According to this theory, when a person 
religiously perceives an object, the person values the object as it is in itself, without 
comparisons 01* contrasts to other objects and without appeal to any practical concern. 
The person sees the sacred object as a separate phenomenon having its own features. 
Consequently, the experience of an object is religious only if  the object is not 
subsumed under alternative concepts. Its sacredness hinges neither on being a result 
o f some deeper cause nor on its matter-of-fact uses and utilitarian goals.
This idea further suggests that, since sacred objects have their own unique 
features, they cannot be translated into the terms of other theories and ideologies 
without becoming obscured, at best, or conceptually eliminated, at worst. 
Accordingly, if a scholar is to understand any religion, he must become an “insider”,
77 For a phenom enological version o f  this argument, see Mircea Eliade, P atterns in Com parative  
R eligion , trans. Rosemary Sheed (N ew  York: Meridian Books, 1963) as w ell as W illiam E. Paden, 
“Interpretive Frames”, Interpreting the Sacred  (Boston: Beacon Press B ooks, 1992), 1-14. For a 
W ittgensteinian version, see D.Z. Phillips, Religion Without Explanation  (Oxford: Basil B lackwell, 
1976), and Faith after Foundationalism  (London: Routledge & ICegan Paul, 1988).
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someone who perceives the unique religious features o f objects in the same way as the 
religious community or individual he is studying.78 Moreover, the religious features 
also help us to demarcate the religious attitude from other kinds o f attitude -  like the 
scientific, the moral and the aesthetic attitudes, which, it is said, focus on different 
features of the world.79
By postulating a demarcation between these attitudes and the differing features 
of their objects, we are able to establish the conceptual autonomy of the “religious”. 
It is in this way that we distinguish religion from other realms o f human experience 
and, hence, make the academic study o f religion qua religion possible.
To help illustrate the view that any contrasts, for example, between scientific 
and religious attitudes eventuate from differing perceptions o f the features of objects, 
we might consider four thinkers in particular: Plato, Kant, Kierkegaard, and Buber. 
To begin, consider the two passages below. The first passage depicts the attitude and 
method found in Francis Bacon’s interpretation o f science, 80 as described by Bryan 
Magee; the second passage portrays the attitude of the “loving man”, as described by 
Buber, who argues for an analogy, if not identity, between the loving attitude and the
7S See, e.g., Norman M alcolm, “The Groundlessness o f  B e lie f', in C ontem porary Perspectives on 
R eligious E pistem ology  ed. R. D. Geivett and B. Sweetman (N ew  York and Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 1992), 92-103. See also, R udolf Otto, The Idea o f  the H oly , Chapters I-III; Joachim Wach, The 
M eaning and Task o f  the H istory o f  R eligions  (R e/igionsw issenschaft); Mircea Eliade, A New  
Humanism: Rosalind Shaw, Fem inist A nthropology and the G endering o f  R eligious Studies; Raymond 
Firth, An A nthropological Approach to the Study o f  Religion: all o f  these articles and excerpts can be 
found in The Insider/O utsider Problem in the Study o f  Religion: A R eader , ed., R ussell T. M cCutcheon  
(London and N ew  York: Cassell, 1999).
70 Again, Norman M alcolm, “The Groundlessness o f  B e lie f’; see also, Gerardus van der Leeuw, 
Religion in E ssence and M anifestation  (N ew  York: Harper & Row, 1963); W .B. Kristensen, The 
M eaning o f  Religion , trans. J.B. Carman (The Hague: Nijhoff, 1960); W.L. Brenneman, Jr., S.O. 
Yarian, and A.M. Olson, The Seeing Eye (University Park: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1982); 
J. Wach, Types o f  R eligious Experience: Christian and N on-Christian  (Chicago: University o f  Chicago 
Press, 1951), chapters 2 and 3.
S() 1 chose B acon’s idea o f  the scientific attitude only as an illustration, not as an endorsement o f  
Bacon’s method. Popper or Kuhn’s interpretations o f  science w ould illustrate, for my point, exactly the 
same contrast.
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religious attitude/ For Buber, the scientific and loving attitudes are demarcated
through the idea that the second of them understands its object as singular, whereas
the first understands its object in causal relation to other objects.
[The scientific attitude] begins by carrying out experiments [on objects] whose 
aim is to make carefully controlled and meticulously measured observations at 
some point on the frontier between our knowledge and our ignorance. [The 
scientist] systematically records his findings, perhaps publishes them, and in 
the course of time he and other workers in the field accumulate a lot of shared 
and reliable data. As this grows, general features begin to emerge, and 
individuals start to formulate general hypotheses -  statements of a law like 
character which fit all the known facts and explain how they are causally 
related to each other. The individual scientist tries to confirm his hypothesis 
by finding evidence which will support it. If he succeeds in verifying it he has 
discovered another scientific law which will unlock more o f the secrets of 
nature. The new seam is then worked — that is to say the new discovery is 
applied wherever it is thought it might yield fresh information. Thus the 
existing stock o f scientific knowledge is added to, and the frontier of our 
ignorance pushed back. And the process begins again on the new frontier.82
Now, notice here that the scientific attitude of observing objects, with its ambition to
elicit shared features that establish a basis for general propositions, is in direct
contrast with Buber’s idea o f the “loving attitude”:
The loving man is one who grasps non-relatively each thing he grasps. He 
does not think of inserting the experienced thing into relations to other things; 
at the moment o f experience nothing else exists, nothing save this beloved 
thing, filling out the world and indistinguishably coinciding with it. Where 
you with agile fingers draw out the qualities common to all things and 
distribute them in ready-made categories, the loving m an’s dream-powerful 
and primally-awake heart beholds the non-common. This, the unique, is the 
bestowing shape, the self o f the thing, which cannot be detained within the 
pure circle o f world comprehensibility. What you extract and combine is 
always only the passivity o f things. But their activity, their effective reality, 
reveals itself only to the loving man who knows them. And thus he knows the 
world.8j
81 See Martin Buber, “With a Monist” in Pointing the Way (N ew  Jersey: Humanities Press 
International, Inc., 1990), 25-30.
82 Bryan M agee, P opper  (London: Fontana Press, 1985), 19.
8j Martin Buber, “With a M onist”, in Pointing the Way, 28f.
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According to certain trends in phenomenology -  such as Buber’s idea above -  human 
attitudes are distinguished by their distinct appreciation o f the objects o f the world." 
The world, ever since Plato and Kant sliced it in two, has often been claimed in
o  c
phenomenology to present itself to human perspective as twofold." And, our different 
attitudes branch out from this bifurcation between the features o f the world unveiled 
by scientific investigation and the phenomenological features o f the Lebenswelt, the 
human world o f values whereby human life becomes possible, distinctive, and 
humanly explainable.86
It is believed that, within the scientific paradigm, the human subject is 
abolished as far as possible, since the scientific attitude seeks an impersonal and 
absolute perception o f the world as it is in itse lf and not necessarily as it appears to 
humans. However, in the scientific paradigm, hinging as it does on the ambition for 
raw objective knowledge divorced from human subjectivity, distinctive and, indeed, 
valuable features o f human life seem to disappear. Phenomenologists complain that 
what vanishes in scientific explanations is the “intentional understanding” through 
which mankind justifies, explains, excuses, and describes the world as it appears in 
human perspective and action. A person, for instance, might perceive and describe all 
the shapes and dots o f colour that comprise a painted portrait, but, nevertheless, fail to 
see the face in the portrait. Such a person might perceive all the details o f colour and 
shape, but miss seeing the portrait, to say nothing of its beauty. And that possibility 
means something. It means it is possible that a way of responding to the painting can 
escape a man, since the appearance o f the portrait depends on the application of an
84 W.L. Brenneman, Jr., et. a l ,  The Seeing Eye] also see W.C. Smith The M eaning and End o f  Religion  
(N ew  York: Macmillan, 1962).
85 Dermot Moran, “Editor’s Introduction” in The Phenom enology R eader, ed. Dermot Moran and 
Timothy M ooney (London: Routledge, 2002), 1- 26.
86 Ibid.
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intentional understanding that eludes the mere noting of structure and detail.87 
Similarly, an existentialist like Buber would argue that a scientist might observe all 
the functioning o f a human organism as well as have a complete account of the 
organism’s structure and behaviour, and yet not see the person  in the organism. In 
short, phenomenologists and existentialists draw our attention to the idea that, under 
the sway of a strict scientific attitude, important explanatory concepts such as 
“beauty” , “justice” or the “sublime” evaporate, as well as all those other intentional 
understandings which, though unable to be communicated wholly in objective terms, 
nevertheless, fill the human world with the meanings that are implied in much of our 
goals, deeds, explanations and emotions.
By employing the Platonist/Kantian model of a twofold world, we see that the 
scientific attitude conceptualizes its object by placing it in a nexus o f causal relations 
to other objects, while something like Buber’s “loving attitude” guards its object as 
unique and separable from any such nexus. The loving attitude posits, in effect, that, 
when its object (the beloved) is either comprehended through its causal relations to 
other objects or explained through notions of pragmatic use, the human experience 
and language of loving an “other” or “thou” are altered into something categorically 
different, a category incommensurate with our ordinary experience and explanations 
o f loving a person. The scientific attitude, by contrast, contends that the true nature of 
the object is understood only through an explanation of its causal relations and utility. 
So, where the scientific attitude “carefully controlled” and “meticulously measured” a 
submissive and, in principle, knowable object, the loving attitude did not manipulate 
or analyze a passive thing whose features were measurable and explainable. The 
loving attitude engages on equal ground with an Other, thus confronting an active
87 Roger Scruton, “Radical Therapy”, in The Politics o f  Culture and O ther E ssays  (Great Britain: 
Cacanet Press, 1981), 183.
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object whose features are not always predictable or usable. Such contrasts in attitude 
turn on the notion of uniqueness, and this all-important concept is conferred only on 
objects in the Lebenswelt.
Now, analogously, the religious attitude, since it too is part o f the Lebenswelt, 
is contrasted with the scientific attitude. This contrast occurs as a result o f the 
uniqueness bestowed on its objects; for, unlike the scientific approach, the religious 
attitude appreciates the sacred object like the lover appreciates the beloved: fo r  itself 
rather than in relation to any other factor. The religious attitude is concerned neither 
with cognitive comparisons nor with establishing scientific laws.
What is more, when the unique object is something as overwhelming and 
sublime as Yahweh, Allah, Brahman, Tao, Nibbana, the Word o f God, or the like, the 
sacred object is sometimes claimed to be incapable o f being subsumed in any way
on
under conceptual categories. And, we see here that because the scientific attitude 
does not ever approach an object in this way -  by radically negating concepts en bloc 
— the religious attitude can be contrasted with it by means o f the drastic uniqueness 
attributed to sacred objects. Indeed, Kierkegaard, an advocate of this view, has 
described the religious mindset as consisting o f a blind “leap” whose aim is the 
absolute individuality o f the sacred object. For him, what is ultimately important is 
the single-minded “passion” of the religious attitude, which appreciates the radical 
uniqueness of the sacred object,89
Now, in light of Kierkegaard, it is important to remember that this theory of 
uniqueness also claims a seminal role in distinguishing the religious attitude from 
aesthetic and moral attitudes. The distinctions between these attitudes are, of course,
88 Martin Buber’s Ecstatic Confessions (Syracuse University Press Edition, 1996) seem s designed to 
prove this point, as do the essays in Robert K.C. Forman, ed., The Problem  o f  Pure Consciousness 
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1990).
8) Soren Kierkegaard, Fear and Trembling  and Siclcness unto D eath , trans. Walter Lowrie (N ew  York: 
Doubleday Anchor Book, 1954).
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at the core o f Kierkegaard’s writings, and his ideas have, even if tacitly, generated and 
influenced much o f the discussion about such distinctions within 20th century 
phenomenological and existentialist literature.90 However, the attitudes associated 
with religion, ethics and aesthetics are more difficult to distinguish than the religious 
from the scientific attitude. This is partly because they are all integral features of the 
Lebenswelt. Like the aesthetic attitude toward the aesthetic object,91 religious 
appreciation of the sacred object seems to involve the setting aside o f practical 
interests to enjoy a particular entity. And, like the ethical attitude toward the objects
oo
of morality, ‘ the religious attitude does not judge the sacred object as a means to 
some end that is independent of the religious happening. The sacred object is an end 
itself. Furthermore, the three attitudes do not approach their objects simply as 
vehicles for evoking alleged aesthetic, moral or religious “feelings”. No other object, 
in other words, can stand in “just as well” as a cause of the appropriate emotions.
If there is a distinction among these attitudes, it seems to derive from the 
relative place in the hierarchy of value in which the religious, the ethical and the 
aesthetic are positioned (by a philosopher) within the Lebenswelt. When the religious 
attitude is at the top of the hierarchy, it deems its objects the end, not just an end. The 
objects have a unique quality of ultimacy or transcendence that is absent from 
aesthetic and ethical objects. That is to say, in the “kingdom of ends” the aesthetic and 
ethical attitudes judge their objects as an end within their respective conceptual 
regions, while the religious attitude is more general because it can include the 
aesthetic and the ethical. It might be said, for instance, that an aesthetician may
y° What follow s is not an interpretation o f  Kierkegaard, but a summary o f  a general kind o f  approach to 
the different attitudes.
1)1 Regarding the “aesthetic attitude”, 1 am assuming a Kantian understanding o f  these notions. This 
seem s to be, so far as I can tell, what the phenom enologists and existentialists assume when they make 
these distinctions.
1)2 Again, this is a Kantian conception o f  morality.
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certainly appreciate the beauty of the Qur’an, admiring its poetry for its own sake. 
And this, to be sure, would be treating the Qur’an as an end. But it would not be 
religious appreciation, since it would not be treating the Qur’an as the end, which is to 
say, as scripture. A person can appreciate the Qur’an’s beauty while denying its 
holiness; however, asked the advocate of this philosophy, can a person appreciate its 
holiness while denying its beauty? Unlikely, it would be answered because the beauty 
which a Muslim finds in the Qur’an will itself be deemed holy, or at least a result of 
its holiness. In this way, by perceiving the Qur’an as the absolute end, the Muslim’s 
religious appreciation is demarcated from the aesthetician’s appreciation. Holiness 
becomes primary, the aesthetic and ethical secondary.93 This idea can be found, for 
instance, at the heart of Kierkegaard’s masterpiece, Fear and Trembling,94 For 
Kierkegaard, there is a special ultimacy, a radical uniqueness, to the religious object. 
And, because of this ultimacy, the religious trumps all moral and aesthetic claims, 
however important they are. Indeed, it is through this idea that Kierkegaard and his 
followers justify the “teleological suspension of the ethical” .95
But if, in contradistinction to the Kierkegaardian philosophy, the ethical 
becomes primary, then the distinction between the religious and the ethical is 
generated through a shifting in the hierarchy. This appears to be a Platonist position. 
In answer to the ethical conundrum —are moral precepts valuable because God said 
they are good, or did God say they are good because they are valuable? — Plato and
1)3 Thus, w e see, in a Christian context, the Benedictine abbot Johannes Trithemius (1462-1516), in his 
treatise In P raise o f  Scribes, advising: "Holy Scripture is deserving o f  all possible adornment. 
However, w e should beware that this artwork does not become an end in itself. Otherwise, beauty 
might prevail over truth... "Robert G. Calkins, M onuments o f  M edieval A rt (Ithaca and London: Cornell 
University Press,
1979), 202.
1)4 Soren Kierkegaard, F ear and Trembling  and Sickness unto Death, trans. Walter Lowrie (N ew  York: 
Doubleday Anchor Book, 1954).
1,5 Ibid.
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his philosophical descendents seem to endorse the latter option.96 For this line of 
thought, then, the ethical becomes the end, the final standard, whereby the religious is 
rendered merely an end. In this way, by subordinating the religious to the ethical, we 
are provided with a different method to distinguish the two within the Lebenswelt.
The same applies for the aesthetic attitude, if it is placed atop the religious 
attitude in the kingdom of ends. This, arguably, is Kant’s position. His Critique o f  
Judgement shows us what a theology derived from aesthetics might look like.97 
Through aesthetic contemplation, modern man perceives the features of the world that 
were once the concern of religious meditation. Because natural theology has proved 
impotent, man can no longer demonstrate the validity of his religious existence by 
philosophic reasoning, and, hence, the concept of God is, at best, understood only by 
a via negative that prevents the concept’s valid application. Even so, the argument 
goes, man possesses a sentiment o f the transcendental and the beautiful: through his 
feelings o f beauty, he senses the rationale and the purpose of the things around him; 
and through his feeling o f and longing for the sublime, he senses something awe­
inspiring and ineffable beyond his world, grounding and justifying it. These feelings 
cannot be rendered valid through ratiocination or scientific inquiry. Man cannot Jmow 
the transcendental -  and, ironically, that is all he can know about it. Yet, through 
aesthetic experience, according to Kant, the sense of the world is revealed, and therein 
man can feel the transcendent, thereby discovering, through his feelings of beauty, the
98truth o f his religious inclinations.
% See, for exam ple, Buber’s critique o f  Kierkegaard, which, perhaps only tenuously, seem s close to the 
Platonist emphasis on the ethical, “On the suspension o f  the Ethical” in E clipse o f  God: Studies in the 
R elation Between Religion and Philosophy  (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, 
Inc., 1988), 113-120.
1)1 Immanuel Kant, The Critique o f  Judgment, trans. James Creed Meredith (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
1952).
1)8 The various theodicies that try to answer the problem o f  suffering via aesthetic explanations -  i.e., a 
world with pain is more beautiful than one without -  also may be associated with this approach.
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Be that as it may, wherever the different philosophers ultimately place “the 
religious” in this hierarchy -  whether at the top, below or in the middle of the 
Lebenswelt -  it is clear that, for many philosophers, it is thought to be some kind of 
end, having some kind of autonomy in human affairs. Thus, religion becomes worthy 
of study for its own sake; and thus, it is able to avoid reduction to other disciplines. It 
follows from this that if we are to understand the concepts o f religious judgment and 
experience, demarcating them from other kinds of human judgments and experiences, 
we must first recognize the uniqueness, the value or end in itself status, attributed to 
its objects. After recognizing that the uniqueness o f these objects in turn establishes 
the religious attitude, the task of modem scholars is to discover the religious features 
o f these objects and determine how humans perceive them.
But how does all this stand in relation to the mundane-sacred object?
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CHAPTER 9
WHAT DOES IT MEAN TO CALL A MUNDANE- 
SACRED OBJECT AN “END IN ITSELF”?
We must now confront what it means to call a mundane-sacred object an “end in 
itse lf’. Does the general view of sacred objects as “unique'’ apply to a mundane- 
sacred object? To an extent, the answer is yes. But, we need to clarify what we mean 
when we call a sacred object an “end in itself’; that is, we need to provide conceptual 
clarification, and not merely assume that it is there.
Now, as for the view, discussed in the last chapter, o f the sacred object as an 
end, we might immediately argue that no philosophy of religious experience and 
religious language about the sacred can be persuasively offered because of 
intransigent flaws in the philosophical methods by which philosophers’ theorize. It is 
common today to find many philosophers, particularly among Derrida’s followers and 
neo-Wittgensteinians, who rebel against the very possibility o f theorizing about 
religion (although that does not typically prevent them from offering us their own 
theories).99 For such thinkers, to use the terms of Derrida’s school, a radical “reversal” 
of our “Western tradition” is required.100 Theories about religious attitudes and 
judgments -  like those of Plato, Kant, Kierkegaard or Buber -  are considered by them 
to be too abstract, too general, and too remote from common language. In fact, they 
are alleged to reflect a bygone “modernist” or “Orientalist” age of thinking. Words 
and phrases like “religious attitude”, “the holy”, “the religious”, “religious
w For example, it hardly seem s right to say that the neo-W ittgensteinian, D.Z. Phillips, in his many 
excellent philosophical works, is not h im self offering us theories o f  religious epistem ology, however 
much he protests against theory.
1<K) Jacques Derrida, P ositions , trans. and ed. Alan Bass (Chicago: University o f  Chicago Press, 1982); 
M argins o f  Philosophy, trans and ed., Alan Bass (Chicago; University o f  Chicago Press, 1981).
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experience”, or “the sacred” are only technical terms, which might make sense within 
the defined context o f a philosophical theory, but which cannot be employed, except 
arbitrarily, in the ordinary world, where such distinctions either do not exist or do not 
feature in day-to-day linguistic usage. Further, they claim that such unitary notions are 
so terribly abstract as to make attitudes and behaviours that have little, if anything, in 
common seem somehow similar. Given any single religion, they posit, why must we 
assume that the feelings and attitudes when reading a scripture are similar to the 
feelings and attitudes when we bow before a shrine or offer a sacrifice? Or why, they 
might ask, given several religions, must we assume that, for example, the attitudes of 
a monk meditating on the Metta Suttct in a Thai forest monastery are in any way akin 
to the attitudes inherent in a Santo Domingo Pueblo com dancer in northern New 
Mexico -  or, for that matter, an A1 Qaeda suicide bomber on a “martyrdom operation” 
in a hijacked plane heading toward Manhattan? Prior to even studying religion, we 
have already grouped a baffling array of human happenings, all under the assumption 
that there are commonalities. But why must we say that there are commonalities? 
Why are we compelled to offer a unified account o f these attitudes that exhibit no 
obvious connection?
A possible reply is quite simple or basic: if we do not make such an
assumption, there will be no way of accounting for the reason human beings do judge 
such a sundry o f mundane objects -  like various books, rituals, seasons, spaces, 
buildings, art works, behaviours -  so similarly. It is merely a matter of observation 
that humans do employ, across cultures, a specific (family-related) language of 
appraisal. This language is seemingly connected to a distinct phenomenon, which 
today many o f us call “religion”. This observation warrants the assumption that there 
is something like a “religious attitude” toward the world. Across the globe, people
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speak o f certain kinds of books as “scripture” and “holy”, even though the individual 
texts are comprised o f paper and ink Like any other books; they call a poem, a 
“prayer” ; a trance, a “meditation”; a slaughter, a “sacrifice” ; a massacre, 
“martyrdom”. They describe some space as “profane”; some time as “sacred”; some 
food as “taboo” ; some men as “wise”; some women as “enlightened”, and so on.101 
Why does humanity make this kind o f appraisal? Such uniform uses o f language, even 
if they involve overlapping conditions rather than necessary and sufficient conditions, 
seem to elicit the supposition that, behind these words, a unique and distinguishable 
attitude toward the world exists.
According to this reasoning, we think in terms of particular religious attitudes 
within some people precisely because of the existence o f the linguistic practice of 
religious appraisal. In other words, the religious judgments themselves suggest 
conceptual unity or, at least, conceptual relations. These ordinary modes of appraisal, 
found worldwide, demarcate “religion” as an autonomous sphere of human 
experience. And, so, we do not typically describe, for example, a Larry McMurtry 
Western as “scripture” or a Tony Blair speech as “holy”, because they belong to 
different kinds of discourse. The language of religious appraisal is reserved for a 
different sphere with different objects. Because humans ordinarily reserve religious 
appraisal for some objects, but not others, the idea arises that there is, transpiring here 
in our world, some distinct human attitude to be studied, something conceptually 
autonomous, even if it fails to be universal. That something is “the religious”. Thus, 
old-school “modernist” philosopher attempts to demarcate what is religious in terms 
o f  an analysis o f  the concept o f  religious appraisal, arise partly because ordinary
1111 Based on discussions o f  religious attitudes and language with individuals from varying cultures and 
religions, it is assumed that there are approximate equivalents to many o f  these terms in other 
languages, especially in our now globalized world.
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language seems to entitle us to the assumption that religion is a unified 
phenomenon.102
This assumption also seems to cohere with the idea o f uniqueness presented in 
the prior chapter. As we may recall, the idea of uniqueness suggests religion has 
some kind of autonomy within the Lebenswelt:; that is, objects that are judged to be 
religious are considered an end in themselves for their own sake and not as a means 
for something else. Even when religion exhibits distinctive functions — for example, a 
Christian mother petitioning Jesus to heal her cancer-ridden child, or a Sikh drawing 
his kirpan to protect his community, or a Hindu utilizing the water from the Ganges to 
cleanse his body -  these functions are not appraised as merely operational activities. 
Regardless of their outcomes, the sacred is judged to reside in the acts themselves, a
1 OTpoint persuasively emphasized by Phillips. In religious appreciation, the religious 
man steps out o f the world o f perishable objects, as it were, and faces a world of 
objects containing an enduring value in themselves.
The view of the religious object as an end, along with its coherence with the 
notion o f a distinctive language of appraisal, fortifies the modernist assumption of an 
underlying religious attitude. Moreover, if the concept o f the religious attitude can be 
deduced from ordinary speaking and thinking, then the intuitions o f those modernist 
philosophers’ “terribly abstract” theories that the sacred object is an end in itself will 
have a more familiar, more concrete basis, and the theoretical ambitions of these 
philosophers will not be so far fetched after all. Perhaps, too, the coherency of these 
two ideas is why the argument that the religious object is not a means, and so must be 
granted some degree o f conceptual autonomy, has been so prevalent in the theory of 
religion.
102 At least, this is how I interpret the assumptions o f  “modernist” philosophy o f  religion, with its 
frequent supposition o f  a unified phenomenon underlying religious discourse.
I(b D.Z. Phillips, Religion Without Explanation  (Oxford; Basil B lackwell, 1976), 35.
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Admittedly, when taken to its extreme, such ratiocination in favour o f the 
autonomy of religion may lead us to dubious conclusions. It may leave us either with 
a complete denunciation of emotion in religion or with a radical religious autonomy 
whose experiences bear no resemblance to other human phenomena. Why? Contrary 
to logical-positivist thought, whatever else might comprise religious interest, it cannot 
be solely an interest in an object as a mere means to the stimulation of emotion; for, in 
so far as the religious object exists only for the encouragement of emotions, it is not 
religious, because the religious object might equally have been supplanted by some 
other object promoting similar feelings. And, as Wittgensteinians would point out, 
clearly the sacred object is not replaced by other causes o f the emotion. Therefore, 
emotions cannot be the reason for the religious object.
But is this argument convincing? Certainly some religious people will 
persuasively retort that, in viewing the religious object simply as an end, we are 
neglecting the importance of the emotions that religious objects, in fact, stimulate. An 
assertion that a scripture or a religious ritual is not a means for arousing emotions, or 
that the emotions they do kindle — feelings of awe and humility, for example -  are 
irrelevant to their status as scripture and ritual is absurd. Such a position would 
jettison the important role emotions play in religion by denying their importance as 
vehicles for religious experience. The idea that emotions are irrelevant to the sacred 
object as an end implies that, ultimately, religious appreciation o f an object is nothing 
other than disinterested and dispassionate contemplation whose object can only be 
described by certain formal properties, and that seems mistaken.
Now, if it is contended, as we say above, that emotions play a central role in 
the religious experience, then there must exist something that might be called the 
“emotions o f religion” , and if mundane-sacred objects are understood as ends, then
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this emotional experience is itself rendered an end; it is autonomous, having little if 
anything in common with what might be felt or experienced in another situation. 
Furthermore, it will be impossible to incorporate the experience into any of the 
normal (or alternative) linguistic categories o f emotion, thought or experience. As a 
consequence, the shared language serving to describe it will become vague, 
unknowable and/or ambiguous. What is more, if a mundane-sacred object is merely a 
means for the arousal o f a radically autonomous experience, then it will be a means 
that cannot be understood by any other object, since the mundane-sacred object is not 
a way o f producing anything that is identifiable apart from it. This, briefly, is the idea 
of autonomy that Eliade utilizes to insulate religion from reductionism.104 But, the 
troubling upshot is that it seems also to isolate the mundane-sacred object from 
everything external to it.
Given this two-pronged conundrum, something clearly has gone wrong with 
the idea that the mundane-sacred object is demarcated by the concepts o f ends and 
means. Indeed, an opponent might repudiate the whole idea by arguing that the 
proposition that religious interest in the mundane-sacred object has nothing to do 
with means is a cultural bias because not all religious groups treat their mundane- 
sacred objects in that way. Early Vedic cultures sometimes used the hymns o f the 
Rig-Veda as magical incantations. That is, they used those texts as a means to some 
other end. Or, witness the example of the rain-king. Frazer tells us that an Abyssinian 
king, the Alfai, is believed to possess the power to cause rain and “if he disappoints 
the people’s expectation and a great drought arises in the land, the Alfai is stoned to 
death, and his nearest relations are obliged to cast the first stone at him.” 105 This is a 
dramatic example of performing a religious act to achieve some independent aim. So,
104 Mircea Eliade, Patterns in C om parative R eligion ; Carl Olson, The Theology and Philosophy o f  
Eliade: A Search fo r  the Centre  (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1992).
105 James G. Frazer, The Golden Bough (London: Macmillan, 1922), 107.
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are these not instances of mundane-sacred objects lacking the “end in itse lf’ quality? 
If so, can we not also say that the purported autonomous nature o f the religious 
attitude is only a philosophical bias in favour of one sort of religious approach to 
mundane-sacred objects? And, if this is so, by what right can the theory about ends 
be said to be the theory that constitutes religious appreciation o f mundane-sacred 
objects?
This “cultural-bias argument” is not as fatal to general theories as we 
sometimes assume, for what is important is that we are able to identify some mental 
states as religious appreciation. Even if it were ethnographically shown that there are 
some mundane-sacred objects that are treated merely as a means to an end that is 
external to the religion -  that is, if these religious phenomena are wholly instrumental 
activities -  we still have some religious attitudes that are not. And that fact is all we 
need to demonstrate that religious appreciation is different from, and similar to, other 
attitudes toward objects of the world. Indeed, this fact alone shows that religious 
appreciation possesses an autonomous area of the human mind. As such, we are not 
required to produce a timeless concept of “religious appreciation” in order to identify 
a distinct attitude, an autonomous region of human experience. The standards 
employed in the cultural-bias argument are set too high. It is not crucial or relevant to 
our philosophical project whether other cultures make the same identification in 
strictly the same way as we do. At least for the purpose of analyzing mundane-sacred 
judgment, we need an initial theory that fosters some reasonable organization among 
mankind’s current ways of discourse -  in our globalized world -  about mundane-
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sacred objects. Furthermore, we need to offer in any case some theory in order to 
determine the purported truth of the cultural-bias argument.106
Jettisoning the distinction between ends and means, and its application to 
mundane-sacred objects, will not allay our philosophical confusion. Rather, we must 
further analyze what it means to be interested in something as a means or as an end in 
itself. So far, we have seen that the idea o f conceiving a religious object as an end is 
often asserted without argument. But, are there reasons that, at least, clarify the 
concept? It seems there are. For if we combine the two intuitions about religion 
mentioned earlier, we see that they mutually reinforce each other. That is, if the idea 
that appreciation o f  a mundane-sacred object is not an appreciation o f  it as a means 
to any independent end. is combined with the idea that there is a distinct language o f  
mundane-sacred judgm ent, then we might be able to use these two ideas to elucidate 
one another. In other words, understanding in what way religious appreciation is 
appreciation of a mundane-sacred object “as an end” is through an analysis of the use 
of mundane-sacred judgment.
To see this, consider what it means to appraise something as a means; that is, 
to see it under the light o f some other purpose. For instance, if we are interested in an 
object (say, a pair o f glasses) as a means to some end {to see immediately) then 
particular features o f the object are judged on whether or not they lead to our desired
106 As for the specific case of the Rig-Veda, it is not obvious that the incantations from the Rig- 
Veda were deemed religious while their outcomes were not. On what grounds can such a 
distinction be made? Certainly not by the Vedic texts themselves, since they seem to suggest a 
comprehensive religious world where causes and effects are tied, a world where both the 
causes and the effects are deemed sacred. The same can be said of the rain-king's desired 
effects. Whether or not ethnographic material provides evidence of purely efficacious intent 
on the part of ritualists, they do not falsify the notion that the ritual itself -  its intent and its 
effects -  is not viewed as an end. The ritual surrounding the Alfai, for example, is complex: it 
has sacredness whether the king succeeds or fails in bringing rain, and while the ceremonial 
action may shift depending on either of those two outcomes, its sacredness does not. 
Therefore, we are talking here of a ceremony permitting two different eventualities. The 
above theory absorbs both outcomes.
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end. When the required features are present, then the object fulfils its duties as a 
means toward our purpose. But if the glasses have merely an attractive colour and 
shape, but not the right prescription that allows for sight, then we shall turn our 
attention to another object, a different pair of glasses, which possesses those features 
that will help us achieve our predetermined goal. Our puipose will define the criteria 
o f relevance for those features. Further, because the features that are relevant to the 
assessment of the glasses do not need to be identifying features, then different glasses 
may be identical with respect to their merits as a means toward our goal, which is 
seeing clearly.
However, if there is no purpose or end distinct from the object, then there will 
be no criteria o f this kind that will enable us to say some features o f the object are 
relevant while others are not. That is, if interest in a mundane-sacred object truly is 
not an interest in that object as a means to any predetermined purpose, then there is no 
criteria of relevance that permits saying that the sacredness o f the mundane-sacred 
object depends on something having this feature and not that feature, or that a 
mundane-sacred object must have some set of features in order to be judged sacred.107
In plainer language, every feature of a mundane-sacred object will be relevant 
to the appraisal of it as sacred, for no feature is serving as a means for something 
outside the object. Accordingly, without an external purpose, there can be no rules 
fo r  the assessment o f  mundane-sacred objects. (This is one reason why definitions of 
the “mundane-sacred object” will so often prove unpersuasive.)
So, whatever in fact is the “nature” or “essence” o f religious appreciation, it 
must involve an interest in the uniqueness of an object having no external puipose,
107 To read this argument in its original, aesthetic context, see: Scruton, A rt and Im agination , 21-23.
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just as Kant, Kierkegaard, Buber and Wittgenstein, in their different ways, tried to 
express about sacred objects in general.
And if the forgoing argument concerning the meaning of the uniqueness of the 
mundane-sacred object is sound, then we have characterized, at least in part, 
mundane-sacred judgment and religious appreciation. We have found that, to start, it 
is an interest in a unique object and a response to an object viewed as an end in itself. 
Moreover, the attitude appears connected to a mode of appraisal (mundane-sacred 
judgment) in which a feature relevant to the object’s assessment does not exist. How 
far this theory provides a sufficient description o f a distinct realm o f religious 
experience, and how far it enables us to demarcate mundane-sacred judgment and 
religious appreciation in relation to other phenomena with which they might be 
compared, remains to be seen in later chapters. But, at this point, a method has been 
found for determining what it means to call the mundane-sacred object “unique” or an 
"end in itse lf’: it has 110 external purpose and no rules for its assessment.
Related to this idea, at least at first glance, is whether the uniqueness o f the 
mundane-sacred object is a result o f its identity. To that question, we now turn.
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CHAPTER 10 
THE IDENTITY OF THE MUNDANE-SACRED OBJECT
We mentioned in the Introduction that, along with questions surrounding the 
uniqueness of mundane-sacred objects, there were also questions surrounding their 
identity. How do we identify a mundane-sacred object? If  a mundane-sacred object 
changes over time, do we identify it as the same or as another mundane-sacred object? 
Is its identity important?
At the outset, it seems clear that the concept of the uniqueness o f a mundane- 
sacred object is distinguishable from the concept o f its identity. To be sure, the 
uniqueness of the object is included in all religious references to it as an identifiable 
object. But if it is the case that the mundane-sacred object has conditions o f identity 
that are responsible for its uniqueness, then the identity conditions could not change 
without the mundane-sacred object ceasing to be the same sacred object. However, 
this idea -  whether the mundane-sacred object has such sturdy criteria that define its 
identity -  is perhaps not so critical to the theory o f religious appreciation. The more 
important (and manageable) issue it would seem is this: if a mundane object that at
time Ti is judged sacred undergoes some change at time T 2 , then will the object
remain sacred in the eyes o f the beholder? Or will the object necessarily lose its 
religious character? In other words, will the religious appreciation be affected by the 
alteration in the object? Will it lose its sacredness because of this change?
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By investigating these questions, we will find that the object’s uniqueness 
need not be the result of any stipulation concerning identity conditions. Rather, its 
uniqueness may well be the product, not of the object itself but o f a particular state of 
mind -  what we are calling “religious appreciation” -  wherein the object is 
appreciated for its uniqueness. Hence, within the psychological state of religious 
appreciation, the mundane-sacred object is not fungible; it cannot be substituted by 
something else that serves just as well. It is seen to stand on its own. And, given that, 
there is no logical requirement that we must assume that all the features that a man 
appreciates must for that reason be defining features o f the mundane-sacred object. 
Accordingly, the purported uniqueness of the mundane-sacred object will not be 
objectified as an attribute of the object itself; instead it will be understood and 
analyzed as a formal element of the psychological attitude o f religious appreciation. 
In fact, that idea is the perspective we are exploring throughout this dissertation, the 
notion that the uniqueness of a mundane-sacred object is part of the make up o f the 
psychological experience of religious appreciation, and not wholly o f the external 
object itself.
Against this view, it can be contended that religious appreciation of mundane- 
sacred objects obliges a special criterion o f identity. For example, as Cantwell Smith 
seems to suggest, we ought to identify a scripture with a physical object only in so far 
as humans truly appreciate it as a type, which does indeed have strict identity 
conditions.108 Otherwise, our concept of a scripture and our concept o f a “tendency to 
scripturalize” will not hold together. This contention seems mistaken.
To counter those phenomenologists who argue all sacred objects ought to be
described as “types”, we need only remind ourselves of the physicality of some
108 Wilfred Cantwell Smith, What is Scripture: a com parative approach  (M inneapolis: Fortress Press, 
1993).
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mundane-sacred objects. The religious character of, say, a wall has as much to do 
with it being a physical thing as it does with it being a conceptual type o f which the 
religious man is somehow appreciating. If the Western Wall in Jerusalem, for 
example, were to be destroyed entirely, this could only result in an alteration o f it as 
an object of religious appreciation. The appreciation o f it as a “type” cannot be what, 
at least wholly, determines the object’s worth. Thus, it seems more fruitful to avoid 
applying ubiquitously the notion of types. Rather, we ought to identify mundane- 
sacred objects in the way they immediately present themselves to our sense organs. 
That is, some mundane-sacred objects -  such as paintings, sculptures, buildings, 
rocks, and so on -are  physical objects. Others, such as musical scores, logical 
theories, dances, or rituals, have a more complicated identity resulting from a formal 
notation or behaviour pattern. Still others, such as various printed editions o f a 
scripture within a tradition, are, o f course, types. But, the concept o f types has a 
limited application, and, hence, the question of the identity of the mundane-sacred 
object and the question of its uniqueness is in each case distinct.
Now, if that suggestion is true — that the mundane-sacred object’s 
uniqueness and identity are conceptually d is tin c t-w e  shall need to analyze mundane- 
sacred judgment about the mundane-sacred object, and the religious appreciation 
behind it, independently o f its alleged contribution to the identity-conditions o f the 
mundane-sacred object. To begin this project, we might try to develop the concept of 
“uniqueness” through an analysis of the kinds of reason that can be adduced in 
support of mundane-sacred judgments. And, to do this, we might look to moral and 
aesthetic reasoning and language109 for analogies. As pointed out in earlier chapters,
109 Here I am thinking o f  Kant’s and post-Kantian philosophers’ ideas o f  ethics and aesthetics.
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there seem to be some family resemblances in the language we find in all three of 
these spheres.
Yet, it might be argued that mundane-sacred judgment cannot share the logical 
structure o f ethical and aesthetic judgments because o f the absence o f reasons 
supporting mundane-sacred judgments in the sense of descriptions which would 
always eventuate in some given conclusion. In other words, there cannot be properties 
that bestow “sacredness” on a mundane object in the same way as certain properties 
might confer “value” on ethical and aesthetic objects. For in religion, the effect of 
any property must be determined through the experience of the religion or “form of 
life”, and not by any external properties. This is partly what Eliade meant when he 
contended that the sacred is not reducible to prior or alternative concepts, 
classifications or descriptions o f its objects.5,0 In religion, the religious person is 
focused on the uniqueness of the particular case, the religious object in itself, as a 
singular and irreplaceable happening, while in morality and aesthetics the concern is 
with the properties that bestow values on acts, characters and art works. Here, then, 
there is a difference in reasoning, and it is this fact that confers autonomy on religious 
discourse.
This objection, to be sure, has its merits. It seems sustained by the well-known 
idea that an object can be appraised as sacred partly on account o f some feature that in 
another object produces no such evaluation. The poetic effects o f Arabic in the 
Q ur’an, for example, are a feature that may be cited as part of the splendor o f that 
scripture; but the poetic effects of Arabic in, say, an Egyptian sit-com engenders no 
similar evaluation, no matter how beautifully the language is rendered. Hence, the
110 Eliade, P atterns in C om parative Religion.
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feature o f “poetic effects” is in one case a feature which prompts the attribution of 
“sacredness”, while in another case does no such thing.
But, in reply, this characteristic o f religious thinking is not enough to prevent 
an analogy between mundane-sacred judgment and ethical and aesthetic judgments. 
For in aesthetics, too, an aesthetic object can be of value partly  because of some 
feature that in another object produces little aesthetic merit: the effects o f slang in 
Mark Twain’s Huckleberry Finn, for instance, are part o f the aesthetic genius of that 
work; however, a book that unintentionally uses slang can be aesthetically unpleasing; 
so, here too, is a case where the same feature can result in entirely different aesthetic 
judgments. It is the same with moral judgments: a single feature can be the deciding 
factor between whether an action is good or bad. An action that causes pain (say, 
having a diseased organ removed in a medical transplant) might be good  when the 
pain leads to a better situation. But pain in other circumstances (say, having a diseased 
organ removed in an act o f torture) is bad when it does not produce a better situation.
The retort to this could be that in ethics and aesthetics there are in fact features 
of actions and artworks that truly do decide their worth. These features, however, are 
not first-order features, like causing pain or literal meaning in a poem; but instead 
they are second-order features that are only disclosed through interpretation or 
hermeneutics, In ethics, for instance, the valued features would be stipulated or 
discovered by a set o f ethical rules, or by stipulations that have a distinct role in a 
moral “language-game”. The Aristotelian virtues, for example, belong to this class of 
features. Temperance, it might be said, would be a feature that always affixes worth 
to an action. And, whether an action possesses the feature o f temperance is not, either 
in its Kantian constitution or in its utilitarian consequences, directly observable. It is a 
matter of interpretation, and it can be described even without a complete account of
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the action. So here would be a case of a feature providing a reason for a given moral 
appraisal.
In aesthetics, it is the same. There may very well be two orders for describing 
artworks, in which the occurrence o f a second order property is always a reason for 
determining an artwork a success: on one level, an aesthetic object can be described in 
terms of, say, its metrical structure; but on another level, it can be described as tragic, 
evocative, or sincere. This second order terminology is, again, a reason fo r  its worth, 
and it is decided by interpretation of the case at hand.
But can the same rational process be attributed to mundane-sacred judgment?
The answer is yes. For even if this ratiocination were true, it would not be 
enough to show that mundane-sacred judgment was not analogous to moral and 
aesthetic reasoning about the uniqueness of its objects. Just as with aesthetic objects 
and moral objects, mundane-sacred objects also appear to generate two orders of 
description. In religion, both religious practitioners and non-believers offer first-order 
descriptions of mundane-sacred objects: for example, a ritual might be described 
according to sociological terms; a prayer explained in psychological terms; or an 
ontological proposition understood under metaphysical assumptions and terminology. 
What is important to note is that such varying descriptions can be, and sometimes are, 
voiced by both, a religious person and a secular person. However, as important as that 
fact is, there is, nevertheless, a second order of description evidently reserved for 
religious appreciation as such. A ritual, a poem, a proposition, a stone, a wall — all of 
these, from the religious point o f view - may be judged as possessing the features of 
being sacred, holy, evil, good, noble, authentic, divine, blessed, enlightened, blissful, 
beautiflil, sad, and so on. In other words, there is a kind of description for these 
objects that likewise requires a hermeneutic analysis, a broader interpretation than the
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immediate characteristics perceived. And this second order vocabulary is similar in 
certain ways to the terminology that we find in virtue-based ethics and certain kinds 
o f aesthetics; that is, like these other philosophical fields, this vocabulary can be cited 
as a reason for the religious appraisal. Consequently, this reasoning allows us to 
conclude that there could just as well be a comparable two-order description for 
mundane-sacred objects.
The effort, then, to distinguish ethical and aesthetic judgments from mundane- 
sacred judgments via the different methods by which they attribute uniqueness to their 
objects does not seem a profitable intellectual exercise. At any rate, it is not 
conclusive.
Of course, the reasons behind a mundane-sacred judgment are, in some way, 
different from ethical and aesthetic judgments. Even though the various judgments 
each involve the assessment of objects as ends and not as means, the end associated 
with mundane-sacred judgments often includes the objects that we find in both ethics 
and aesthetics. Moreover, many mundane-sacred objects -  like icons and mountains 
and so on -  seem especially different from moral objects, in that they are more 
immediate, involving a particular physical object that can be seen, heard, touched or 
tasted. In this respect, the mundane-sacred object bears closer resemblance to 
artworks. But, given that mundane-sacred judgments refer us to the religious, to the 
transcendent or to the ultimate, these judgments must be sustained by reasons o f a 
special kind. What these reasons are, however, cannot be fully specified until we have 
a broader theory explaining the origin of the mundane-sacred judgment.
How do we go about discovering the factors that bring about the mundane- 
sacred judgment? A theory describing the psychological state o f religious appreciation 
could be used to do this. For, if we could specify the features of religious
132
appreciation, it would immediately suggest suppositions about the kind o f reasons that 
substantiate the language associated with it, as well as provide an insight into its 
distinct kind o f evaluative speech-acts, as McClendon and Smith have interestingly 
investigated (in other areas of religious language) with plausible conclusions.111
But how do we go about describing the experience of religious appreciation? It 
would seem that, if we jettison a phenomenological approach, our only option is to 
begin by an investigation of its language. By deciphering the meaning of mundane- 
sacred judgment, we shall obtain clues about the experience alongside that language.
It might be argued against this proposal, however, that religious appreciation 
should be characterized through the objects it perceives, and not in terms of the 
language o f appraisal that give expression to the experience. According to this theory, 
religious appreciation is the perception of certain kinds o f features of things. And so, 
we must begin not by investigating the language o f religious appreciation but by 
analyzing the features of the mundane-sacred objects, as this is what is necessary to 
understand the psychological experience o f appreciating them. In light of this, it 
could be argued that the objects o f aesthetics are the second-order aesthetic features of 
a work; the objects o f ethics are the second-order virtues and vices o f a deed; the 
objects of science are the causal dependencies and practical features o f an object; and, 
for our investigation, the objects o f religious appreciation are those second-order 
features of mundane-sacred objects mentioned above — sacredness, holiness, 
blissfulness and so on.
This contention provides us with a way o f describing religious appreciation. It 
tells us, in short, that religious appreciation is nothing other than the psychological 
state whereby one appreciates certain features of things. And, similarly, mundane-
111 James Wm M cClendon Jr, and James M. Smith, Convictions: D efusing R eligious R elativism  (V alley  
Forge, PA: Trinity Press International, 1994).
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sacred judgment is nothing other than a method o f appraisal where we are told that an 
object possesses those religious features. This in turn suggests that we are able to 
identify what is and what is not “religious appreciation” in the world, since it is 
simply a matter of cataloguing the features that are typical objects o f mundane-sacred 
judgments.
This idea you will notice is the popular idea of “religious perception”, a 
philosophical theory to which we now turn to investigate.
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CHAPTER 11
IS THERE A RELIGIOUS PERCEPTION WHICH PROVIDES 
MEANING TO MUNDANE-SACRED PREDICATES?
The idea that certain features of objects define religious appreciation and judgment 
makes plausible the suggestion that there is some distinct class o f “religious features” 
or “religious types” or “religious patterns” to which mundane-sacred predicates, the 
words used to communicate the experience of the mundane-sacred object, refer. 
However, this suggestion in turn raises the question of what it means to perceive such 
features. Phenomenologists often embrace the notion of religious perception, arguing 
that only an “insider” o f a religious tradition can perceive and describe these features 
aright. Underlying this theory is a key idea in the general philosophy of 
phenomenology: namely, the idea that perception delineates phenomena. “By 
phenomena”, defines the father o f phenomenology, Franz Brentano, “ [I mean] that 
which is perceived by us, in fact, what is perceived by us in the strict sense of the 
word.” 112 Or, to paraphrase, a phenomenologist o f religion might say that, “By 
religious phenomena, I mean that which is perceived by us, in fact, what is perceived 
by us” . Under such a definition of phenomena -  no doubt suggestive o f idealism — we 
might be tempted, by a kind of epoche, to bracket off a class of “religious features” of 
objects from other kinds o f features. Succumbing to this temptation leads us to a core 
assumption in the phenomenology of religion: religious appreciation o f an object is
112 Franz von Brentano, D escrip tive  Psychology, trans. and ed., Benito Muller (London: Routledge, 
1995), 137.
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nothing other than the perception o f religious features, and that a religious perception 
is the requirement for recognizing these features. According to this approach, the role 
of the scholar is to achieve a state of such radical sympathy with the group he is 
studying that he is able to perceive their religious world as they do — and, thenceforth, 
communicate that vision to outsiders. By employing this approach, the scholar is then 
able to describe the religious features o f phenomena. To do so, the scholar begins 
with (what might be called) an exercise of absorption in the religious world of the 
“Other”. This chapter addresses how a theory of perception might relate to mundane- 
sacred judgment.
As an illustration o f phenomenological absorption, consider this passage from
Alexander Piatigorsky’s Lectures on the Phenomenologyf o f  Myth'.
When I think about mythology I know that myth is me, my thought, speech 
and behaviour... At the same time, when I think about my own thought, 
speech and behaviour, I know, even without any prior knowledge, however 
superficial and elementary, o f mythology as a discipline and of myth as its 
object, that some, at least, of my thoughts, words and acts are subject to 
certain patterns and forms which I see [italics mine] exactly, literally almost, 
reproduced in other people’s events, occurrences and situations. And then, by 
a simple extrapolation, I arrive, in my thinking, at the idea that -  barring a 
solipsistic surmise that reality is a reflection of, or derivation from, my own 
thinking -  these forms and patterns constitute, themselves, that which is other 
than my individuality, as well as the individuality o f other people. And if  so, 
then I know that I am that other, which, as soon as the notions of myth and 
mythological are post factum ... appropriated by me, is the mythological; the 
mythological in the sense of being neither individual nor non-individual, so 
that in this case I am myth.113
Piatigorsky’s argument is a nice expression o f some o f the assumptions and ideas in 
the phenomenological approach to religion. Evidently, Piatigorsky feels justified in 
saying “myth is me” because, first, a priori he sees that the patterns of myths -  or 
what we are calling religious features -  are reflected in his own thinking and
113 Alexander Piatigorsky, M ythological D eliberations; Lectures on the Phenomenology’ o f  Myth 
(London: School o f  Oriental and African Studies, University o f  London, 1993), 1.
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behaviour, from which he, secondly, infers that the patterns (or “features”) do not 
belong wholly to himself, they are also “other” or a separate class; and this, in turn, 
leads him to the belief that the divorce between his individuality and the myth is 
dissolved. Thus, he and the myth are, in some sense, one. That is, he can perceive the 
features as an independent class; he is no longer an “outsider” to them.
Now, ignoring the merits or demerits of this interesting argument, consider 
what it implies: namely, not solipsism but absorption. And the question to ask of this 
theory is: what does such absorption mean? The phenomenological answer is that it is 
some kind of religious perceptual capacity. But what is this capacity? How do we 
perceive such religious features? And what is its relation to the mundane-sacred 
judgment that expresses it?
In considering the theory of religious perception, we shall be distinguishing 
features from properties, the purpose of which will become apparent in later chapters. 
For now, let us understand the notion of a feature as anything satisfying the predicate 
place in formal grammar, and let us understand the notion of a property as anything 
belonging to an object in fact. That is to say, a feature is grammatical and may be, but 
does not have to be, ontological, while a property is always ontological, even if in the 
current state of our knowledge we do not know whether a certain attribute belongs to 
the category of features or to the categoiy of properties. This means that there is a 
feature for every grammatical predicate, but not necessarily a property. A Leninist, for 
example, might perceive Jesus’ advocacy of poverty in the Sermon on the Mount as in 
fa c t an ideology harming the genuine interests of the proletariat, and he might 
perceive it as in fact a literary tool devised by a ruling party for the exploitation and 
manipulation o f the working class. In that case, the Leninist would be crediting 
himself with the ability to perceive the properties o f the Sermon on the Mount, while
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at the same time asserting that the faithful are only percciving /m /i/rev o f that sermon. 
In this example, the features ascribed to the text are a kind o f delusion fostered by an 
exploitative ruling class and embraced by a naive Christian working class. But, even 
if that is the case, we are not logically obliged to accept that all features are delusions, 
since properties may have features. We should also note that, if a feature is a delusion, 
it still can make grammatical sense; that is, one might still understand mundane- 
sacred judgments even if, in fact, the predicates of those judgments do not refer to 
properties.
Assuming this distinction, let us begin our discussion by asking another 
question: how does one identify religious features of mundane-sacred objects? This 
question, after all, is the first problem facing the scholar of religion, for he needs some 
reason for believing that he is studying a religious phenomenon rather than something 
else, or a religious judgment rather than, say, a political judgment. Furthermore, if it is 
true that observation is “theory laden”, as many philosophers from both the analytic 
and postmodern traditions tell us, then it is doubtful that the scholar can answer this 
question pre-theoretically.
Even so, we can assume for now that some features o f mundane-sacred objects 
are empirically available to the five senses, while other features -  sacredness, 
scripture, dharma and so on -  are available only to those with the additional aid of 
“religious perception”. So, again, our question is: how do we first identify the 
religious features, especially those features requiring religious perception? Intuitively, 
we might answer that the scholar’s initial pre-theoretical means o f identifying 
religious features is derived from observing the actual uses o f mundane-sacred 
judgments. That is, through an inventory o f the predicates that attribute religious 
features to objects, we are able to identify religious features. Thus, we might look to
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grammar and nomenclature -  and, in looking there, we might observe, and indeed do 
observe, a bewildering variety of predicates ascribed to mundane-sacred objects.
For instance, as mentioned in the Introduction, we notice that there are 
predicates whose principal use is, nearly only, in religious judgments: “holy” , 
“sacred”, “scripture”, “Dhamma”, and so on. Such words happen chiefly in judgments 
that are classified within the discourse of religion. “The Western Wall”, a religious 
Jew might say, “is kodesh” That kind of language would be an example of attributing 
a predicate used mainly in religious discourse. Furthermore, we observe that it is not 
uncommon to find mundane-sacred judgments suggesting practical ability: “well- 
done”, “balanced”, “mature”, “spiritually advanced”, “disciplined” and so on. The 
judgments surrounding the many practices of “spiritual discipline” -  the variety of 
meditations, yogic exercises, austerities, and prayers -  often employ these kinds of 
“technical accomplishment” predicates. We also see that mundane-sacred judgments 
often make use o f predicates that typically describe mental and emotional states of 
human beings, as when a non-human object -  for example, the sculpture of the 
footprint of the Buddha -  is described as “joyful” or “blissful” . In addition, we notice 
that objects of religion are described in terms of the feelings they evoke: for example, 
the scriptural story of prince Gotama’s compassion for the insects slaughtered beneath 
the farmer’s plow might be called “moving” or “compassionate”; the story o f the 
flight of the Hebrews from their Egyptian slave-masters, “exciting”; the advanced 
meditative states of a Jain holy man, “enjoyable” . These terms seem to express human 
responses projected onto the mundane-sacred objects themselves.
We also often witness comparative or analogical language. Here mundane- 
sacred predicates are used “metaphorically” or “figuratively”. For some examples, 
just ponder the varieties o f analogical language describing G od’s relationship to
139
humans: the relationship has been compared to that between lovers (as in the Song o f  
Songs, or in the Gita Govinda, or in the passionate poetry o f the Muslim mystic Halal 
al-Din Rumi); in many Jewish, Christian and Hindu sources, the relationship has been 
likened to a parent ’s relationship to a child; it has been compared to the affinity 
between friends , as in, for instance, the friendship between Christ and the disciples in 
the Gospels, or between the Lord Buddha and his bikkhus in the Suttas; and it has 
been compared to the teacher and pupil relationship, which we find, for example, 
between the Gurus and their followers in the Sikh tradition. Examples of analogical 
predicates are abundant. Moreover, this kind of analogical language is used not just to 
describe human relationships to transcendent objects -  like Gods, Goddesses and 
Nibbana -  but also to terrestrial objects. The comparative descriptions are present in 
mundane-sacred judgments: a Guru’s sermon, for example, might be described as 
“heavy” or “deep”.
Besides analogical language, we also find various descriptions o f mundane- 
sacred objects in terms o f what the objects symbolize (or fail to symbolize). Here the 
judgments seem to use terms denoting some kind o f relationship to truthfulness or 
knowledge or Being. The sacred stories and heroic legends, the dramas and art 
works, the dances and songs -  all o f these are, within the various religions, often said 
to articulate or symbolize something true about the ultimate reality o f the world.
Also, there are ethical terms found in mundane-sacred judgment. In various 
religions, types o f deeds and relationships are said to express the order and disorder of 
things. The “Law”, the way things are or are meant to be, is often expressed in written 
or spoken codes, poems, and rules which refer human beings to something ultimate. 
Taoism, Hinduism, Judaism, and Islam, just to name four religions, speak constantly 
o f the Tao, the Dharma, the Torah, and the Sharia, and the boons that manifest when
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the Law or Way is followed, and the ills when it is not. In these religions and in many 
others, we find certain actions and works described as good , evil, wholesome, 
unwholesome, skilful, unskilful, vulgar, noble, as well as most o f the other words 
commonly employed in virtue-based ethics.
There are also mundane-sacred judgments that employ aesthetic terms. For 
example, the words of Jesus might be called “beautiful”; the Buddha’s quiet walk 
through the grove, “graceful”; the logic of the Kalaam argument, “elegant” .
This survey o f mundane-sacred judgments, while not exhaustive, is certainly 
staggering. It is enough to show that promulgation o f a comprehensive theory o f 
mundane-sacred judgments would have to be as complicated as any other region of 
our language. Judgments utilizing terms of “practical accomplishment”, o f 
“metaphor”, o f “aesthetics”, of “ethics” , o f “ontology”; judgments referring to human 
emotions; judgments employing symbolic language, such as in rituals, in art, in dance 
and in festivals; judgments describing the inability of language to symbolize religious 
phenomena — all of these judgments would need to be included in a comprehensive 
theory o f mundane-sacred judgment. And, no doubt, there are other linguistic areas of 
mundane-sacred judgments which have not been identified that need to be included in 
such a theory. For instance, we have not mentioned the realm o f religious language 
where certain terms -  like Om and other mantras -  do not refer to any object at all but 
are holy in themselves, the mere sound being religious and linguistically meaningful. 
Indeed, we should extend the above list o f religious predicates in mundane-sacred 
judgments to include any predicate that can be used to refer to religious features, 
whether or not at present there are such descriptions.114
114 Remember, new religious movem ents arise frequently, and they often em ploy novel language to 
describe their religious experience.
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All of this, no doubt, educes diffidence for a would-be theory bent 011 
comprehending mundane-sacred judgments and the features of mundane-sacred 
objects to which these judgments refer. Such a sundry o f predicates seems to force 
upon us the deduction that all phenomena are possible candidates for being religious 
features. With that conclusion, it appears as if there is nothing to contrast religious 
features against -  and, so, nothing to say independently of what it might mean to 
perceive such features.
But, although the bewildering assortment of religious language picks out an 
indefinite amount of phenomena of indefinite linguistic complexity, it, nevertheless, 
seems true that we do determine if  someone’s interest in an object is religious on the 
basis of the language he is willing to employ to describe that object. A distinguished 
scholar o f Zoroastrianism once joked that British football fans appeared to possess 
traits which were analogous to those found in religious persons, and, therefore, the 
interest o f the former might be considered an instance of religious experience worthy
115of study. Admittedly a comic suggestion, but, nevertheless, something rings true 
about it: there are some shared characteristics between football devotees and religious 
devotees. Yet most people do not conflate or confuse the two phenomena. Why?
The answer, as noted in the previous chapter, seems related to language and its 
uses. Aficionados of athletics typically do not use religious language to describe 
British football matches — just as (shall we say) Vicars typically do not “high-five” 
their congregations after an exciting sermon. And that indicates something to us.
Scholars do not feel puzzled over whether they are studying religion or 
studying sports because ordinary day-to-day language and its accompanying 
behaviour unconsciously allay any confusion. Language, in short, points us toward the
115 Stated by John R. Hinnells in a lecture at the School o f  Oriental and African Studies during the fall 
o f  1997.
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features o f our study, even when there are overlapping uses and the conceptual 
borders are rough.
So, from the intuition that language identifies religious predicates, it is not an 
unreasonable assumption for phenomenologists, and many of their existentialist 
offspring, to presume religious language refers to perceivable characteristics of 
phenomena. After all, much o f everyday language is referential o f perceivable 
properties.
Now the phenomenological/existentialist approach to religion avers, in short, 
that we are able to distinguish religious activity by a person’s interest in the religious 
features of an object. Accordingly, scholarly knowledge of a particular religion is 
nothing more than the knowledge about religious features gained through the 
acquisition o f a religious perception. If this idea is also true for mundane-sacred 
judgment, then only after acquiring the appropriate perception do our concepts of 
religious appreciation and mundane-sacred judgments become intelligible. This is 
why the phenomenological slogan that we must describe the religious as they describe 
themselves is so often heard.
Let us be clear. A theory of religious perception (be it derived from 
phenomenology or some other philosophy) does not fail, if  it does fail, because the 
notion o f a “religious perception” is counterintuitive or implausible. If it fails, it does 
so for other reasons. In the end, solving the conundrum about how we identify 
religious features hinges 011 answering the question whether there is some unitary 
logic distinguishing the religious use o f words. An idea that religious people perceive 
some features of mundane-sacred objects could serve as a means for providing this 
unitary logical sense to mundane-sacred predicates.
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However, if, as some postmodernists assert, there simply is no unitary logic 
behind religious discourse, then the concept of a “religious appreciation” of a 
mundane-sacred object, defined solely by way of an indefinite and expanding class of 
features, appears to be wholly arbitrary; that is, a concept with no ultimate foundation, 
110 grounds. It thus deserves no special place in a philosophical study of the mind. If 
the postmodernists and their ilk are right, the phenomenological program collapses. 
Moreover, distinguishing the “religious” from the “secular” becomes almost 
impossible.
Now Malcolm -  a prominent neo-Wittgensteinian, who appears to offer 
several arguments for relativism -  argues that there are 110 grounds for the application 
of religious term s.116 But, nevertheless, he somehow sees a distinction between a 
religious attitude toward the world and a scientific attitude (which is also groundless,
I I y
in his opinion). Therefore, from his perspective, although religious features depend 
on non-religious features, with the consequence that, say, a wall (like the Western 
Wall) might be called kodesh or holy because of a set of revered stones, the features, 
the stones in our example, are not “grounds” for the application o f these terms. 
Malcolm argues that any description given as a ground for an object’s being 
“religious” could just as well be given for some other object’s being not-religious, and 
any two objects could be religious for different, possibly even conflicting, grounds. 
So, even though religious features are often dependent on non-religious features -  for 
example, a religious argument for the existence of God might depend on the truth of 
the finitude o f the universe -  these non-religious features still do not, in themselves, 
necessitate the emergence o f religious features. Hence, Malcolm concludes that there 
are “reasons” or “causes” for religious judgments but not “grounds”. “Religion”, he
llft Norman M alcolm, “The Groundlessness o f  B e lie f ’.
117 Ibid.
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asserts, “is a form of life; it is language embedded in action -  what Wittgenstein calls 
a ‘language-game.’ Science is another. Neither stands in need o f justification, the one 
no more than the other.” 118 In other words, there is somehow  a distinction between 
the “religious language-game” and the “scientific language-game” but this has 
nothing to do with grounds.
This argument, while reasonable, proves difficult to demonstrate. It appears to 
rest on the assumption that, if a reason is to be considered a ground, it must 
necessitate one particular description. Because no list of non-religious features can 
entail only a religious description, there is no sufficient condition, in terms o f non­
religious features, that establishes the ground for a mundane-sacred judgment.
This theory is debatable.
For, why can we not argue that different mundane-sacred judgments share the 
same grounds? Is it not possible that, say, a word used to describe a mundane-sacred 
object boiTows the criteria for its meaning from some other context? One might say 
the term is groundless -  but only in the religious context, and that is because the word 
is borrowing its grounds or criteria o f meaning from some other, secular application, 
which very much has grounds.
The assertion, for example, that the universe is finite might be a ground for 
both the “holiness” as well as the “meaninglessness” of things, but the reason for 
using either of those terms will depend on the context and the individual who voices 
it. That situation does not imply total “groundlessness” or total absence of 
“foundation” for those judgments. It is conceivable that at least the list of features, 
which constitute the total “first-order” descriptions o f a religious object, entails the 
occurrence of any “second-order” feature it possesses. We might even lack a ground
118 Ibid., 100.
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or foundation for choosing a religious term rather than a non-religious term, but that is 
simply not enough to prove that there is a radical contrast between religious and non­
religious descriptions in terms of such an alleged absence o f grounds or foundations. 
For, just as it has not been demonstrated that there is a logical distinction between 
evaluation and description, so too it seems unlikely that a similar categorical divorce 
of meaning between religious and non-religious descriptions can be demonstrated.
Indeed, to shed light on the notion of a religious feature, it is helpful to 
compare it with moral judgments. Like the division in ethics by some philosophers 
between moral values and “brute facts'1, the radical distinction here between religious 
and non-religious, first-order and second-order, features seems too absolute. Just as 
the naturalist in ethics argues that any list o f facts does not entail a moral judgment, so 
too the opponent of religious features argues that the “groundless” or “foundationless” 
character o f these features arises because no fact necessarily entails a mundane-sacred 
judgment.
But is this true? Perhaps it is persuasive to say that sitting cross-legged, 
smelling incense, closing one’s eyes and lowering one’s heart rate are not “grounds” 
or “foundations” in themselves for employing religious terms; but it does not seem 
persuasive to assert that the discipline o f sitting lotus at appointed hours, the subtlety 
bom of rhythmic breathing, and the control of one’s thoughts are only contingently 
related to a religious description of meditation. The latter properties seem to belong 
somewhere between the non-religious and religious features, between the “first-order” 
features and the second order religious features which depend on them, just as in 
ethics “ institutional facts” sit between values and brute facts.119 If this is true, if there 
truly is this “third category” resting somewhere between first-order features and
119 John R. Seade, Speech A cts (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), ch. 8.
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second order religious features, then we cannot accept that the groundlessness or 
foundationless-ness of religious descriptions is what distinguishes the logical unity of 
religious language, much less mundane-sacred judgment. What Malcolm offers 
cannot be shown; it can only be asserted, based on an intuition that is disputable. And 
so, if one is to maintain Malcolm’s view, and similar postmodernist views, then we 
shall need a fuller theory for the meaning of mundane-sacred judgment that will 
include an independent explanation of all that is involved in such descriptions. The 
simple assertion that religious features are not conditioned by non-religious features is 
no more than a protest -  or perhaps an attempt to insulate religion from criticism — 
against a plausible hypothesis.
So, the modernist and phenomenological theories that advocate religious 
perception o f features that provide grounds or criteria for religious judgments are not 
so easily debunked.
Now, it could be replied that someone can acknowledge and accept a total 
description o f a religious object -  that is to say, evince total understanding of the 
terms used to attribute a religious character on the basis of the description -  and yet 
still reject any religious attribution, no matter how closely he studies and understands 
the object. For instance, Malcolm suggested, in a different essay, that a person could 
believe and accept the description of a work of religion -  say, Anselm’s Ontological 
Argument -  while at the same time demonstrating a total understanding of the terms 
attributing a religious quality to the work, but nevertheless rejecting its religious 
quality or meaning.120 That is, the person might believe in the validity of the 
Ontological Argument, assent to its truth that God’s existence has been proved, yet 
still not believe in God in any meaningful way.
120 Norman M alcolm, “A nselm 's O ntological Arguments'" in The Existence o f  G od , ed. John Hick 
(London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1964), 47-70.
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But, this argument is really only an assertion, not a proof, that there are no 
grounds for religious descriptions, since it depends on an intuition about what it 
means to “understand” a religious judgment that can be, and has been, questioned.121 
(And, in any case, what is meant by a total description o f a religious object?)
Because a person can dissent from attributing a religious term to a 
phenomenon, while at the same time understanding the meaning o f the term, it does 
not follow that there simply are no grounds or foundation for a religious description. 
More evidence, by some other means, would need to be adduced to save this position 
from oracular assertion. Even without this proof, it may, nonetheless, be true that 
terms in religious judgments have no grounds. But, although this idea is popular, we 
should remember that it is, at the moment, only a hypothesis, whose plausibility 
depends on the explanatory power o f what follows from it.
Such non-foundationalist theoreticians could in fact compound the 
persuasiveness of their position by, surprisingly, borrowing the theory that the 
religious features o f a phenomenon are comprehended through a kind o f special 
“religious perception”. That is, they could, for example, offer a theory redolent of 
Moore’s ethical intuitionism. Moore, remember, concluded that, since values are not 
deducible from brute facts, “goodness” must be analogous to phenomena like colours, 
which are simple properties of experience whose objective truth, like mathematical 
truths, is available solely to a mature or developed mind.122 Under this rather elitist 
view, Moore hypothesized a special faculty or intuition by which these simple moral 
properties could be perceived.
Now, vis-d-vis Moore, one might argue that religious features -  and the 
meaning of the mundane-sacred predicates that refer to them -  are discerned by a
121 Gerard J. Hughes, The Nature o f  G od  (London: Routledge, 1995), 185.
122 G.E. Moore, Principia Ethica (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1903).
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special religious faculty or “religious perception” that is based not on the object’s 
properties but rather on emergent properties that a few anointed souls can perceive. 
So, although the man o f religious appreciation uses language that is dependent on 
non-religious features o f objects, those features do not wholly determine them. There 
has to be something special in a man in order to perceive them. Like a gestalt 
configuration, the emergent properties depend in some way on other properties; but 
the emergent properties are not of a logical or necessarily observable nature for all 
men. Indeed, somehow, when a man of religious appreciation sees the properties on 
which emergent religious properties rest, he comes to “see” the religious properties of 
the phenomena, and thus uses mundane-sacred judgments to describe what he sees. In 
this way, we might say the grounds for the application of that term refer directly to the 
“emergent properties”, and, thus, it does not refer us to the criteria which give the 
word its ordinary meaning.
It is also worth noting here that this special religious faculty of perception is 
not identified by the body, that is, by the five sense organs. Presumably, it is more 
like the notion o f “taste” in aesthetics, or the ability to perceive “goodness” in ethical
i 'y'xintuitionism, or the power to see an aspect in a gestalt figure. ~
Pursuant to this theory, scholarly descriptions of mundane-sacred judgments 
do not offer “grounds” or “foundations” for the judgments, but instead aim to direct 
the outsider toward seeing a particular and elitist perception o f the world that the 
judgment is communicating. Religious scholarship, therefore, is an endeavour to 
explain the properties of some phenomena in such a way that the emergent religious 
properties mentioned in the mundane-sacred judgment somehow become apparent 
also to the curious outsider. Now, because the dependence of religious features on its
123 Indeed, I shall be arguing for som ething like this in later chapters.
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first-order properties is not a logical dependency, the scholar is not able to advance 
arguments to convince the external observer of the existence of those religious 
properties. All the scholar is able to do is explain the material in such-and-such a way 
-  and, thence, hope that the outsider sees that the religious properties are there. If, 
however, in the explanation, the outsider still cannot perceive them, then there is 
simply no ratiocination that will compel him to perceive or “know” their presence. To 
appreciate the religious properties, then, one ultimately has to “see for oneself’. 
Hence, the emergent religious properties will be said to depend on others in some 
way, but in no particular way. The only thing that can be said about this dependence is 
that someone might be able, if the requisite perceptual capacity is present, to come to 
“see” the emergent religious properties o f the object.
In a nutshell, this “anti-foundation” theory contends the following: mundane- 
sacred predicates refer to emergent properties that are groundless, in the sense that not 
everyone can understand the application of such words to mundane-sacred objects. 
For, if these terms had universally accepted grounds, their meaning would be 
available to all people, while in fact their meaning is only open to a few with the 
appropriate perceptual abilities.
In the next few chapters, I argue that there is a kernel o f truth to this theory. 
But, it has serious problems. Its main problem turns on a difficulty o f linguistic 
ambiguity. Namely, the same set of properties can eventuate in the perception of two 
different “emergent properties”, just as the duck-aspect and the rabbit-aspect 
eventuate from the same visual patterns in a Gestalt picture. This ambiguity happens 
both withm religion as well as withoz// in religious scholarship. Incompatible 
interpretations can be based entirely on the same set of first-order features o f religious 
objects. Where Aquinas does not see a religious feature in the idea o f an infinite
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universe, Buddhaghosa does. Similarly, in the world o f Zoroastrian academic 
scholarship, Mary Boyce and Julian Baldick have construed from the same first-order 
properties (the “evidence”) such contradictory accounts o f Zoroastrianism that the 
layman might justifiably feel they were describing entirely different religions.124 
Examples o f this kind compel us to recognize that, in religious appreciation as well as 
in scholarship, diametrically opposed interpretations of “emergent properties” can be 
derived from the same set o f perceptual properties, thus leaving the notion of an 
“emergent property” for a select few utterly confusing.
Obviously, such ambiguity about who correctly sees the emergent property is 
particularly troubling for the theory o f religious perception. It shows that much more 
must be said about what is entailed in perceiving some “emergent property” as 
religious. More plainly, the unique relationship of two conflicting religious features to 
the same properties must be explained. But, more importantly, the theory must 
explain how those incompatible religious features are observable when a person, 
reflecting on the same set o f properties, can at one moment see one feature where he 
formerly saw the other feature (as in, for example, religious conversion). Of course, 
these questions, alone, do not impugn the theory of religious perception, whereby 
mundane-sacred predicates allegedly derive meaning, but they do show the 
complexities inherent in it.
Furthermore, there is another, more troubling difficulty with this theory. It 
concerns something that prompted us in the first place to note the existence of 
mundane-sacred judgments within the wider field of religious language. Remember, 
mundane-sacred judgments often describe non-human but earthly and inanimate
124 Julian Baldick, “Mazdaisra”, in F. Hardy, ed., The Religions o f  Asia  (London: Routledge, 1990), 20- 
36; Mary Boyce, “Zorastrianism ”, in J. Hinnels, ed., A N ew Handbook o f  L iving R eligions (London: 
Penguin, 1998), 236-60.
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objects with the ordinary terms denoting emotion. We might call them joyous, sad, 
blissful, mournful, and so on. But, these are inanimate things that cannot literally be 
said to be in a state of emotion. So, if these words are, in their religious use, denoting 
emerging perceptual properties that are groundless -  that is, if they do not possess the 
ordinary criteria for their application -  then we are forced to accept that the religious 
use and the non-religious use of such emotion-words are even more radically 
ambiguous than we had assumed. For, remember, the grammatical application of 
emotion-tenns to some mundane-sacred objects cannot literally be “joyful”, since the 
nature of these object do not in themselves feel joy, indeed they do not feel anything 
at all.
What this means is that, as a consequence of saying there are no grounds or 
criteria fo r  mundane-sacred predicates, we are applying predicates to religious and 
non-religious phenomena for wholly different reasons. In the non-religious use, we 
apply the word “joyful” to denote a property according to accepted criteria, such as 
the gestures, tone of voice and expressions that a particular human being exhibits; 
while, in its religious use, these criteria are absent, or at any rate need not be present. 
Accordingly, the religious use would not be applied according to our ordinary 
methods for applying such words; the basis for the ascription o f each use would not 
be anywhere near the same. In the one use, the term denotes an emergent perceptual 
property for a few; in the other use, it denotes a property determined by ordinary 
criteria for everyone. But this means that one could in theory understand the use of the 
word “joyful” in the religious context but not understand that word in its non-religious 
use for one would be employing independent criteria for the religious ascription. This 
would mean the word would be fundamentally divorced conceptually from our 
ordinary understanding and use o f that word. And, if that consequence is true, if the
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meaning of “joyful” in the religious and non-religious context is so utterly 
independent, then it provides support to the notion that there is a far-reaching divide 
between the religious insider and non-religious outsider. Both would inhabit totally 
different languages, despite the similarities in their surface grammar.
However, such a radical divide assumes that there is not a primary human 
emotional state that confers sense 011 terms like “joyful” when they are applied to non­
human mundane-sacred objects. But, remember, we have already agreed that
n c
phenomena such as stories and sculptures do not literally feel emotions. " Therefore, 
we must conclude that, If there is a phenomenon that feels, it is the human being, and 
that phenomenon must be our source for understanding such words. There must be 
some relation between that word and the human emotional state. Because any person 
who does not understand a word like “joyful” in its ordinary non-religious use -  along 
with the criteria that oblige its ordinary application -  would, therefore, not understand 
its ascription to a corn dance, a sculpture or any other non-sentient but terrestrial 
religious phenomena. Therefore, while we may accept that there might be nuances of 
additional meaning to emotion-terms when ascribed to mundane-sacred objects, we, 
nevertheless, should remember that there is, to borrow Austin’s phrase, some kind of 
“primary nuclear” sense to such words, which is open and perspicuous to everyone 
who can learn a language. It is out of this ordinary meaning that the other religious 
meaning acquires sense.
Let us pause to note here that, if this is the case, then the much discussed 
insider/outsider gap is not without its bridges, nor always very wide. Aspects of 
religious language, such as the ascription of emotion-words to mundane-sacred 
objects, suggest linguistic bridges of understanding between the religious and secular
125 Notwithstanding, o f  course, cases o f  miracles, such as the claim that som e Hindu and Christian 
sculptures have cried milk, blood or tears.
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use of words. No doubt, there would be little reason for religious people to voice the 
assertion that a non-human mundane-sacred object is “joyful” unless they see some 
kind of connection between the religious phenomena and our ordinary criteria for 
attributing emotional states. Indeed, without that relationship, it would be very odd for 
a religious man to describe the phenomena in such a conventional way. It is not 
uncommon for a religious man, when asked to explain what he means when he 
describes a certain religious object as “joyful”, to point to commonplace experiences 
o f that emotion. This suggests -  does it not — that he believes there is some kind of 
parallel understanding in the world o f the secular outsider.
Hypothetically, if there were a religious person who saw no such parallel with 
the secular use and meaning o f a word like “joyful”, and if he, nevertheless, used this 
word solely for religious objects, while not understanding how to apply that word in 
its ordinary, day-to-day usage, then we would be inclined to say he did not understand 
the meaning of the word, would we not? He would be the one not comprehending its 
primary nuclear sense. And, in not comprehending this primary meaning, his choice 
of the ordinary word for the religious phenomena would be completely arbitrary and, 
assuming there cannot be a private language, perhaps meaningless.
Given this consequence of radical ambiguity and arbitrariness, it seems then 
that the idea of religious features as emergent properties without criteria or grounds is 
an unhelpful route for explaining the meaning of mundane-sacred predicates. 
Moreover, since the theory of religious perception seems to require such a view o f the 
mundane-sacred object and how mundane-sacred predicates acquire their “special” 
meaning, we should doubt as well the explanatory power o f the notion of religious 
perception itself. The theory of religious perception fails because it implies too deep a 
chasm between religious language, particularly mundane-sacred judgments, and our
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ordinary language. In truth, no such radical gap exists. Since if it did, we would have 
no explanation for the meaning of mundane-sacred judgments that ascribe such day- 
to-day predicates to inanimate, non-feeling mundane-sacred objects.
It is precisely this ambiguity o f language which partly fosters the belief in the 
sharp divorce between the “religious insider” and the “outsider”. In the following 
chapter, we consider how the ambiguity might be clarified. Without a clarification, 
the meaning o f mundane-sacred judgments is profoundly hard to explain. And, 
religious appreciation ends up an entirely independent and unrelated dimension of 
human life, an experience whose language, logic and value are radically cut off from 
ordinary elucidation and evaluation. O f course, such a consequence may be a 
desirable consequence for some; but for the scholarly “outsider” -  who, after all, is 
often paid (sometimes on taxpayer money) to assess and explicate religious judgments 
-  it cannot be an acceptable outcome. And, yet, this outcome, we should not forget, is 
not the eventuality o f all theories and approaches to mundane-sacred judgment. It is 
the consequence of the theory of religious perception, which construes the features 
and language o f religious experience as something wholly unrelated to our ordinary, 
day-to-day practical awareness and linguistic practice. This I shall soon be disputing.
Nevertheless, the alternative to the theory of religious perception has its own 
difficulties, as we shall see. Without the criterion of perception, we may well find that 
the notion of religious features o f the object surceases to define the nature o f religious 
appreciation. Even worse, we may well cease being able to explicate how religious 
appreciation is different from other kinds of appreciation -  moral, aesthetic, scientific 
or what have you. If a word such as “joyful” means the same when applied to a 
mundane-sacred object as it does when applied to any other phenomenon, then how
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will we be able to separate what is different between the two cases? Will we still be 
able to distinguish religious appreciation from other types of experience?
Clearly, if we jettison the theory of religious perception, the concept o f a 
religious feature raises a dilemma. If words like “joyful” are not applied to religious 
phenomena according to our ordinary criteria for ascribing such terms, and if they are 
not applied to a perceptual property, then in what sense is it applied at all? The words 
neither depict perceptions nor denote the objects which are perceived. In what way, 
then, are they genuine properties? In the next chapter, I consider those questions.
To conclude this chapter, however, we have found that the explanation of 
“religious appreciation” in terms o f perceptual features of the mundane-sacred object 
is not tenable. We found that the theory does not adequately consider the relationship 
between mundane-sacred judgments and day-to-day language. What we may 
conclude from a richer explanation o f this linguistic relationship remains to be seen. 
At present, our investigation has led simply to the conclusion that the perceptual 
theory is unsatisfactory as a means for defining what we mean by “religious 
appreciation”. In later chapters, we will develop the idea that, rather than looking to 
features o f the mundane-sacred object to ground the meaning of mundane-sacred 
judgment, we ought to look to the experiential conditions -  that is, the psychological 
state o f the experience of religious appreciation -  to glean how these strange 
sentences acquire sense. However, to make that argument we need to first cast doubt 
on the idea that mundane-sacred judgments are in fact descriptive declarative 
sentences.
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CHAPTER 12
ARE MUNDANE-SACRED JUDGMENTS 
DESCRIPTIVE DECLARATIVE SENTENCES?
In jettisoning the notion o f religious perception, we have -  so it seems -  jettisoned the 
highly intuitive, if not most plausible, explanation of mundane-sacred predicates. 
How else do we understand mundane-sacred judgments if, as the last chapter 
suggests, we must discard religious perception and the related idea that mundane- 
sacred predicates are referring to emerging properties in mundane-sacred objects? 
Indeed, by foreswearing religious perception, we are now faced with a dilemma. Our 
previous discussion suffers the implication that if (a) mundane-sacred predicates 
denoting religious properties have the same meaning as they have in non-religious 
contexts, then we shall have a formidable problem distinguishing religious properties 
as a separate class; but if (b) they have a different meaning, then we shall have an 
equally severe problem in determining the reason for the naming of religious 
properties in the way people do; that is, their choice o f words will appear strikingly 
arbitrary. We found that, at least, some mundane-sacred predicates have the same (or 
at least similar) meanings as they have in non-religious settings. So, we are left with 
the need to meet the problem o f option (a): how do these mundane-sacred predicates 
contain some o f their ordinary meaning while preserving their autonomous status.
How shall we meet this problem?
First, it is important to note that this problem assumes that we have criteria for 
the meaning o f the concepts o f “sameness” and “difference”, an assumption that
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eminent philosophers -  Quine (of the analytic tradition), Malcolm (of the 
Wittgensteinian tradition) and Derrida (of the postmodern tradition) -  have challenged 
(for different reasons, o f course). And this problem, the problem of ambiguity, comes 
before our dilemma. Thus let us start with a brief consideration o f it before attempting 
to address our main conundrum.
Remember, it has been frequently noted that formal logical analysis o f 
meaning, besides having problems with the notion of vagueness, often blurs the 
distinction between the concept o f ambiguity and the concept o f extended meaning. 
This is because the meaning of sentences when derived solely from logical analysis is 
only part of the larger story of linguistic meaning. Formal logic analyzes the concept 
o f meaning through the purportedly more primitive concepts o f syntax, formal 
semantics and inference types. However, in focusing on these rational dimensions of 
meaning, logical analysis fails to capture the empirical dimension o f language. It 
simply leaves out the intimate relation between meaning and practice, wholly ignoring 
those practical aspects o f language that have been noted by many of the great 
twentieth-century philosophers.126
Hence, while logical analysis reveals important information about the 
syntactical or rational framework upon which our sentences hang, it neglects the 
meaning that words acquire through lived, messy, empirical practice, that is, through 
the social institutions o f teaching, speaking and the learning o f words. These latter 
features of language, occurring between an I  and a Thou within a community, are the 
background in which words become meaningful. And, this, perhaps, is Wittgenstein’s 
key contribution to Frege’s and Russell’s logical program, namely, his suggestion that
126 Such as, Wittgenstein, Strawson, Austin, Heidegaar, Buber, Gadamer, and many others.
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the theory of meaning requires more than just a formal explication, it also requires an 
awareness of the pragmatic and historical features of word use.
Now, keeping in mind the pragmatic/historical context, it is almost always a 
matter of degree whether a word is ambiguous. A linguistic question often concerns 
whether the new use o f a term is wholly independent o f the old use or whether it is 
simply an extension o f it. (See, for instance, the idea behind the “infinite polysemy” 
thesis127).
So, given that question, what is “ambiguity”? A conspicuous example of 
ambiguity would be two independent uses o f a single word, such as with the word 
“bear”. Only the context of its use seems to clarify which meaning o f bear, the noun 
or the verb, we are voicing. How does this ambiguity come about? Such ambiguity 
happens when the two sets of criteria for the application o f a word are logically 
independent, so that a person can understand one use while not comprehending the 
other, for example, understanding what a “bear” (the animal) is, but not understanding 
what the verb “to bear” (a load, for example) is.
However, we must remember it is not always the case that several uses o f a
single word are logically independent in a way that would count them as ambiguous
in the formal sense. Scruton, for instance, has given us an example of extended
meaning that shows how this can happen: consider the word “duck” when it is used to
describe both decoy ducks and live ducks. Just because the word “duck” can have
these different uses, we are not obliged to say the word is therefore ambiguous.
Moreover, we would not be inclined to say the class of ducks has been extended to
include the creation of decoy ducks, since decoy ducks are obviously not live ducks.
Rather, the word “duck” fails to count as ambiguous because the one use of duck, the
127 See John Lyons, Sem antics , vol. I. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977; U. Weinreich  
“Explorations in Semantic Theory”, in Theoretical Foundations, ed. T.A. Sebeok (The Hague: Mouton, 
1966).
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128decoy duck, is “parasitic on the other, and could not be understood independently”. 
That is, the first use -  applied to flesh-and-blood ducks -  is the primary use, hence 
providing an extended meaning for the other.
Another example o f the extended meaning of a term, which might mislead us 
into wrongly attributing the notion of ambiguity, is the common practice of analogy. 
In analogy, we observe shared features between two different phenomena, and so 
apply a term from one context with some of its criteria to a different context 
exhibiting some similar criteria. This may be what happens when an artwork like a 
painting is called “sad” . The painting may be rendered in such a way that it exhibits 
some of the criteria that we normally utilize to justify our attribution of the term “sad” 
to a human being, a withdrawn expression, tears, and so on.
There is yet another important linguistic phenomenon, besides analogy, that 
ought to be classified in the category of extended meaning rather than the categoiy of
129ambiguity. It is Aristotle’s observation of paronymy, which Austin explicates. A 
word is used paronymously when it is used in a derivative sense, and the derivative 
sense can only be understood if the primary nuclear sense is comprehended 
beforehand. Paronymy might look like ambiguity; but, again, it is not. Thus, we 
might talk o f a “healthy body” and a “healthy complexion” and a “healthy 
personality” , but all of these uses are derived from a more immediate, primary nuclear 
sense o f “healthy” . All these different uses contain a part of the primary sense. And, 
without cognizance of that primary sense, the other derived senses would be 
unintelligible.
Now, to be sure, the concept o f paronymy might very well be utilized to 
resolve problem (a) -  the problem of mundane-sacred predicates denoting religious
128 Scruton, A rt and Im agination. 45.
129 J.L. Austin, “The M eaning o f  a Word”, in P hilosophical Papers, ed. J.O. Urmson, et. al. (Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 1970), 71.
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features having the same meaning as they have in non-religious contexts - but then we 
have difficulty distinguishing religious features as a separate category of phenomena. 
Using the concept of paronymy, a theorist might alleviate our anxiety by arguing that 
the examples o f paronymy are exactly the kind of case that explains how a term like 
“mourning” (or any commonly used modifier) is applied to an inanimate mundane- 
sacred object. When religious people apply the word “mourning” to a scripture or to a 
sculpture, or to any non-human terrestrial object, they are using that word 
paronymously. Hence, the term is neither wholly the same as the original meaning nor 
wholly different from it. Mundane-sacred judgments employing such terms are merely 
a species o f paronymy; these words are an extension o f the primary nuclear sense of 
words found in ordinary language.
From this, we might further note that religious features are observable in the 
way something “mourning” outside religion is observable, like the mourning we 
observe in a human glance. Consequently, we describe the road to Zion as 
“mourning” because the meaning is derivative of our ordinary criteria for the 
application o f that word; similarly, we call a religious practice, such as a funeral, 
“mourning” because it is a symptom of mournfulness; and, we call a sculpture or a 
scripture “mourning” because, by analogy, it resembles the gestures o f mourning. In 
other words, religious objects acquire their religious features and their accompanying 
descriptive language by imitating certain states of mind and human behaviour. In this 
way, we demarcate religious features while acknowledging their relation to other, 
more ordinary categories o f empirical life and word usage.
But is this argument persuasive?
Well, on one level, the answer is yes. It seems right to say that the meaning of 
many mundane-sacred predicates derive from ordinary meanings. And, it seems
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unfair to say that there is only one way in which words are employed in mundane- 
sacred judgment.
However, on another level, it seems equally right to say that this theory does 
not provide us with a comprehensive analysis of mundane-sacred judgment, for how 
can a road, like the “road to Zion”, or a footprint, like the Buddha’s footprint, or 
anything of the sort, share the formal properties of a human state o f mind? How could 
these inanimate objects imitate a state of mind? And, why would we choose to 
describe them in that way?
More specifically, such mundane-sacred judgments certainly do not mean that 
Jews and Buddhists, always and in all cases, feel mourning or joy upon meditating on 
these respective mundane-sacred objects. That is, these objects do not necessarily 
make people fe e l those emotions. Nor, do these judgments necessarily mean that the 
mundane-sacred object tends to make people feel such emotions. One can reasonably 
imagine an entire Buddhist community attributing the term “joy” to the sculpture of 
the Buddha’s footprint without ever feeling joy themselves as they observe or 
encounter it, just as an audience can describe a play as “comical” without ever having 
sincerely laughed at its jokes or even thinking the play is funny. Consequently, 
analogies and paronymy might explain some dimensions o f mundane-sacred judgment 
— and indeed they probably do — but these concepts do not capture all o f the meanings 
of mundane-sacred-predicates. In short, they fail to provide a general sense of the 
meaning of this odd religious language.
Consider, then, another interpretation of mundane-sacred judgment, which 
may well help to fill out the above theory. This interpretation we might call the 
“normative theory”. It theorizes as follows: when people express a mundane-sacred 
judgment, they are not saying what others will feel, but what they should feel. To say
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that the Buddha's footprint is jo y  is to say that it is appropriate to feel joy upon 
encountering it. When a sculpture, a scripture, a sacrifice or any other mundane- 
sacred object is called “joy”, then it is like calling it exhilarating or thrilling. It is a 
way o f saying what would be natural and appropriate to feel given the presence of the 
mundane-sacred object. Hence, I call the Buddha’s footprint “joy” because the 
mundane-sacred object explains how I feel or should feel -  and perhaps how you too 
should feel. In this sense, the mundane-sacred judgment describes the object so as to 
justify  my experience. I am feeling exhilarated because of the Buddha’s footprint, 
therefore I say to you, “The Buddha’s footprint is joy”.
There seems to be something attractive about this idea.
Yet, it prompts a question: what exactly is appropriate when the non-human 
mundane-sacred object is called an emotion like joy? As we said earlier, it is not the 
case that an observing person necessarily feels joy by a mundane-sacred object -  and, 
yet, he may, nevertheless, continue to describe the object in those terms. Why does he 
go on speaking that way if he feels no such emotion? Even more troubling, it sounds 
peremptory to speak o f the response toward a mundane-sacred object. Can we really 
be confident that there is a common response?
But, even if those questions can be answered, there is still another drawback 
with the normative theory. Suppose we could, in theory, identify a response or 
experience involved in every appropriate linguistic assertion o f a mundane-sacred 
object. Even given that assumption, why must we further assume that the role o f the 
assertion is to describe the object and justify  the experience? A more immediate, 
indeed simpler, theory would suggest that mundane-sacred judgments do not so much 
justify  that a certain state of mind is made appropriate because of the object, but rather 
recommend that the judgments offer direct expression of the state of mind itself. In
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calling the Buddha’s footprint “joy”, I am not describing the object so as to justify  my 
experience. No, I am merely expressing my immediate response to that object. Here, 
in this religious language, the language of mundane-sacred judgment, we are not 
describing beliefs. We are expressing responses and experiences, and that is why a 
man who is not conventionally religious feels so at ease using this kind of language. 
He is not committing himself to any claim about the external world.
Let us call this the “expressive theory”. Under this theory, mundane-sacred 
judgments do not aver, or necessarily aver, that a certain response or belief is 
mandatory, normal, or nonnative, as appears to be the case in the normative theory. 
But, rather, this language exhibits direct expression of the response itself. That is, it is 
the direct expression of an experience of religious appreciation, and, thus, the 
assertion expressing the experience does not tell us what people should appreciate, but 
rather what, they do appreciate and might appreciate. In the expressive theory, 
mundane-sacred judgments, then, are not always or even primarily descriptive 
declarative sentences. They are not about beliefs.
According to this reasoning, the nonnative theory o f mundane-sacred 
judgment fails to capture its non-descriptive dimensions. What is more, the normative 
theory requires an explanation o f what justifies the response a person should have, 
and — as in ethics and aesthetics — that is no smalt task. Religious people often use, 
one suspects, the religious sense of emotion-terms like “joy” without knowing what 
would justify or make appropriate such a response, and, nevertheless, they feel 
confident in the application of those kinds of words to mundane-sacred objects. This 
is because, through an established practice or tradition, they agree to certain 
applications of words. But that does not mean they must necessarily know how to 
justify  or elucidate the truth-conditions of their judgments, as if they are referring to
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beliefs. This may be why both “insiders” and “outsiders” to religious traditions can 
often understand and use mundane-sacred judgments without knowing how to explain 
them in terms o f beliefs.
Now, if the expressive theory is the correct interpretation of mundane-sacred 
judgment, then we cannot say that this religious language is necessarily descriptive. 
Rather, such non-descriptive mundane-sacred predicates may very well relate to non- 
cognitive states of mind, expressing such psychological phenomena as the 
imagination. This relation between non-cognitive states of mind and mundane-sacred 
judgment may well be akin to the way that descriptive language is associated with 
cognitive states of mind about actual states of affairs, like the way beliefs are 
connected to descriptive statements.
This theory, too, o f course raises difficult questions. For, if  mundane-sacred 
judgments are not, or not always, descriptions of states o f affairs, even though they 
look like ordinary declaratives, then what are these peculiar judgments? What is the 
nature of the mental state behind them? What do these declarative sentences refer to 
or intend to communicate? What do they tell us about the mundane-sacred object? 
With what can the applications of mundane-sacred predicates be compared?
The brief answer, the theory o f this dissertation, is this: mundane-sacred
judgments do not refer us to properties about the object; rather they express an 
experience, a psychological state, derived from confrontation with that object. And, 
the agreement with a mundane-sacred judgment does not entail an agreement in 
beliefs, but rather an agreement in responses. Moreover, the features that give an 
object its religious character — which prompt that response — can be compared with 
the way we describe “aspects”; that is, the psychological state, which allows one to 
“perceive” the features ascribed to mundane-sacred objects, derives from, or is like,
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the imaginative capabilities that allow one to engage in “aspect seeing” . (Later 
chapters will expound on that suggestion.)
In order to help elucidate this “expressive theory”, let us understand 
expression to mean the relation between a sentence and a mental state. Some 
statements will express beliefs, others will express different states o f mind. Our theory 
assumes, similar to Grice’s arguments about language,130 that, in some way, 
expression determines meaning (in that this relation between mind and language 
determines our understanding of a sentence). The idea here is that mundane-sacred 
judgments, because they are not descriptions, do not express a linguistic relation to 
beliefs. On the contrary, they express a relation to what we are calling “religious 
appreciation”, a different kind o f mental state that, as will be argued later, is closely 
associated with features of the imagination. It follows from this suggestion that, if one 
sincerely voices or assents to a mundane-sacred judgment, then one can do so only if  
one has had a particular kind of experience, just as one can understand a certain 
description of a state of affairs only if one has had a certain belief or mental picture 
about that state o f affairs. Mundane-sacred judgments, to be concise, are not 
descriptions about the mundane-sacred object. They are expressions of an experience 
when confronting that object.
But, if mundane-sacred predicates are not descriptive o f the mundane-sacred 
object, how do we construe their meaning? To that question, we now turn.
Ijl) H.P. Grice, Studies in the Way o f  Words (Cambridge, MA; Harvard University Press, 1989).
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CHAPTER 13
HOW CAN A MUNDANE-SACRED PREDICATE 
HAVE A NON-DESCRIPT1VE MEANING?
Let us go back to the question about the meaning o f mundane-sacred judgment. In the 
foregoing pages, we considered commonplace questions: what are religious features, 
what are mundane-sacred judgments, and what is it about a mundane-sacred object 
that makes us say it possesses religious features. Now, if the hypothesis of this 
dissertation is correct, if the expressive theory holds, then these are misleading, 
perhaps even totally mistaken, questions because such questions rest on a flawed 
notion of mundane-sacred judgments. Namely, they confuse us by suggesting that 
mundane-sacred judgments are descriptive in nature and, thus, in need o f an 
explanation about a man’s beliefs. This in turn implies that we should investigate the 
truth-conditions that justify those beliefs; we should look to see how they can be 
verified, perhaps by some kind of special perception. Instead of all that, however, the 
expressive theory directs us to ask what it means to accept or decline a mundane- 
sacred judgment. That is, the expressive theory instructs us to ask about the 
experience or response this language seeks to communicate or elicit, if we wish to 
understand this peculiar kind of religious language.
Admittedly, this suggestion faces a difficulty similar to the one we found 
plaguing the theory o f religious perception. Explaining how mundane-sacred 
predicates maintained their original meaning when placed in a new religious context 
befuddled the theory o f religious perception. Similarly, the expressive theory must
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answer how mundane-sacred predicates like “joy” or “mourning” preserve their same 
meaning when relocated from a descriptive to a non-descriptive use. How do we 
avoid the problem of ambiguity between religious and non-religious uses o f terms?
The answer is this: if linguistic phenomena yield the possibility that individual 
words not only acquire extended meanings (through analogy, paronymy, or other 
figurative practices), but also can be used in radically new ways while maintaining 
their original and accepted meanings, then we shall have a means to interpret those 
mundane-sacred predicates non-descriptively without falling into problems o f  
ambiguity. That is, if  we can discover the possibility that, in some cases, there is no 
genuine extension of meaning, but instead a different context -  an extended use, as it 
were — then we can successfully meet our intransigent problem by not going between 
the horns of the dilemma, but rather by arguing that the terms mean the same (or close 
to the same thing) in both non-religious and mundane-sacred judgments. The only 
difference is that they are being used differently.
Fortunately, we find a clue to our problem in Wittgenstein’s Philosophical 
Investigations.131 Wittgenstein observed that words are, indeed, sometimes used with 
their ordinary meanings when out of their ordinary contexts. It is important to note 
that this happens not from paronymy, but rather from the fact that the ordinary 
meaning is applicable in a different environment. In short, it has a new  use with an old 
meaning. In such cases, the extended use is understood, but only if the meaning from 
which it is taken is comprehended beforehand. To illustrate, Wittgenstein offers the 
following example:
Given the two ideas “fat” and “lean”, would you be rather inclined to say that 
Wednesday was a fat and Tuesday lean, or the other way round? (I incline to 
choose the former.) Now have “fat” and “ lean” some different meaning here
ljl Ludwig W ittgenstein, P hilosophical Investigations, trails. G. E. M. Anscom be (Oxford: Blackwell 
Publishers Ltd., 1998).
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from there usual one? -  they have a different use. -  So ought I really to have 
used different words? Certainly not that. -  I want to use these words (with 
their familiar meanings) here. — Now, I say nothing about the causes o f this 
phenomenon. They might be associations from my childhood. But that is a 
hypothesis. Whatever the explanation, - the inclination is there.
Asked “What do you really mean here by ‘fat’ and ‘lean’?” , - I could only 
explain the meanings in the usual way. I could not. point to the examples of
t
Tuesday and Wednesday. “
The upshot of Wittgenstein’s example is that to understand such a peculiar use of 
terms is not to comprehend some derivative relation o f those terms to a central and 
primitive case, as in paronymy, but to see a different point for using those familiar 
terms in a new context. What is more, such a peculiar use o f words (similar to 
Wittgenstein’s example) happens often, and not just in what is called “slang”. If we 
consider the novel uses o f words in dreams — when the normal referents of those 
words are altered by a peculiar context but the meaning nevertheless stays the same -  
then we see that just about any word is capable of being used in new, almost radical, 
ways. And, yet, it does all this while preserving its commonplace meaning.133 So, in 
order to understand this kind o f use of terms, we must comprehend the purpose or 
point o f the description, and thus we need not learn any new meaning or paronymous 
meaning.
It has also been noted that Wittgenstein’s example bears similarities to certain 
kinds of aesthetic descriptions -  descriptions, for example, o f the “weight” of certain 
visual effects or the “warmth” of a colour scheme. Not surprisingly, because there are 
some striking resemblances between mundane-sacred judgments and aesthetic 
judgments, Wittgenstein’s example also has commonalities with certain types of
132 Philosophical Investigations, 216. This quote was brought to my attention while reading Scruton’s 
A rt and Im agination , 50.
13j A rt and Im agination . 49-50.
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mundane-sacred judgments. Descriptions of the “depth” o f a sermon or the 
“heaviness” o f a Yom Kippur service serve to illustrate.
Now, such mundane-sacred judgments might be explained, at least in part, 
through the concept o f analogy, but, to say that this is all that is involved in such 
language seems dubious. For such judgments, if they are simple analogies, would be 
injudicious, to say the least. What, after all, would be the similarities between an 
abstraction like “heaviness” and a religious service?
Such unresolved questions allow us to maintain that, in both aesthetic and 
mundane-sacred judgments, there is additional room for a non-descriptive 
interpretation o f their terms. Even if we are not always able to elucidate how people 
are purposefully using words non-descriptively, it does not imply that we can never 
indicate what we mean by such usages. A simple example suffices to remind us of 
this. Suppose you pointed to Jastrow’s duck-rabbit configuration and said, “That is a 
duck”. The ostensive word “that” in your judgment would be non-descriptive, would 
it not? Clearly, it does not refer to the drawing, but instead refers to what is in the 
drawing. And, if someone were to think you were referring to the drawing -  the 
physical object -  as a duck, he would entirely misconstrue your sentence. Your point 
in making that statement is not to attribute a property to that object, but rather to draw 
our attention to an aspect in the drawing. The use o f the word “that” becomes 
meaningful in the context of your purpose, which is to try to get the other to see the 
aspect.
How is it that the man does not misunderstand you? Is it because he holds 
some grand semantic theory about the meaning of the ostensive “that”, which allows 
him to anticipate your meaning beforehand? Is it that he has a “special” perception?
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No, it is because he understands the conditions for the acceptance o f this 
judgment. By the conversational context, he understands the non-referential nature of 
the word “that”. It is the same with mundane-sacred judgments. When the man of 
religious appreciation points to a mundane-sacred object and says, “This is 
mourning”, there is nothing in his statement alone that informs us that its meaning 
intends to convey the attribution o f properties to the mundane-sacred object, with this 
language thereby expressing a perception. Assessing such a statement by a logical or 
semantic theory of meaning alone will simply not allow us to determine whether or 
not some property is being attributed by this description to the mundane-sacred 
object. Such language, standing 011 its own, could just as well be indicating features of 
the mundane-sacred object, with this language thereby expressing an experience — and 
not a perception. The language on its own is meaningless without reference to its use, 
which is to express the experience.
Accordingly, our understanding of any given mundane-sacred judgment 
hinges 011 an ever-renewed study of the circumstances in which it is used — as well as 
on dialogue with those who assert them -  because we will not be able to say in 
advance, by any kind of semantic theory, whether the mundane-sacred predication of 
the judgment is attributing a property 01* not. Its meaning needs to be determined by 
the presence of the experience the judgment is directly expressing.
Indeed, it is here, while trying to distinguish religious features from properties, 
where the idea of “aspects” genuinely helps to clarify the dilemma voiced at the 
beginning of this chapter. Identifying aspects have several qualities that are 
comparable to the way we use mundane-sacred predicates to indicate “religious 
features”.
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Like aspects, a description o f religious features does not refer us to simple 
properties of objects, which the “religious perception” of a select few can discern. 
This is the case even if in some ways the words denoting the features behave like the 
way we describe simple properties. Just as a person who is ignorant o f duck drawings 
may, nevertheless, faithfully draw the properties of Jastrow’s duck-rabbit, and thus 
reproduce the duck aspect without “seeing” that aspect,134 so too a man may 
reproduce all the properties of what he sees of a sculpture of the Buddha without ever 
“seeing” its religious feature o f joy. It takes a certain experience to see the point of a 
mundane-sacred judgment, just as it takes a certain experience to see the point of 
describing Jastrow’s duck-rabbit drawing as a duck. Religious features, like aspects, 
cannot be properties.
Another comparable quality is this: the terms that describe aspects receive 
their meaning from their normal sense, even when the uses of those words are not 
their normal employment. The term “man” has the same meaning when describing a 
flesh-and-blood man as it does when describing an aspect in a picture; indeed, our 
criterion for the application of the word “man” to the aspect in the picture is the 
term’s normal sense. Similarly, our criterion for the application of a commonplace 
term to mundane-sacred objects is its conventional meaning, albeit used  in a different 
or extended way.
Still another comparable, and related, quality is this: the use of words to 
describe aspects is not analogical or figurative or some other derivative linguistic 
practice (like paronymy). This is because, again, the meaning of these predicates 
comes from the normal sense of these words. The same is true for mundane-sacred
lj4 P hilosophical Investigations, 194.
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predicates. In this use o f language, mundane-sacred predicates are not, or need not 
necessarily be, figurative.
Wittgenstein provides a final comparable quality: when Wittgenstein 
distinguished aspects from properties, he argued that the application o f a term to an 
aspect does not need any new criteria, since terms used to draw attention to aspects
I T Semploy the criteria and meaning that inform their normal sense. If the same is true 
in the use o f mundane-sacred predicates, which draw our attention to the experience 
of religious features of mundane-sacred objects, then mundane-sacred judgments also 
do not require new criteria for their meaning. As when we describe an aspect by using 
the criteria employed in other contexts, we express the experience of the religious 
features o f a mundane-sacred object by exploiting language everyone uses.
All of these comparisons with the way we describe aspects suggest that 
religious features are, as we assumed in the last chapter, distinct from properties, 
since, most importantly, they do not invoke novel criteria for their application. In this 
way, we do not fall into the problem of a radical autonomy to the meaning of the 
religious use o f ordinary terms, and -  very importantly -  we do not negate their 
extended uses. Moreover, in this way we avoid the need to hypothesize “religious 
perception” o f properties, and thereby avoid all the theoretical difficulties such a 
hypothesis brings along.
If we have accepted -  or followed - the argument so far, then we will begin to 
see why a distinction is drawn between features and properties. For, if mundane- 
sacred judgments are not descriptive, then we must interpret such language as 
attributing not properties to things but features to things. That is, mundane-sacred 
judgments are not necessarily making an assertion about the properties of an object,
135 Philosophical Investigations, 193-214.
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even if their language sometimes appears that way. Accordingly, we need to make 
room for this dimension in our interpretation of religious language, particularly 
mundane-sacred judgment. Distinguishing features from properties does just that.136 It 
also allows us to understand what a religious feature means, since the meaning of the 
mundane-sacred predicate, which denotes the feature, is the same as its sense in non­
religious contexts. We appeal to the same criteria for establishing a mundane-sacred 
predicate’s meaning without asserting it as a property of the phenomenon to which it 
is applied. To be sure, the use of the words is different, but that is not a criticism. In 
fact, that is the point. The sense is the same, but the use is different. And, that is how 
both religious and non-religious men come to voice mundane-sacred judgments.
Interestingly, this expressive theory also assuages the “ insider/outsider” 
controversy. When we recognize that there is a distinction between words expressing 
features and words denoting properties, we see that words that express features need 
not possess independent criteria for their application, for their criteria, and thus their 
meaning, are the same as in their other ordinary sense. As a result, they do not have 
different criteria when applied to mundane-sacred objects. Therefore, even an outsider 
to a religion has an opening into the language of the “other”, from which dialogue and 
further understanding may blossom.
Such are the consequences o f recognizing a distinction between features and 
properties, as well as o f rejecting the thesis that mundane-sacred judgments are given 
meaning only by new criteria of meaning or by direct religious perception of special 
religious properties that have no foundation or grounds. In short, to see some object of 
the world as sacred or mourning or joy does not necessarily mean that one is seeing
136 O f course, this is not to say that religious assertions never describe states o f  affairs. Here, w e are not 
repudiating this traditional practice in the philosophy o f  religion, as many W ittgensteinians and 
Postmodernists do. But, care should be taken in not confusing a piece o f  religious language that 
expresses an experience with religious language that asserts a property.
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some property in it, which only those inside the religion can comprehend. It is to 
have a response to an object, which others may or may not experience.
To sum up, the foregoing ideas have suggested the possibility o f an analogy 
between the description of an object’s religious character and the description o f the 
aspect o f some object. This analogy, in turn, prompted the idea that we should try to 
describe mundane-sacred judgments in terms of an experience that the judgments 
express, rather than by a belief. The phenomenology of religion, with its notion of 
religious perception, proceeded from the assumption that “seeing for oneself as the 
other sees the religious object” is the prerequisite for understanding religion qua 
religion. And, to the extent that one must share a response to agree with a mundane- 
sacred judgment, this is true. However, it is a dubious phenomenological claim that 
one must rely on oneself, on one’s own perceptions, to experience religious features 
of mundane-sacred objects. Other than invoking the sin o f “reductionism”, the 
phenomenological approach never truly explains why a person has to rely on the fact 
that he has shared another’s vision in order to understand the alleged religious 
properties. If something is a visual property, it is simply not true that a person must 
see the property himself in order to know that an object possesses it. A blind man can 
know about colours without perceiving them himself; so why is it not the same for a 
non-religious man or an “outsider” to know about alleged perceptual religious 
properties he has never seen? An understanding of mundane-sacred judgments, 
therefore, does not hinge on one’s perception, or some radically isolated “language- 
game” because o f  a unique property in the object. Rather, it is because our “seeing” is 
not the perception o f a property at all. Our seeing is an agreement in a response. And, 
it is not at all obvious that an outsider camiot share in this response.
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The knowledge that some religious feature is “in” the mundane-sacred object 
is provided by the same linguistic criteria that evinces a person understands the 
meaning of the respective word expressing that feature, just as in the case when one 
“knows” an aspect is “ in” a picture. In this case, “seeing” and “knowing” that a 
mundane-sacred object has the feature of joy are the same phenomenon because, to 
accept the judgment that the mundane-sacred object is joy is not to accept a belief, but 
to agree in some kind of response or experience or mental state that, which unlike a 
belief, is wedded logically to the conditions that elicit it.
If you grant that, we can now state our theory more generally. Justifying a 
mundane-sacred judgment is to justify its acceptance}31 More specifically, by 
elucidating the experience whereby a mundane-sacred judgment is accepted, we can 
show that it is different — or may be different -  from the conditions for the acceptance 
of an ordinary description o f a belief, and, thus, we can demarcate this branch o f 
religious discourse. The relation between the experience o f religious appreciation and 
mundane-sacred judgment is really only the relation between a sentence and the 
experiential conditions where it is accepted, and these conditions can vary with the 
kinds of declaratives we are considering. For example, on the one hand, if the mental 
state associated with some sentence is a “belief’, then the acceptance conditions 
would be some kind o f verification condition. A justification of the judgment would 
be a justification o f the belief in terms o f truth-conditions that would determine the 
acceptance of the judgment. That is, the belief that is being justified is the belief in the 
truth o f that judgment; or, to put it differently, the truth o f the judgment would be the 
justification for both the sentence’s use and the belief it is expressing. Thus, in the 
cases where sentences are descriptive of belief, their meaning is made possible by
L’7 This idea, o f  course, is borrowed from — or at least similar to — Roger Scruton’s affective theory o f  
aesthetic judgment.
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justification. On the other hand, the acceptance conditions for mundane-sacred 
judgments may not be a belief at all. Instead, it may be some other mental state that 
better explains the point o f the mundane-sacred judgm ent So mundane-sacred 
judgments need not have the same truth conditions that descriptions o f beliefs require; 
and, thus, to justify a mundane-sacred judgment may be to justify an experience and 
not a belief.
O f course, the comparisons so far given between religious descriptions and 
aspects do not adequately resolve the problems associated with the use of religious 
terms. The term “joy”, for instance, is not clearly an aspect o f a sculpture (or sermon 
or scripture or mantra o r...) in the way that a “duck” is an aspect of a drawing. Only 
after more thorough investigation, in later chapters, will the comparison be more 
adequate. For now, we can minimally say that the condition for the acceptance of 
mundane-sacred judgments is an “experience of appreciation”, and not a belief. 
Furthermore, the definition o f the experience of “religious appreciation” should be for 
now understood in the broadest possible sense, until the ideas in later chapters give it 
more content.
Now, it is worth pointing out here that, if a special experience is the condition 
for the acceptance of a mundane-sacred judgment, then a mundane-sacred judgment 
can be sincerely voiced only by someone who experiences the religious object in the 
appropriate way. But what is that way? Later chapters seek to answer that.
To recapitulate this chapter, however, its key point is that mundane-sacred 
predicates do not have a radically different kind of meaning when used in mundane- 
sacred judgments, even though such terms are being used differently in religious 
contexts. Like Austin’s use o f “healthy” and Wittgenstein’s use o f the words “fat” and 
“lean”, the religious use o f terms can often be understood as in someway derivative
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from ordinary usage. A conspicuous explanation of religious words in mundane- 
sacred judgments is best offered by tracing back their meanings to their normal, day- 
to-day usage. None of this implies, however, that understanding mundane-sacred 
judgments is simply no more than understanding the ordinary usage o f words. O f 
course, there is a difference between using those words in a religious context and 
using them outside such a context. And, o f course, there is a difference between a 
person who understands when a description is related to a religious context and a 
person who sees no such relation and who thus does not “see the point” made of those 
words. This person, who fails “to see the point”, who is unable to share a particular 
kind of response, understands the religious usage as an injudicious analogy or a 
flawed simile and probably nothing more. Such a person might even understand that 
the words are used in a mundane-sacred judgment, but may not understand the 
purpose o f using those words in that way. And, according to the theory advanced in 
this chapter, his failure to understand the religious description results from his lack of 
acquaintance with the experiences that the judgment is used to express.
The perceptive reader will have noticed that our analysis o f the mundane- 
sacred judgment has, in a sense, ended where we began. In trying to delimit the states 
o f mind involved in religious appreciation, we began by seeking out the “religious 
features” of mundane-sacred objects toward which religious appreciation is directed. 
But, we found that there is no way o f construing these features except through 
identifying and analyzing the mundane-sacred predicates which we ascribe to 
mundane-sacred objects. However, we concluded that the mundane-sacred predicates 
could only be understood in terms of the state of mind that it expresses; that is, in 
terms o f the experience of religious appreciation. In the following chapters, we,
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therefore, turn back to an analysis of “religious appreciation”, the experience for the 
acceptance o f mundane-sacred judgments.
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CHAPTER 14
A SUMMARY OF WHERE WE HAVE BEEN
So far in this thesis we have been concerned with the meaning of mundane-sacred 
judgment, and we interpreted it under the “expressive theory” . Recall that we did not 
elucidate the meaning of mundane-sacred judgments in terms o f the truth-conditions 
by virtue o f which someone believes such assertions. We rejected the attempt to fill 
out the meaning o f these strange religious “declaratives” via a schema such as S  
believes P i f f  S  and P possess features x, y, z, and so forth. Instead a more fruitful 
explanation pointed to the experiential conditions whereby one accepts such language: 
that is, S sincerely voices P if f  S experiences x, y, z. This denial of the applicability of 
concepts like “belief’ or “truth-conditions” in this area o f religious language was 
sparked by the discovery of some perplexing examples o f mundane-sacred judgment: 
namely, those linguistic instances that borrowed expressive predicates from everyday 
discourse. Given the application o f these kinds of predicate to mundane-sacred 
objects, we argued that the most coherent, if not the most intuitive, explanation of 
such religious language ought to postulate a mental experience other than belief We 
hinted that this mental state of non-belief was associated with the experience that we 
called religious appreciation, and that this religious experience bore some 
fundamental connection to day-to-day linguistic meaning and experience.
In the next chapters, we shall elaborate on this point, hoping to disclose more 
fully the salient features of religious appreciation, the experience that provides the 
point o f voicing mundane-sacred judgments. An understanding o f these features, it is
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hoped, will spell out the experiential conditions that supply the meaning of this kind 
o f religious language. If these features can be ascertained, and if indeed they are 
distinguishable from the features of other kinds o f religious understanding, then we 
shall have succeeded in identifying a religious experience separable from the more 
commonly recognized sorts. This would be an exciting philosophical discovery, for 
we shall have unearthed not just the meaning of a certain kind o f religious judgment 
but also a new category o f religious experience, an experience which would decidedly 
determine our general conception o f religion.
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CHAPTER 15
THE RESPONSE-RESEMBLANCE THEORY OF 
RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION
Now, to resume our discussion, recall a predicate such as “mourning”. Note bow it is 
used in a mundane-sacred judgment such as the roads to Zion mourn. When a 
religious person applies this kind of emotion-predicate to a non-sentient object, we are 
immediately faced with a philosophical puzzle. As we discussed earlier, we want to 
know how this person, and those around him, would come to accept such a curious 
judgment. What is the experience that invites a religious man to apply such language 
to an object that clearly possesses no capacity to suffer the mental state of human 
mourning? And, why is it that those around him accept it so nonchalantly?
It has been suggested that there are, at least, two ways to use a predicate like 
“mourn”. One use describes a state of mind, a belief; the other expresses a state of 
mind, an experience. And so we noted that the state o f mind o f one use is not 
necessarily the same state o f mind occurring in the other. That is, we have at least 
two mental states and- yet, they both exploit the same word. Now this idea o f at least 
two distinguishable mental states using an identical term was suggested after our 
repudiation of various interpretations of mundane-sacred judgment. It is not, we 
noted, because the road necessarily makes a religious man mourn that he is prepared 
to say it is mourning, nor is it because he believes the road actually to be in a state of 
mourning, nor is it a result o f the man, after analyzing the object, realizing that the
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predicate stands for a property of it. None o f these hypotheses withstood conceptual 
analysis.
Yet, the rejection of them only furthered our confusion, because if we 
jettisoned such highly intuitive suggestions, intellectual honesty obliged us to explain 
why religious people used the same word, or the same predicate, so differently. We 
had to wonder how it was possible to account for the predicate’s novel application in 
the religious context. Clearly, a religious man did not have to learn a different 
meaning for the word’s new use. On the contrary, his understanding of the word was 
obtained organically, through the natural manner by which he and those around him 
learned the word in their native language. Otherwise -  if we did not propose ordinary 
language learning -  such diction would be inexplicably chosen and applied, if not 
outright arbitrary. Its meaning in the religious context had to be suffused with the 
religious man’s effortless understanding of the word’s primary meaning in mundane 
circumstances. In light o f this everydayness of the language, we, therefore, argued 
that the word’s use, and not its basic sense, was being extended from its ordinary 
application.
Now this fact, we thought, offered a further clue about the nature of the m an’s 
religious experience of the mundane-sacred object; for if the primary day-to-day 
meaning o f the predicate were still present in the new religious use, then undoubtedly 
the primary meaning would mark some limits to what the experience must be like. 
The religious experience would invariably bear some connection to the ordinary 
meanings o f the words expressing it. Significantly, the diction would have meanings 
that any o f us -  the religious man as much as the non-religious man, the insider as 
much as the outsider -  could understand.
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That surprising fact -  deadly to relativist theories of religious language -  now 
raises the deeper question of our final chapters of the investigation into religious 
appreciation:
Can we fin d  a plausible theory that will add more content to our 
understanding o f the experience o f religious appreciation than ju s t what is 
expressed in the basic, everyday sense o f the predicates employed in the 
mundane-sacred ju  dgmen t ?
One response to this question, the one for which most o f us would be inclined to
advance, is to proffer the explanatory concept o f metaphor. It is an almost instinctual
explanation o f mundane-sacred judgment. To the question -  “On what grounds could
there be a similarity between a man’s experience o f a road that is said to be mourning
and his experience with another man who is said to be mourning?” -  we are
unvaryingly tempted to explain the predicate “mourning” by way o f the concepts of
analogy and association, that is, in terms of the notion o f metaphor.
According to this explanatory impulse, a man who chooses to voice a
mundane-sacred judgment does so, at least in part, because there are analogies and
associations between the ideas that he is joining in his judgment. Idea-associations are
then, according to this view of language, inextricably comiected to the appreciation of
mundane-sacred objects. Under the sway of a metaphorical explanation, the
mundane-sacred judgment therefore involves, on the one hand, a linguistic association
between the word “mourn” and the word “road”, and, on the other hand, a deeper
expression o f the association between the concepts behind those words. O f course,
this association o f ideas may be distinct from any analogies we might find between
their denotations because clear-cut and significant analogies cannot always be
adduced in favour of conjoining two concepts such as “road” and “mourning” . But
there is an association, and that association is all that is required for the mundane-
sacred judgment to have a meaningful explanation and application.
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That is not all, however; the metaphorical explanation goes deeper still. 
Linguistic and conceptual associations are not the only associations embedded in the 
religious experience; religious experience of the mundane-sacred judgment also 
involves, at its deepest level, m an’s desires. For what is important in religious 
appreciation -  on this metaphorical interpretation -  is that there is an appetite in man, 
when he confronts his mundane-sacred objects, to associate those concepts. This does 
not mean, though, that when the religious man associates the various ideas in his 
mundane-sacred judgment -  when he connects the cast o f the Buddha’s footprint to 
the concept of joy -  he is describing associations; more simply, his association o f the 
ideas is involved in his more immediate desire to speak in that way. The experiential 
component of this religious experience is, then, very much about desire, appetite, or 
will.
Now something of the above line o f argument is probably what most, at least 
at first glance, think is happening in mundane-sacred judgment. But, in fact, such an 
explanation does not resolve the mystery of this kind o f religious language. The 
upshot of this theory is that, when metaphor and comparison are employed as an 
explanation of mundane-sacred judgment, we are presented with exactly the same 
philosophical problems we find in those cases when terms in their non-metaphorical 
use are being exercised in such judgments. More precisely, we still require a broader 
philosophical account for the experience behind the words in order to explain the 
impulse to combine the concepts. This is true whether or not the terms are being used 
metaphorically. In other words, even if we accept a metaphorical explanation, the 
broader question as to why those metaphors are used remains, as well as why those 
associations of ideas arise in the will, the appetite, or the desire of the religious man.
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What is the experience that tempts a man to speak in that metaphor rather than 
in some other way? What is happening inside him when he chooses to speak with this 
particular word about that particular object? Whence does this desire for metaphor 
arise? Why is this impulse so widespread in religious language?
The metaphorical explanation seems too shallow, too pat. We want to go
deeper.
So here is another theory for our consideration, the one we shall be defending 
in subsequent chapters. In a nutshell, it goes something like this. If a man describes a 
mundane-sacred object as “mourning” (or under some other similar everyday 
predicate), he is responding to that object in a way similar to the way he responds to 
the mourning o f another human being. He uses the same word for these different 
objects because he reacts to each object in a similar way. The sameness of diction in 
the religious and non-religious contexts is therefore reflected and justified by the 
similarity o f the man’s experience in the two different environments. Again, this is 
because in both contexts he has a similar response. And this “response-resemblance” 
in the two different contexts is a necessary condition under which the mundane-sacred 
judgment is accepted. This necessary condition provides its meaning. Accordingly, 
when a religious man sees a mundane-sacred object as “mourning”, he does not see a 
correspondence between the objects themselves -  i.e., a sameness in the mourning of 
a human being and the purported mourning of a mundane-sacred object. The two 
objects are for him very different, just as they are different for any other man. Rather, 
the religious man simply uses the word mourning to describe all mundane-sacred 
objects that draw forth responses in him that are analogous to his responses when he 
faces another human being in a state o f mourning. It is this, the resemblance of his 
response, rather than any similarity in the various objects themselves, that explains
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why the man chooses to use the word “mourning” in both religious and non-religious 
environments, and why he does not have to learn any new meanings for the term 
when it is applied in an unusual religious context.
For convenience, let us call the above suggestion the “response-resemblance 
theory” . It appears to cohere with some idealist and phenomenological interpretations 
of religion, particularly those that emphasize the idea of “empathy”. It also bears 
some resemblance to certain theories in philosophical aesthetics.138 Indeed, to 
compare it with aesthetic theory, we might extrapolate by saying: just as -  according 
to Collingwood -  a portrait of my deceased cousin is like my dear relative because, 
when I look at her portrait, I fe e l like I am again in her presence, so too -  according to 
the response-resemblance theory -  when I choose to employ the word “mourning” to 
a mundane-sacred object I fe e l like I were in the presence o f another human being in 
mourning. Thus, as in certain theories of aesthetic experience, in religious 
appreciation it becomes irrelevant whether the features o f a mundane-sacred object in 
fact resemble the features o f other objects that are described by the same term. What 
is important is that the word expresses some shared response on the part of the 
spectator. It tells us something about the human soul, as it were.
In view o f that, we can then say, if a religious man voices that the road to Zion 
mourns, it is philosophically uninteresting that the road to which he points exhibits 
little or no resemblance to the sounds, gestures or emotions o f an actual man in 
mourning. In our theory, the two objects in themselves do not have to be alike. All 
that we need to note is that the mundane-sacred object has, for whatever reason, the 
power to arouse feelings similar to how this man feels when facing another human
138 Particularly, R.G. C ollingwood, The Principles o f  A rt (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1938), 52-6; 
Scruton, A rt am i Imagination,
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♦ \ TObeing in a state of mourning. Indeed, that is what marks out this language as 
distinct from other kinds of religious language. Thus, we have a kind of religious 
language referring back to the mundane, concrete world, to the world of men and their 
eveiyday emotions, language, and meetings. This language derives its sense by not 
pointing beyond and above to heavenly or mystical worlds, to those realms whose 
linguistic denotations few, if any, truly understand. Rather, mundane-sacred judgment 
returns us to the human world itself, to a religious experience very much earthly.
Now this theory, as it stands, tells us precious little about the nature of this 
“shared response” . What precisely is its constitution? To which category of mind 
should the experience be classified? The implication appears to be that it is not a 
belief. Yet, if that is true, then what is it — an emotion? Is the experience just a raw 
feeling  that merely or contingently happens to express itself in both religious and non­
religious situations?
A whole constellation of secular twentieth-century intellectuals, from 
Freudians to logical positivists, have urged us to consign all religious experience and 
language to the mental realm o f “feelings” and not “beliefs” . Following their lead, we 
may come to the conclusion that, when we interpret mundane-sacred judgment, we 
confront a simple disjunctive choice: either the experience behind this religious
language is connected to the mental state of emotion and therefore it lacks truth- 
conditions, or it is connected to the mental state o f belief and therefore its language 
has truth-conditions.
On closer scrutiny o f the paradigm, however, this taxonomy may be slightly
misleading. To believe that our response-resemblance theory necessitates an
explanation via either strictly emotional or cognitive classifications is hasty. In
ljt) Here I say it has the “power to arouse”. This is admittedly vague, but rest assured it will becom e  
clearer, as the argument progresses, what this “power” is that produces the kind o f  language and 
response involved in mundane-sacred judgment.
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classifying any given human experience, we, of course, not only need positive 
arguments that one category o f mind is more fitting than another, but also we cannot 
simply assume that there are only two broad mental states appropriate to the 
classification o f all religious experience. We ought to remember it still may be 
possible to find another paradigm. If  we are persistent, we may yet identify another 
mental state that is not properly described either as an emotion or as a belief, but 
could cogently explain the experience of religious appreciation. It is that hope which 
will be our overriding objective in the following pages.
We shall find, in the course of the next several chapters, that discovering such 
a mental state will be fraught with menace. Difficult dilemmas and muscular counter­
theories await us. Whether our theory can make it through them depends on how well 
it meets these upcoming challenges.
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CHAPTER 16
A PROBLEM FOR THE RESPONSE-RESEMBLANCE 
THEORY: THE INTENTIONALITY DILEMMA
Let us return to the main question posed in the last chapter: how do we add content to 
our theory that, when a man sees a mundane-sacred object as “mourning” or as “joy”, 
or as some other emotion, he is responding to it in the way he responds when moved 
by another human being in mourning or in joy? Clearly, in order to understand such a 
response, we would need to discover the conditions that identify this experience. Only 
then, when the conditions o f the experience are in hand, will we be in a position to 
comprehend how it comes about that meaning is provided for this religious language. 
Because of this requirement, our theory must make available a robust account o f this 
response, an account that is independent o f the purported “religious properties” o f the 
mundane-sacred object, so as not to appeal to the concept o f belief, but which is not 
wholly reduced to emotion either. Can this be done?
Before we can even attempt to offer such an explanation, there are many 
theoretical problems immediately confronting us. There is, for instance, a particularly 
daunting phenomenological objection. This objection bluntly asserts that our effort to 
provide an independent explanation of the experience is futile. We might be able, at 
best, to provide a vague explanation of the response but we shall never be able to 
offer any precise description o f its nature. This is because a fuller explanation will 
necessarily end up in a quagmire of paradoxes, resulting from our confused 
assumption that a m an’s response toward any object can be characterized
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independently o f his awareness o f it. In other words, our effort to characterize the 
experience o f  mundane-sacred objects independent o f  the consciousness o f  those 
objects will have violated a basic phenomenological law about the human mind; 
namely, that human responses are intentional. And this intentionality necessarily 
involves some kind of belief. That means our response-resemblance theory is guilty of 
negating belief when some land o f  belie f is a necessary condition fo r  the existence o f  
responses. Our theory, according to phenomenology, thus collapses because of an 
elementary phenomenological mistake.
To see this, reconsider our theory. Up until now, we have suggested that there 
is no distinction between the response to a mundane-sacred object and the recognition 
o f that object. That is, we have implied that a man’s response to the road to Zion is 
indistinguishable from his recognition of it. This seems to further imply that there is 
no distinction between a man’s concept of the sacred object and his response to it. 
But, as Brentano and his philosophical offspring would quickly point out, responses 
are intentional. They are directed towards things, they are about conceptualized 
objects. Unlike reflexes, which flash out in a man’s behaviour with evidently no 
reference to his concepts about things, a man’s responses toward objects have the 
quality of conceptual aboutness: they entail an awareness about the object to which 
the man is responding. And, it is precisely this awareness that our theory is neglecting 
to consider. A m an’s responses must originate from a particular conception of the 
objects o f his universe, whether or not those conceptions are grounded in reality.
Because those conceptions define the intentional objects of his responses 
toward material things, we cannot justifiably speak about “response” without a more 
subtle analysis of its intentional objects; that is, without a deeper examination of the 
awareness that the response involves. When referring to any response, as we are with
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the religious response to a mundane-sacred object, we necessarily must be referring to 
a particular awareness. In more concrete terms, this means that an object that, for 
example, evokes envy (a response) is also believed to be desirable (a recognition). The 
response is associated with what might be called a “believed conception”. This 
believed conception is, in phenomenological parlance, the intentional object of the 
man’s envy. The “ intentional object” marks the awareness out o f which his response 
grows. Conversely, if there were nothing about the material object that was first 
believed to be desired, then there would also be no response o f envy.
For another example, imagine a young boxer who wishes to evoke the 
response of fear in his would-be opponents. What would the fighter have to do to 
achieve his end? Clearly, he would first need to do something that demonstrates, in 
the awareness of his adversaries, that he is “something harmful” . Because “something 
harmful” is the intentional object o f the response of fear, without establishing such a 
conception in the awareness of his enemies, there would be no fear, and, thus, the 
boxer would not realize his goal to be fearsome. Generally speaking, then, when 
phenomenologists classify intentional states of mind in such ways, they are also 
discovering for us features of intentional objects, features such as harmfulness or 
desirableness, which material objects may be thought to possess and, which, in turn, 
spark characteristic human responses and language.
Now, a similar way o f thinking about the mind has been introduced in 
contemporary cognitive psychological theories, particularly those that draw 
inspiration from the Hellenistic period of philosophy. Rational-Emotive-Behaviour 
Therapy, a popular form o f cognitive therapy in England and the United States,
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exemplifies this thought.140 As in phenomenology, this theory contends that human
responses are founded on beliefs or judgm ents.141 Systems of thought determine how
people feel about and behave toward the world.
For example, three people working for the same firm lose their jobs at the 
same time. The first person is angry because she believes she should have 
been promoted and not sacked; the second person is depressed because she 
believes that without a job she is worthless; and the third person is happy to 
have lost her job because she always found it boring. The important lesson to 
learn from this story is that though the loss of the job contributes to the various 
emotional reactions, it does not cause them: how each individual perceives 
being made redundant is the key factor in determining the emotional 
reactions.142
This individual judgment arises because, on a deep level, a man first intensely 
believes a proposition -  such as “I should not have been fired” or “my parents must be 
kind to me” -  that he ends up responding with turbulent emotions when the world 
fails to correspond to his beliefs. His responses result from dogmatic cognitive 
demands placed on a recalcitrant and often flawed world. Thus depression, anxiety, 
anger, and so on, are generated from and dependent on those demanding but 
fallacious convictions about the nature o f things. Accordingly, from this theory of 
mind, a new philosophy -  one more cognizant and tolerant o f the inherent 
imperfection of the universe -  would mollify emotional mayhem. Without such 
demanding beliefs about the world, a man’s state of mind will, more often than not, be 
characterized by concepts other than depression, anger, anxiety, fear or some other
140 Albert Ellis, Reason and Emotion in Psychotherapy, (N ew  York: ICensington Publishers, 1994). 
The discussion does not do full justice to E llis’ theory. The relation between reaction and thought, over 
the years, has becom e far subtler in Rational Emotive Behaviour theory.
141 This contrasts sharply with Freudian and Jungian psychological theories, w hich often argue that 
beliefs and judgm ents are grounded in deep-seated emotions, cravings and urges. We, therefore, 
should not be surprised if  Rational-Emotive-Behaviour theorists would analyze the psychology o f  
religion quite differently from what usually passes for “the psychology o f  religion” in the seminar 
room.
142 M ichael Neenan, “Rational Emotive Behaviour Therapy”, in Counselling and Psychotherapy, ed. 
Stephen Palmer (London: SAGE Publications, 2001), 279.
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painful emotion. Like the phenomenological theory, this interpretation of the mind 
draws a distinction between our recognition o/objects and our responses to them.
Given these ideas in phenomenology and cognitive psychology (and, before 
them, in Hellenistic philosophy), we are in a position to see the dilemma they pose for 
a response-resemblance theory of mundane-sacred judgment. Our theory wants to 
interpret the experience o f religious appreciation by saying that a man regards a 
mundane-sacred object as “mourning” if he responds to it in a way that resembles the 
manner in which he responds when he is moved by human mourning. We also want to 
say that this happens without belief about the properties o f that object. But, if the 
above phenomenological and cognitive psychological ideas are true, then we cannot 
sensibly say that the religious man’s response and language are without belief and 
truth-conditions about that object’s nature, as we alleged in earlier chapters o f this 
dissertation. Belief is integral to the response.
The strength o f this objection can be seen if we consider the following 
dilemma it creates.
Let us call a m an’s response to human mourning “response-X”. Now either 
(1) belief is essentially definitive of response-X or (2) it is not.
(1) If the belief is definitive of response-X, then it must reappear 
whenever response-X reappears; the belief must even reappear 
when the object o f response-X is not a man but, for instance, the 
road to Zion or a statue o f  the Buddha or any other non-sentient 
object. So, even a mundane-sacred object, such as a road or a 
statue, can be believed to mourn in a way similar to how a flesh- 
and-blood man mourns. Thus, the “mourning” that is said about the 
mundane-sacred object is a matter o f  belie f just as the response to 
another m an’s mourning is a matter of belief. But, we have 
contended that the meaning o f mundane-sacred judgment does not 
involve belief (i.e., truth-conditions). So our original contention 
about the meaning of mundane-sacred judgm ent must be false.
(2) If, on the other hand, the belief is not definitive o f response-X, and 
so response-X can reappear without the belief, then response-X is
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not necessarily about human mourning. “Mourning”, in other 
words, is not the intentional object of response-X. Therefore, when 
response-X occurs toward mundane-sacred objects, we are unable 
to say that it necessarily reappears with the kind of recognition or 
awareness of mourning that stimulates a characteristic response. 
But, if that is the case, then we shall not know why it is an 
important fact about response-X that it is called “mourning”, or 
how response-X’s recurrence in the religious context is, in fact, the 
recognition or awareness o f “mourning” in the mundane-sacred 
object. So when the religious man employs the predicate 
“mourning”, we cannot explain its use by any particular kind of 
response, or by our response-resemblance theory. Therefore, our 
theory is, if not false, then merely guesswork. Only by accepting 
the idea of belief as essential to this response can we understand its 
diction.
Let us call this the intentionality-dilemma. It will haunt us throughout the rest o f this 
dissertation. In short, it says: either response-X applies the word “mourning” to the 
mundane-sacred object because it involves belief about that object, in which case our 
theory that belief about the object is not involved in mundane-sacred judgments is 
false; or response-X applies the word without belie f about the mundane-sacred object, 
in which case we are left unsure as to why the word is being applied to the mundane- 
sacred object, and what the awareness o f the object entails. To avoid this latter 
consequence, we must accept that religious appreciation does include belief, and that 
its language has truth-conditions. As a result, our theory against that idea must be 
rejected. Our response-resemblance theory, once again, collapses.
If we wish to break the horns o f this dilemma, and keep our theory that 
mundane-sacred judgments do not involve truth-conditions, then we need to find a 
different mental state; that is, an awareness or mental state other than belief that can 
be incorporated into the experience of religious appreciation, and at the same time be 
able to explain the ordinary use of terms in mundane-sacred judgment. That will be 
our philosophical quest.
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CHAPTER 17 
INTENTIONALITY WITHOUT BELIEF?
We might begin this quest to find a mental state that provides for the experience of 
religious appreciation by taking the offensive. Before defending our own position, we 
could pose some questions to the proponent of the dilemma. As a starter, is it 
obviously true that, as the stoic, the phenomenologist or the cognitive psychotherapist 
might say, the intentionality of a mental state arises only as a result o f belief or 
judgment?
Undoubtedly, it would be an unwarranted constraint on the concept of 
intentionality to suggest that, of all the mental states available to a m an’s 
consciousness, only his beliefs have the power to generate intentional responses. 
While it may, indeed, be true that a man must believe himself to be a worthless human 
being in order to suffer responses such as depression, it hardly seems true that a man 
necessarily has to believe something about a situation to be, shall we say, disgusted by 
it. Without citing facts, without appealing to evidence, without evincing beliefs, a 
man might simply be disgusted by, say, the company in which he finds himself at a 
dinner party. Here, in this particular environment, among these particular people, he 
is ju s t  repulsed, disgusted, nauseated. In which case, it is merely a brute fact of his 
consciousness, having neither rhyme nor reason, that he is repelled by these people 
around him. An emotional “cloud” has descended on him, as it were.
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As some existentialists contend, such responses of “disgust”, like the 
responses of “amusement”, “boredom” and “horror”, often arise without any belief or 
judgment about events. These emotions simply happen (which, o f course, does not 
mean that they do not have causes). And, importantly, these kinds o f “general 
responses” put in question the presence of belief in all conscious human behaviour 
and response.
To add to this, we might recall that a common criterion o f clinical mental 
illness is the reoccurrence of responses that have as their psychological basis, not even 
irrational beliefs, but no beliefs at all. These are what could be called “unfounded 
responses” , as in those medical observations of patients who suffer the profoundest 
anxiety or despair, while neither the patients nor their doctors can provide the slightest 
reason why there is such violent emotional upheaval. Under these circumstances, 
clinical psychiatry is justified in hypothesizing that there is no underlying belief -  a 
reason -  generating the behaviour, but rather a chemical imbalance o f some kind -  a 
cause.
This psychological idea -  o f response without belief -  has even crept its way 
into an international relation’s theory, the “security dilemma” . This theory contends 
that a state, even under the awareness that all other states are abiding by international 
norms, and even under the awareness that all other states do not seek to exercise 
violence and coercion with one another, still might experience a sense of insecurity in 
the international realm without any objective belief why it should feel so.143 Like a 
deranged patient, who responds strongly for no reason or conviction, a state has the 
possibility o f responding towards other states without grounds or belief. It can ju s t 
feel insecure, and then act from there -  with devastating consequences.
143 Chris Brown, U nderstanding International Relations (London: Palgrave, 2001) 101-102.
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Now, if such counter-examples from existentialism, clinical psychology and, 
perhaps, political science can be trusted, then the concept of intentionality does not 
necessitate a reliance on the mental state o f belief, since, as we have seen, responses 
can transpire without it. Therefore, the case that we wish to present still has some life. 
Be that as it may, at this point it is enough to know that the kind o f intentional 
response inherent in religious appreciation may not, nor does not have to, involve 
belief. If that idea is, indeed, the situation behind mundane-sacred judgment, we will 
be able to sidestep proposition (1) of our dilemma, that “mourning” is believed to be 
part o f the mundane-sacred object to which the religious man is responding; that is: 
belief is not necessary for such responses, as it is erroneously assumed in the 
dilemma.
In opposition to our suggestion, it might nevertheless be replied that, even in 
the extreme cases, every man will at least believe in the existence o f the objects 
evoking his responses. A man who feels “disgust” at those around him -  at least 
believes in their existence. A man who is clinically ill and fraught with anxiety -  at 
least believes in the existence o f a threat, however nebulous. A nation-state suffering 
insecurity in the international theatre while being unable to explain why it feels so — at 
least believes in the existence of the international realm. And so on.
Yet, even if all that is true for the above cases, such a counter-argument still 
does not establish that the concept of belief is fundamental to the concept of response. 
Who would deny that a man can be disgusted or amused or bored by something 
entirely imaginary -  such as a mental or cinematic image o f gratuitous violence — 
something of which he knows with certainty not to be real? It is evident that 
imaginary-objects are just as likely to evoke responses in a man as are believed- 
objects. Therefore, we cannot contend that a man’s intentionality is founded only 011
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belief or judgment, not even on the bare belief in the existence o f the intentional 
object. A man can respond to something imaginary.
Make no mistake about it. When a man imagines an event -  let us, say, he says 
to himself, “the trees outside my window are bending down in bitter mourning” -  he 
certainly can respond to this spectacle o f the imagination, and he can do this without 
the slightest commitment to its veracity. The more he indulges in it, the more his 
response toward the trees may even appear similar to how he would respond if he 
were facing an actual man in mourning. His imagination could spark states of mind — 
ideas and responses, metaphors and language -  analogous to those which are 
ordinarily awakened by displays o f authentic mourning; he acts just as he would in 
those moments of concrete life when he truly believes in and responds to the existence 
of a sorrowful, mourning man. (This suggestion no doubt coheres with the oft-used 
Stanislavski method in professional acting).
Such a possibility -  response through imagination — provides us with a clue to 
resolving the intentionality-dilemma, which so impressively threatened our response- 
resemblance theory. For here, we have a mental state that is (1) not a belief and yet is 
also (2) a definitive awareness behind the response. It, thus, provides the kind of 
mental awareness needed to explain the response and language of religious 
appreciation. In this way, we can avoid the horns of the dilemma. But, we can do so 
only if we can plausibly suggest that imagination, or something like it, is the 
“awareness” underlying the response o f religious appreciation. If we can do that, then 
our response-resemblance theory can be salvaged.
Our response-resemblance theory will need to contend that responses to 
mundane-sacred objects are not grounded 011 any belief that attributes properties to its 
object. This can only be accomplished by hypothesizing that religious appreciation
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does not involve the same kind o f intentional objects that we find in responses based 
on belief. In religious appreciation, a man’s response must be founded in a way that 
permits his response to exist without reference to any belief about the nature o f its 
object -  just as disgust, boredom, amusement, or insecurity can exist without recourse 
to beliefs about their objects. That is, our theory will need to show that the response 
inherent in religious appreciation is founded on a thought that does not include the 
ascription o f some property to a physical thing.
This is where imagination comes in. Imagination is the kind o f thought that, like 
belief, can evoke responses; but, unlike belief, it does not involve the attribution of 
properties to physical objects. By utilizing a theory o f the imagination, we are in a 
position to say that, in religious appreciation, a man’s experience o f a mundane-sacred 
object incorporates a distinctive kind of intentionality, wherein the response is 
derivative of imagination and distinct from beliefs. Thus, the language expressing this 
experience is not vulnerable to either verificationist or falsficationist, or perhaps even 
agnostic, challenges since the language is not asserting beliefs — or necessarily even 
feelings.
Indeed, another advantage of exploiting the concept o f imagination is that the 
experience of religious appreciation would not necessarily involve emotions. 
Theorists o f religion who are inclined toward empiricist epistemologies -  thinkers as 
diverse as Freud, Marx and logical positivists -  have tended to discard the idea of 
religious perception, the idea that religious people enjoy some special sense that 
allows them to uniquely perceive the “spiritual properties” of things. In rejecting that 
kind o f religious explanation, empiricists have often concluded that the relations of a 
religious man to sacred objects must be explicable in terms o f a state o f mind, which
200
is ordinarily brought under the heading o f the word “emotion” , and, thus, not through 
the senses that ground belief and knowledge. Here, it is assumed that religious 
experiences can be readily explained in terms o f feelings, as if those feelings can be 
easily detached from the awareness and thoughts they presuppose. Hence, this 
empiricist temptation suffers the phenomenological fallacy mentioned earlier. By not 
recognizing the distinction between recognition and response, the empiricists forget 
that emotions often have, at their base, particular modes of awareness.
Is there, then, a mental-state that (a) includes awareness of its object, but (b) 
does not always include the mental-state of emotion? Again, the concept of 
imagination seems to meet this question. Those mental phenomena grouped under the 
name “imagination” exhibit the kind o f awareness needed for responses, and, yet, they 
often do not arouse emotions, even when emotional words are used to describe 
imaginary objects. A spectator at a play of Hamlet, for example, might describe the 
protagonist as “morose” without the spectator finding any noticeable feeling in 
himself. Any spectator o f this play can describe the main character, stemming from 
Shakespeare’s imagination, in terms o f emotion, while not actually feeling any 
emotion himself. This possibility o f an absence o f  emotion while retaining its 
language is important for our theory. For, surely, if we assume imagination is a 
mental feature inherent in religious appreciation, then feelings, like beliefs, are not 
always present in this religious experience, because they are not always present in 
imagination.
If we are able to utilize the idea of imagination in our explanation of religious 
appreciation, it may well be the case that the recognition o f “mourning” involves, at 
times, nothing emotional at all. In which case, those theories o f religion that contend 
that all religious language has, as its mental base, the status of emotion would also be
201
mistaken. In turn, a rejection of the singular role of “feeling” might help confirm the 
prevalent intuition that sacred objects do not simply stir up people’s raw feelings, so 
much as channel them into focused thought and contemplation.
Not only is emotion not necessary, but also we shall now see that there is even 
some pattern of rational justification  in mundane-sacred judgments, an intellectual 
process that would be absent if the experience of religious appreciation were nothing 
more than feelings, urges, passions, unconscious or otherwise. In short, we shall now 
show that religious appreciation is not irrational.
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CHAPTER 18
REASONING IN RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION: 
THE RATIOCINATION OF COMPARISON
The intellectual dimension of religious appreciation may be so articulated that any 
bare emotion-theory might seem, if not wholly misconstrued, then at least unduly 
simplified. Mundane-sacred objects can be exceedingly calculated and multifaceted 
objects, and so too can their descriptions. Just think about the many elaborately 
constructed temples, sacred sculptures and scriptures abounding in our world. Much 
intellectual exercise may be needed to understand the full meaning of these kinds of 
mundane-sacred objects and the language expressing them. A theory o f religious 
appreciation must, therefore, include the possibility o f a large element o f intellectual 
understanding within this religious experience.
Because o f the potentially vast intellectual content in religious appreciation, 
this experience might very well go beyond any contingent relationship to its verbal 
expression in a mundane-sacred judgment. Indeed, it appears that, among the ways a 
religious man can show that he experiences a mundane-sacred object in light o f some 
particular mundane-sacred predicate, he may choose to express merely the predicate 
itself. That is, the verbal expression of religious appreciation, the mundane-sacred 
judgment, is often the very means by which the experience is justified. This 
justification tends to consist o f making comparisons — as when, say, a Buddhist 
explains a sculpture o f the footprint of the Buddha As “joyful” by comparing it with 
expressions o f joy. Now, this is not so unlike the way some factual statements are
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justified: through patterned forms of reasoning. So, like the justification o f factual
statements, the verbal expression of religious appreciation can also involve a pattern
of ratiocination. When this happens, the mundane-sacred judgment rests on what
might be called a “ratiocination of comparisons” . The kind o f reasoning that is
present in the use o f mundane-sacred judgments exploits comparative reasoning. For
an example o f this, recall the passage from Sri Aurobindo:
One o f these buildings climbs up bold, massive in projection, up-piled in the 
greatness of a forceful but sure ascent, preserving its range and line to the last, 
the other soars from the strength o f its base, in the grace and emotion of a 
curving mass to a rounded summit and crowning symbol.144 (Italics mine)
Here, Aurobindo argues that one building has a “bold”, climbing movement, despite,
he seems to suggest, the heaviness of its massive projection. In comparison, the other
building “soars” from the “strength” of its base, and this leaves us with the impression
that this second building enjoys a movement which is both lighter and less arduous
than the first building. Thus, to express his experience, Aurobindo appeals to the way
the buildings counteract with one another; he wields concepts such as “forceful” ,
“bold”, “soaring”, “emotion” and so on. Aurobindo justifies his experience using two
judgments about the architecture, and in those judgments he makes certain
comparisons with other things.
The implication of this kind o f reasoning is that if  one can come to notice
these features of the buildings, then one will also be in a position to agree with the
mundane-sacred judgment about those buildings, perhaps one will even experience
the response that it serves to express. Through comparisons with other things, the
character of the buildings changes for the onlooker, possibly altering them from being
mere objects in his perceptual field to looking like sacred objects. It is as if
Aurobindo’s description about the relationship o f the mundane-sacred object to other
144 On line at: www.hindunet.org/srh_hom e/1996_l l/m sg00034.htm l.
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things -  such as the way the “boldness” and “massiveness” o f one building plays off 
the “soaring” and “emotional” quality of the other building -  is trying to show that the 
mundane-sacred objects share some property in common with those other mundane 
things.
Thus, if we merely described Aurobindo’s thought process in terms of 
“religious feeling” , we would miss the intellectual content inherent in his mundane- 
sacred judgment. As we shall see, one of the more interesting things about religious 
appreciation is the thought upon which the entire experience rests.
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CHAPTER 19
ANOTHER PROBLEM: THE PROBLEM 
OF RELIGIOUS PARTICULARITY
The intentionality-dilemma rests 011 the contention that there is a logical relation 
between a state of mind and its intentional object. That is to say, responses toward 
objects presuppose a certain mental experience like belief. Had this contention been 
true, it would have undermined our argument in earlier chapters, namely, that the 
meaning of a mundane-sacred judgment is not fruitfully explained through the 
concept o f truth-conditions. We avoided this unwelcome consequence by, on the one 
hand, conceding that there is a logical relation between conceptions and responses, 
but, on the other hand, denying that the mental state in charge of any given response 
must be a belief or an emotion. Now, however, we face another problem, a quite 
similar one. This problem arises from the theory that a logical relation between a state 
o f mind and its expression exists. We shall call this the “Problem of Religious 
Particularity” . The argument resembles Spinoza’s metaphysics, but it is most 
powerfully advanced in the aesthetic theory of Collingwood;145 it can even be found 
in W ittgenstein’s remarks on aesthetics.146 And so, given the great minds that have 
embraced it, the challenge of the argument is not easy to overcome.
In the context o f mundane-sacred judgment, the Problem of Religious 
Particularity argument goes something like this. A mental state and its expression are,
145 C ollingw ood, The Principles o f  Art, ch. 2, 29-36.
146 W ittgenstein, Lectures and C onversations on Aesthetics, P sychology and  R eligious B e lie f  28 IT., 
esp. 34-6; The Blue and Brown Book  (Oxford; Blackwell Publishers Ltd, 1998), 177-178.
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in fact, two aspects of one process, and not two separate phenomena. That means, if a 
religious man voices a mundane-sacred judgment, saying in his judgment that a 
mundane-sacred object expresses a particular feeling, then he is not suggesting that 
there is a relation between the mundane-sacred object and some other object. This is 
because for him the mundane-sacred object is unique, a single whole. It cannot be 
properly understood by reference to something else. Accordingly, when a man says 
that he understands the particular feeling o f any given mundane-sacred object -  its 
quality of mourning, for instance -  his understanding cannot be expressed without 
vigilant attention to and participation with that particular object. He will say that, if 
we try to identify his understanding by any other means than how it is expressed, we 
shall be left with the unacceptable consequence that the mundane-sacred object, 
which is the expression of this understanding, is only contingently connected with his 
experience. That means we would be able to describe the religious experience as if the 
sacred object were irrelevant to it. What is more, the upshot, for us, is that any general 
or philosophical explanation o f the experience — that is, any explanation that would 
permit us to say that this religious experience could be felt towards some other 
mundane-sacred object — would not be a description o f what it is to appreciate the 
value o f that particular mundane-sacred object. It would not be an explanation of 
anything that would lead us to believe a religious man appreciated the religious 
quality of a sacred thing. Consequently, according to this reasoning, the response- 
resemblance theory would divorce the religious experience from its circumstances, 
the very circumstances that, in ordinary language, we call “religious” . That result is 
manifestly absurd. So, the reasoning goes, the response-resemblance theory must be 
flawed.
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This argument is powerful. It is as frequently found in aesthetics as it is in the 
phenomenological theory o f religion. To see this, consider a brief comparison 
between the aesthetician, Collingwood, and the phenomenologist of religion, Eliade. 
When Collingwood drew a distinction of kind between art and craft, he contended that 
art, unlike craft, was an end and not a means; so, too, the phenomenologist Eliade, in 
arguing that there was a distinction between religion and other social phenomena, 
contended that religious phenomena could not be “reduced” to some deeper cause, 
because religion qua religion had to be understood as an end and not a means. And, 
just as art, in order to be properly appreciated, could only be viewed as an 
autonomous activity having no purpose or rationale independent of itself, so too for 
Eliade the concept of a “sacred object” had to be regarded as “irreducible”, if one 
were to grasp its religious meaning. Moreover, just as “ true art” for Collingwood 
would never point beyond itself to objects and states of mind that are separately 
identifiable, so too, for Eliade, true religious objects would be ends in themselves, 
enjoying a singular value. Indeed, like art, religious objects do not express any state 
o f mind that are independently understood, since if that were so, the object would 
have an external end, which would be the expression of that identifiable state o f mind. 
Like in art, the expression of religious objects is fundamentally opposed to 
reductionism and “deeper” explanation. Religious objects, like the greatest artworks, 
present us with a particularity, something unique, autonomous, and valuable in itself, 
as has been argued in earlier chapters.
Eliade’s contention is, without question, a muscular challenge to our response- 
resemblance theory. It renders utterly futile any attempt to independently describe the 
experience of religious appreciation -  indeed, it makes futile any explanation of 
religious experience independent of its object, including presumably Eliade’s own
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theory of “archetypes” (though he does not admit as much). It argues that a man’s 
response toward a mundane-sacred object enjoys its chief expression only in the 
appreciation o f that object, and, therefore, the response cannot be identified separately 
from the expression. The strength of the argument hinges 011 a deduction from the 
necessary connection between response and expression to the necessary connection 
between expression and object.
This idea is remarkably similar to the intentionality-dilemma and, 
unsurprisingly, it offers a similar conclusion. But, note, it also argues that any attempt 
to independently describe religious appreciation inevitably fails to portray the whole 
nature of it. For, under this interpretation, religious appreciation is logically connected 
to the particular circumstances -  that is, the particular mundane-sacred object -  in 
which it finds expression.
As a neo-Wittgensteinian might put it, if we say that a mundane-sacred object 
expresses an experience of a certain kind, then this implies we can identify and 
describe that experience independently. Yet, if this could be done, then it is not 
impossible we would be able to find another way, besides the mundane-sacred object, 
to express that experience, and this different way would serve the religious m an’s 
purposes just as well. A religious man would then be in the position to treat mundane- 
sacred objects experimentally and instrumentally, trading in a traditionally accepted 
sacred object for something else, provided, o f course, the new object stimulated or 
expressed the appropriate feeling or experience inherent in religious appreciation. But, 
in fact, this experimental process is quite alien to the way the religious man relates to 
holy objects. A religious man, generally speaking, relates to a particular thing, an 
object deemed valuable, and that object is what is crucially important to him.
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Given this, the problem with the response-resemblance theory, according to 
the Problem of Religious Particularity, is that it treats the experience of a mundane- 
sacred object as if it were just haphazardly chosen to stimulate an experience. And 
that is nonsense. Sacred objects, be they temples or gods, scriptures or dances, are 
essential to the religious life, often part of an ancient communal heritage. We cannot 
barter with them. Such a flippant regard for mundane-sacred objects would be to treat 
them as a replica for some other experience, making their role wholly instrumental 
rather than integral and essential to a form of life.
Now we have agreed with this theory of the mundane-sacred object to some 
extent, but under a different interpretation.147 However, the theory is again posing 
difficulties to our theory o f response-resemblance.
We can nevertheless also reply to this aspect o f the Problem of Religious 
Particularity, albeit somewhat sophistically.148 The reply is that the Problem of 
Religious Particularity conceals an analytic truth about the identity o f mental states, 
which is trifling at best. If  we adopt a strong criterion of identity, whereby two mental 
phenomena are regarded as belonging to the same category o f mental state if and only 
if their expression are numerically identical, then the problem says nothing more than 
that sacred objects do not express absolutely the same thing. Thus, when a religious 
man states that the particular feeling expressed about a mundane-sacred object (say, 
the sacred hill Tirukkalikkundram in Southern India) is not identical with the 
particular feeling expressed by another mundane-sacred object (say, the Muslim 
muezzin chants), then the man says nothing more than the analytic truth that the two 
objects are not absolutely identical.
147 See Chapter 9, where we argued that, without an external purpose, there can be no rules for the 
assessm ent o f  mundane-sacred objects,
148 The follow ing is how Richard W ollheim , A rt ancl its O bjects , section 48; and Scruton, A rt and  
Im agination, pp 80-82 reply to a similar argument in aesthetics.
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While that analytic truth is true, it is not a fatal challenge to the possibility of 
an independent description of religious experience. The argument, in proffering that 
the religious man responds to a particular object, hinges on the erroneous belief that 
the term “particular” has only an intransitive use, governed only by the strong 
criterion o f identity mentioned above. But, there is another sense to the idea of 
“particularity” , which a religious man may be employing.
As Wittgenstein noted, the term particular has not only an intransitive but also 
a transitive application.149 If a pious Jain asserts that the great Jain statue of Bahubali 
at Shravana-Begola in Karnataka, Mysore expresses a particular feeling, or that he 
responds toward it in a particular manner, then he may very well be applying the term 
“particular” intransitively, as Eliade would contend. In which case, the Jain means to 
stop us from asking him any further questions, such as: What feeling is expressed? In 
what manner do you experience the statue? Rather, it is as if  the man, in employing 
the word “particular” to his feeling, were telling us to hush up, ask no more questions 
o f  me. I am using the word "particular” in. such a way as to indicate there is a strong 
criterion o f  identity inherent in my mental state toward this, and only this, object.
O f course, that the man chooses or implies the intransitive sense of the word 
“particular” does not logically prove that we cannot describe the man’s feelings and 
responses toward the mundane-sacred object independently o f  that object. Instead, his 
point is only that he does not intend to provide us with any fuller description of his 
experience. His mundane-sacred judgment identifies and refers to his particular 
feeling expressed by, or felt in response to, the statue of Bahubali. Thus, he is only 
drawing our attention to what, for him, is the most significant attribute of the statue. It 
is this particular expression of the mundane-sacred object that he wants us to see.
14y Brown Book, 158ff.
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If, by contrast, he wants not merely to draw our attention to his mental state, 
but also to describe that mental state, then what he means is that his “particular” 
feeling, or “particular” response, ought to be understood transitively. In which case, 
he permits us to question him -  “ Which feeling 01* which response or what expression 
are you experiencing?” We are allowed this question because, in this context, the 
m an’s use o f “particular” stands as a linguistic substitute for a broader description that 
he has yet to articulate. Here, then, is an experience that can be described 
independently.
Now, does the fact that there is an intransitive and transitive sense successfully 
sidestep the problem of particularity? Unfortunately, it seems the answer is no. If it 
were true that all uses of the word “particular” when applied in religious contexts 
intended the transitive sense o f that word, then, yes, it would settle the issue. We 
would then be justified in offering independent explanations o f religious appreciation 
that do not make any reference to any particular mundane-sacred object, on the 
ground that the transitive understanding of “particular” is being utilized; thereby 
allowing us to feel confident in giving a general response-resemblance theory for all 
religious appreciation.
However, it appears manifestly true that, when the religious man indicates the 
feelings that are expressed by mundane-sacred objects and the responses that those 
objects awaken in him, he often does intend the intransitive sense of the word 
“particular”, indicating a remarkable relationship to a particularly remarkable object. 
Now, this is merely a result of the way in which mundane-sacred objects happen to be 
appreciated in the world of religion. No doubt, if the religious man were always, only 
and merely relaying to us the feelings that mundane-sacred objects aroused in him, 
then we would have an empirical indication that the religious man appreciates
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mundane-sacred objects as, simply, a means for provoking those feelings. This would 
be a justifiable interpretation based on empirical evidence. We could say perhaps that 
his responses to mundane-sacred objects are analogous to the way some people value 
pornography. As long as a photograph, film, narrative or show scintillates the 
appropriate level of lust in them, then it is no less valuable than any other 
pornographic object. It serves just as well. Likewise any object, a scripture as much as 
a pop song, can be a “mundane-sacred object” provided it arouses the appropriate 
“religious experience”.
Yet, such an idea about sacred objects breaches a widespread observation that 
the religious man, for the most part, does not relate to his holy objects in the way 
people appreciate pornography or drugs150, as merely a means to some other end. 
Whether it be the glorious figures o f the apostles at the Cathedral of Santiago in 
northwest Spain, or the haunting melodies o f holy men beside the Ganges in India, or 
the secretive Hopi kivas in the American Southwest, a mundane-sacred object, by and 
large, does not possess value because it ju s t happens to excite people, as if any other 
object that thrilled in the same way could step in as a substitute. For the religious man, 
these objects are approached as ends, enjoying timeless significance, whether or not 
they arouse feelings in onlookers. Indeed, this is the main reason why thinkers such as 
Eliade, as well some neo-Wittgensteinians and dialogical philosophers, tend to deny 
the psychological and logical-positivist reduction of religious experience to the 
category o f “emotion”. If a mundane-sacred object -  a temple, a hymn, a theatrical 
enactment of the gods -served only as a means for rousing feelings in people, then it 
would follow that we could develop experimental tests whereby “the best” or “most 
holy” mundane-sacred object would be the one that provoked the most emotion of the
150 Pace  A ldous Huxley and his argument in The D oors o f  P erception  (N ew  York: Harper &  Row, 
Publishers, 1963).
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most suitable type. We could create a hierarchy of mundane-sacred objects, just as 
pornographers rate and categorize erotic websites. And, we could do this because such 
objects interest the religious man only as a stimulus for certain feelings, rather than 
because o f their very status as sacred objects.
But, religious appreciation is evidently not like that. Religious experience 
does not reduce to intoxication, as if the worth of a sacred object were no different 
than a good shot o f whisky. Nor does the evaluation of a mundane-sacred object 
simply involve an analysis of its instrumental capacity, as if the object only enjoyed 
value because it has causal power to stir up human passions. In the eyes o f a religious 
community, an object earns the status o f “sacredness” because o f what it is, and not 
for what it does to the feelings of the community, even if it does a lot to them.
The protest against such reductions to emotion, or to some other category, is 
longstanding in the theory of religion.151 It is associated with (sometimes hysterical) 
disdain for Freudian, Marxist, and logical-positivist views of religious experience. It 
is often combined with an effort to define religious experience as an autonomous 
territory of the mind, whose value and place in human experience can be 
independently delineated. It tends to argue that it is a contusion of the “ language- 
game” o f religion to reduce religious experience and language to some other linguistic 
paradigm. It also frequently charges that such reductions confuse and conflate 
fundamental conceptual distinctions, the distinctions between causes and reasons, 
between emotions and thoughts, between means and ends.
Yet, however justified such objections are, there is, nevertheless, room to
question their implications. For, do we truly have to concede that religious
appreciation cannot be independently described -  particularly in the manner we would
151 See, e.g., Part II o f  Russell T., M cCutcheon, ed„ The Insider/O utsider Problem  in die Study o f  
Religion'. A R eader (London and New York: Cassell, 1999).
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like, through a response-resemblance theory? Can we find a way of characterizing 
religious appreciation wherein we maintain the possibility o f the intransitive use of 
“particular” while not forestalling a philosophical explanation? Is it possible to 
preserve our intuition that the mundane-sacred object is an “end in itself” while still 
referring to an experience that is independently described from that object?
Surely, what philosophers such as Eliade, Wittgenstein and Buber have 
revealed is that it makes no sense to say that a mundane-sacred object expresses a 
particular experience, when the word “particular” is meant intransitively. Nor, does it 
make sense to say that, in religious appreciation, a mundane-sacred object stimulates a 
particular response, when “particular” is again meant intransitively. They are right to 
point out that it is important to recognize that religious people, generally speaking, do 
frequently intend the intransitive use of “particular” when talking about their 
mundane-sacred objects. This is because religious people wish to direct our attention 
to the sacred objects themselves, and not to any emotion or experience that could be 
independently described, however wonderful these experiences and responses may in 
fact be.
Conceding these points, how can we go forward with a response-resemblance 
theory? We are trying to proffer a general theory o f the experience — but that does not 
seem possible.
It seems that the only way to proceed is to find an explanation of religious 
appreciation that includes the perception of an object: that is, sensory contact with a 
particular thing. Religious appreciation would then be a kind of religious experience 
that essentially involves the perception of a thing, and therefore explainable partly in 
terms of the human sensory perception o f that thing. This not only coheres with the 
evident sensory dimension of mundane-sacred objects, it also helps us further analyze
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how it is possible that religious appreciation remains an interest in a particular object 
considered as an “end in itse lf’. This is so because the perception is focused on a 
thing distinctly, although this theory o f perception will have to be different than how 
it was understood given the discussions in earlier chapters. If our analysis proves 
successful, it will allow us not only to see how religious appreciation can be classified 
into kinds and, thus, described independently of their physical object, but also to see 
how the experiences are compatible with an appreciation o f any particular mundane- 
sacred objects upon which they are focused.
To begin this task of elucidating religious appreciation, we need to probe 
further into the philosophy o f mind, particularly noting some philosophical 
distinctions between cognitive and noil-cognitive states of mind. In so doing, we shall 
observe in later chapters that there are subtle and important differences between the 
mental state o f belief and the mental state of imagination and in how they are related 
to perception. In recalling these distinctions, we shall be in a position to see how 
“aspect seeing” is a species of the imagination, and how this category of mind and 
perception might enable us to meet the Problem of Religious Particularity.
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CHAPTER 20
YET ANOTHER PROBLEM: 
THE LANGUAGE-DEPENDENT THEORY
The Problem o f Religious Particularity is not the only challenge we need to repudiate 
in order to go forward with a response-resemblance theory of religious appreciation. 
A number of epistemologists, particularly those of an idealist and postmodernist 
leaning, have contended that the concept of belief can only be explained through an 
appeal to the language in which it is found. What this means is that there is no way to 
identify the concept of belief except by way of the more primary concept of verbal 
communication. Yet the response-resemblance theory, as we have proposed it, hinges 
on the possibility that declarative sentences have, at least, two possible sets of 
meaning, those that express beliefs and those that do not. Our contention, at its heart, 
proposes that beliefs can in principle be identified independently of the sentences that 
express them. But this suggestion is rendered absurd if beliefs can only be identified 
through language, for, how would we distinguish those declaratives that do not 
express beliefs from those that do? There would be no way o f distinguishing them. 
Even worse for us, there would be no means to differentiate mundane-sacred 
judgments in terms o f experiential conditions from truth-conditions. Our theory, then, 
would collapse. It would rest on a phantom-like semantic distinction, offering yet 
another example of philosophical muddling with mankind’s ordinary understanding of 
the declarative sentence.
Let us call this criticism “the language-dependent theory”.
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To counter it, a strategy that indirectly subverts the criticism might be our 
best, if not only, approach. By a kind of reductio ad absurdum, we could try to show 
that the implications of the theory -  that the concept o f belief is dependent on 
language -  eventuate in paradox and implausibility. Consequently, out of deference to 
common sense, the language-dependent theory would then need to be rejected. Such a 
counter-demonstration would, at least, allow us to carry on confidently with a 
response-resemblance theory, secure in the knowledge that our approach could not be 
any less plausible than its sceptical alternative. That is the modest goal o f this chapter.
To begin, let us notice that our critic would have us think that we can ascribe 
beliefs to a being if, and only if, we are in a position to say something in language 
about what that being believes. Undoubtedly, this suggestion has a certain amount of 
persuasiveness. As deconstructionists are apt to remind us, we cannot step outside 
language in order to explain language. Just as “rationality” is assumed in every 
argument, and therefore, on pain of circularity, rationality cannot be justified by 
argument, so too language is assumed in eveiy description about belief, and therefore, 
without language, we cannot Jmow about another’s beliefs. This argument posits that 
if we wished, for example, to catalogue the total number o f beliefs in the universe, 
then we could do nothing more than add up the total number o f declarative sentences. 
Otherwise, how else would we tally beliefs, except through calculating the sum 
amount of actual and possible statements in the universe? Moreover, if, in this cosmic 
calculation of declaratives, we felt that two different sentences expressed the same 
belief, then it would appear that our only criterion for this synonymy would be their 
identity in linguistic meaning. In turn, this would imply that the concept o f belief 
could only be grasped through sentences and their meanings. Belief, language and 
meaning would then be intimately and radically fused, so much so that we could
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deduce that without a language no being, whether it is a god or a man, could express 
any clear-cut beliefs. Mere behaviour, in and of itself, would never have the same 
kind o f definitive power that language possesses in expressing belief. Only language 
can provide such definiteness. Given this, we then would be forced to conclude that 
the ascription o f belief to any being would be dependent on that being’s capacity to 
exhibit that (a) it agrees with some sentence, and/or (b) it can employ that sentence as 
a premise in theoretical or practical linguistic processes.
Make no mistake about it: this argument savages the response-resemblance 
theory, since our theory relies entirely on the linguistic possibility that only some 
declaratives convey beliefs. Remember, we are saying that there is a distinction 
between declaratives expressing beliefs and declaratives that do not. But our opponent 
is now refusing that such a distinction can be made. All declaratives, if they are 
meaningful, express beliefs, he says. Indeed, our adversary might further point out 
that, in both day-to-day speech and formal grammar, non-philosophers do not 
recognize such a contrast. Our contrast, then, is also a philosophical fantasy, and not a 
genuine linguistic practice.
Given all that, how can we feel justified in advancing a theory o f mundane- 
sacred judgment that proposes that, unlike other kinds of declaratives, its linguistic 
meaning is dependent on a mental state other than belief?
Well, there is a way.
When we examine the language-dependent theory, we find that it generates 
paradoxical consequences. Ironically, the arguments that this theory utilizes to 
condemn competing theories, such as our own, in the end return to condemn its own 
persuasiveness.
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Notice: the language-dependent theory argues dubiously from the premise 
that beliefs can be identified in language only through reference to declarative 
sentences to the conclusion that beliefs are dependent on language for their existence. 
But, if the logic underlying this reasoning is valid, then it should follow that a similar 
argument could be advanced which would validate the ontological dependence on 
language of every other entity that is similarly identified through language. Such 
entities would include mankind’s bedrock concepts like information, truths, facts , 
states o f  affairs -  the very concepts that make human life possible and give it 
meaning. Like belief, these concepts can only be identified through language; 
therefore, their ontological dependence on language and language alone would also 
necessarily follow.
But, while old-school nihilists and idealists might gleefully accept this 
conclusion, the argument nevertheless suffers the age-old paradoxes and truth- 
dilemmas that such thinkers have never truly faced to the satisfaction o f their more 
pragmatic critics. Remember: if  a concept such as “truth”, be it interpreted as a 
property or as a relation or as a perspective, is dependent on language and only 
language, then what makes the language-dependent theory anymore “true” than any 
other competing theory? Just because this criticism has been voiced, to the point of 
cliche, in just about every first-year philosophy seminar from time immemorial, it is 
no less powerful. Indeed, if we accept the logic underlying the language-dependent 
theory, applying it as consistently to the concept of belief as to the concepts of truth, 
language and fact, there would be nothing to prevent us from collapsing into outright 
solipsism. Such paradoxes and untenable philosophical consequences should be 
sufficient reason to reject any such philosophical contention, and not just with respect
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to the concept o f truth, but also — for our purposes — with respect to the ontological 
relation between belief and language.
To further illustrate the improbability o f the language-dependent theory, also 
consider how Scruton shows, within the context of his “affective theory” o f aesthetic 
experience, that the concept of “ information” plays a similar role as belief in 
language. His analysis of the two words reminds us that the concept of belief, like the 
concept of information, cannot be strictly identified with the language through which 
it is expressed. Thus,
it is commonly assumed in scientific circles (whether rightly or wrongly) that 
this concept [of information] can be used in the description and explanation of 
the behaviour of machines; and yet it shows just the same kind o f relation to 
language and meaning as does the concept o f belief. Information is identified 
in language with just the same constructions of indirect speech that are used to 
identify beliefs. We speak o f the information that..., where the gap is filled by 
a sentence which conveys the precise piece of information that we wish to 
consider. It is often thought to be tme, nonetheless, that the concept of 
information can be applied to the behaviour of a machine: a guided missile, 
say. Such a machine may be said to receive and respond to the information 
that a metallic object is moving ten miles above it at a speed o f five hundred 
miles an hour. It does not matter whether this use o f the concept of 
information is a stretched or extended use. For here we have a sentence in 
indirect speech, for which no immediate substitute is available, and which is 
thought to offer a plausible and verifiable explanation o f the machine’s 
behaviour. Whether it is the best kind of explanation is another matter: it is 
certainly the simplest. And no air of paradox attaches to the fact that here 
explanation rests on a construction in indirect speech. Why should not the 
same be true, therefore, o f the sentences that identify beliefs? We can see this 
concept o f belief as giving a particular kind of explanation of human and 
animal behaviour (explanation by “reason” rather than by “cause”). If the 
concept of belief is introduced in this way then it by no means follows that a 
creature that has beliefs must also have a language in which these beliefs may
1 S9achieve “direct” expression. “
This kind of counter-reasoning against the language-dependent theory suggests that, 
for concepts such as information or belief or truth, paradox is avoided only if we resist 
the temptation to consign their existence to language and language alone. We should,
152 Scruton, A rt and Im agination , 86.
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then, abandon the language-dependent theory. In itself, this rejection of the language- 
dependent theory does not deny that, when we wish to refer to beliefs, we often find it 
necessary to point to the declarative sentences that express them. But, still, the mental 
state o f belief can in principle be understood independently o f its language. And that 
is all we need to know. Thus, we are still justified in our hypothesis that mundane- 
sacred judgments are a kind o f declarative that need not express belief. Even if 
slightly wounded by this objection, we can still press on.
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CHAPTER 21
BELIEF AND CONTEMPLATION
Let us pause to review the course of our argument so far. First, recall the 
intentionality-dilemma from Chapter 16. We argued that if we accepted the 
phenomenological and cognitive psychological theory of intentionality, then two 
alternatives were available to us with respect to the meaning o f mundane-sacred 
predicates: either (1) a word such as “mourning” was applied to a mundane-sacred 
object because it involved belief about that object feeling such an emotion, in which 
case our theory that the concept o f belief and truth-conditions were not necessarily 
involved in mundane-sacred judgments was false; or (2) the word was applied to a 
mundane-sacred object without belief, in which case we were left puzzled as to why 
the word was being applied at all, and to what the content o f the response toward 
mundane-sacred objects actually included. We noted that if we wished to split the 
horns of this dilemma, and thereby keep our theory that mundane-sacred judgment did 
not involve truth-conditions, then we needed to find a mental state other than belief 
which, on the one hand, could be incorporated into the response of religious 
appreciation and, on the other hand, could simultaneously explain the use of ordinary 
terms in mundane-sacred judgment.
In Chapter 17, after denying that belief was a necessary condition for 
intentional responses, we hinted that the mental state o f imagination might be the 
missing mental experience for which we were searching. Here was a mental state that, 
like belief, sparked responses, but importantly did not ascribe properties to its objects.
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Here was a mental state that was not a belief and yet was a definitive awareness 
underlying certain kinds o f response. And, here was a mental state that, because it 
only sometimes included emotional content, was not reducible to the concept of 
feelings; it even sometimes included a kind of intellectual reasoning (Chapter 18). 
Imagination was, it appeared, exactly the kind of mental awareness we needed to 
explain the response and language of religious appreciation. I f  we could plausibly 
argue that imagination, or some species of it, was the “awareness” underpinning the 
response of religious appreciation, then our response-resemblance theory could be 
salvaged from the horns o f the intentionality-dilemma. That is, we could still feel 
confident in advancing the idea o f a particular religious experience toward mundane- 
sacred objects, which was at the same time independent o f the other more recognized 
kinds o f religious experience.
In Chapter 19, however, we noted that philosophers, such as Eliade, 
Wittgenstein and Buber, in their different ways, proffered that it made little sense to 
argue that a sacred object expressed a particular experience, when the word 
“particular” was meant intransitively. Even if these philosophers were at times not 
faithflil to their own insight, the objection, nevertheless, made it difficult for us to say 
with poise that in religious appreciation a mundane-sacred object stimulates a 
particular kind o f response when “particular” was meant intransitively. Accordingly, 
we conceded that these great twentieth-century philosophers were undoubtedly on to 
something: it is imperative for us to remember that religious people, generally 
speaking, do intend the intransitive use of “particular” when talking about their 
mundane-sacred objects. They wish, by and large, to direct our attention to the sacred 
objects themselves, and not to any human emotion or experience that could be 
independently described. This seems to be the case even when the experiences and
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responses are breathtaking and beautiful, in the way that religious experiences are 
most often described. Mundane-sacred objects are valued as ends in themselves, as 
unique, as particular, no matter what people experience as a result o f encountering 
them. Any persuasive theory o f religion, religious language, or religious experience 
would, therefore, need to take this into account.
Hence, out of deference to the “end in itself’ quality typically ascribed to 
mundane-sacred objects, we went on to suggest that, perhaps, the only way to proceed 
with a response-resemblance theory was to find an explanation of religious 
appreciation that included a perception of a particular object. We needed an 
experience that included sensory contact with an existing thing. Thus, we were back 
to the notion of “perception”, albeit understood rather differently from the theory of 
“religious perception” presented in Chapter 11. With regard to our theory, religious 
appreciation would be a religious experience that essentially involved the perception 
of a thing, and, therefore, would need to be explained partly in terms of human 
sensory perception, but it was not about perceiving religious properties, instead just 
the perception of the object.
So, though this religious experience was focused on a distinct thing, it did not 
attribute religious properties in the way that a typical “religious perception theory” 
might propose. We suggested, without elaboration, that if  this requirement of 
perception could be shown to cohere with our other requirements for religious 
appreciation, then it would provide us with a way o f explaining how religious 
appreciation has remained an interest in an object considered as an “end in itse lf’ 
while also being an experience that could be described independently o f  any 
particular object. If this analysis were successful, it would have the advantage of 
allowing us to see how religious appreciation could be classified into kinds, and thus
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described independently of its physical object, while also being related to the 
appreciation of an intransitively particular numdane-sacred object.
To begin elaborating this theoretical project, we proposed investigating the 
subtle differences between the mental state of belief and the mental state of 
imagination, and how they were both related to perception. But then, before we could 
proffer this analysis, we immediately got sucked into another imbroglio. In Chapter 
20, we were defied by the language-dependent theory, wherein it averred that we 
could not distinguish declarative sentences that relate to the mental state of belief 
from declarative sentences that relate to other mental experiences such as imagination 
because the concept o f belief was dependent for its identification — and, tacitly, its 
existence — on language. There was no way to ascertain beliefs that were independent 
o f language. Hence, if this criticism were true, our distinctions broke down and our 
theory was rendered impotent.
But the fallacy o f the language-dependent theory, we discovered, was that its 
logic applied as much to the concept o f truth as to the concept of belief. And this in 
turn rendered the criticism itself vacuous and ineffective. Like a virus that ends up 
killing the very host that gives it life, the logic upholding the language-dependent 
theory could not be trusted. So the criticism was jettisoned. Consequently, we were 
able to retain our initial hypothesis that there was a fundamental distinction between 
declarative sentences expressing belief from those that do not.
This, of course, did not mean that belief was also not identified by way of 
referring to sentences and meanings. It meant only that its existence was not 
dependent on language. While language was indeed often necessary for us to identify 
beliefs, the concept of belief itself was distinct from the concept o f language. And that
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was all we needed to escape the language-dependent theory: the concept of belief 
could in principle be understood independently of its sentences.
But, because language is often necessary to locate beliefs, some philosophers 
have been inclined to discuss the concept o f belief indirectly through the concept of 
an assertion in language. l53 Although at first sight this indirect approach may appear 
an empty semantic distinction, it provides us with a helpful way to differentiate belief 
from other kinds of thought. This is because not every sentence in language is also 
asserted. There are unasserted sentences, and these can be justifiably interpreted as 
sentences without belief\ Here are some obvious examples of sentences that occur 
unasserted:
“Assume, for a moment, that the universe is infinite.”
“Suppose that you were in his shoes.”
“If Socrates is a man, then Socrates is mortal.”
“Tt is possible that aliens are alive on M ars”
The above utterances, while recognizably ordinary grammatical sentences, 
nevertheless do not assert anything and, therefore, do not commit their author to a 
definite belief. But what is especially important to notice here is that the conceptual 
division between asserted and unasserted sentences does not correspond to any 
distinction o f grammar. Both kinds o f sentence, however different in meaning, can be 
expressed in identical grammatical form: a sentence such as “The universe is infinite” 
under certain conditions can in fact mean “Assume that the universe is infinite” . This 
could happen if the context made clear that the declarative was an assumption (for 
example, in a fictional narrative).
I:>3 Peter T. Geacli, M ental Acts (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1971), sections 22-23; Bruce 
Aune, Knowledge, M ind and Nature (N ew  York: Random House, 1967), 213 ff.
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This discrepancy between grammar and meaning can be confusing, leading to 
various fallacies o f ambiguity. We all know that, to avoid such confusion, we 
sometimes need to invoke the total context o f an utterance in order to clarify whether 
or not it is an unasserted sentence. Legend has it that when Orson Wells broadcast on 
the radio that aliens were attacking the earth some latecomers to his show heard the 
report, believed it, and out of panic committed suicide. That is an extreme example of 
what can transpire when an unasserted sentence -  heard in the middle o f a fictional 
narrative -  is mistaken as asserted. Indeed, as regards many verbal accounts, it can be 
nearly impossible to know that the sentences are meant as unasserted: if, for instance, 
prior knowledge o f the initial assumption that the sentences are fictional is missing, 
any o f us could form erroneous, even fatal, beliefs through misunderstanding the 
assertoric nature of the narrative’s chain of sentences.
We have in language, then, the sometimes-confusing phenomenon of 
unasserted sentences. This phenomenon in turn raises a question for the philosophy o f 
mind. What is the mental process corresponding to this use of language? What 
happens when we indulge in this kind of speaking?
We might begin to answer this by recalling some distinctions in folk 
psychology. Let us call the underlying mental state of unasserted declaratives the 
contemplation, not belief, of an unasserted proposition. That is to say, it is a mental 
act mirroring the verbal act o f saying an unasserted sentence; just as believing -  or 
more precisely judging -  is the mental act that reflects an asserted sentence. This 
mental act of “contemplation” would be a kind o f thought that involves, unlike belief, 
the entertaining of a proposition. There is no commitment to its truth on the part of 
the contemplator. Rather, contemplation is the mere consideration o f a possibility, a
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supposition, or an assumption. Here, the mind gazes, as it were, upon a proposition, 
which hovers before the mind’s eye like actors on a stage before an audience.
Many thought processes are of this nature. Ideas, images, propositions, voices, 
even tastes, often float before our minds without any commitment o f belief or faith on 
our part. We might summon before the mind the taste o f a cigar without actually 
believing we are smoking; we might daydream that we are kissing our beloved even 
when she has passed away; and, in all of this, we can sometimes feel as if it were truly 
happening. Whatever the cause of this mental power, its very possibility allows us to 
know what it means to say and understand an unasserted sentence.
As Frege pointed out, the concept of “assertedness” is not a component that 
comprises the meaning of a sentence.154 A proposition must mean the same thing in 
both its asserted and unasserted uses.155 With regard to any declarative sentence, its 
meaning can come before the mind, irrespective of whether or not one believes in the 
truth of that sentence.156 Only in this way are we able to consider the various 
arguments, logic, and interpretations on any given subject. It is this feature o f the 
mind that also allows us to tell a stoiy, to reason, to imagine. When we imagine 
something -  or watch a fictional film or read a thriller -  we are for the most part 
uninterested in its veracity. Even though the substance o f our imaginary stories 
borrows the contents o f a belief, the kind of mental processes behind them are 
nevertheless independent of belief. In such contexts, it is as if we are indifferent to 
truth.
What happens in this mental process? The contemplation of an unasserted 
proposition appears to include at least two specific notions: (1) a proposition “floats”
134 G. Frege, “ Sense and Reference”, in Peter T. Geach and M. Black, ed., P hilosophical Writings o f  
G ottlob Frege', Peter T. Geach, “Assertion”, P hilosophical R eview , 74  (1965), 449-465.
155 Ibid.
150 Ibid.
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before the mind, as it were, and (2) the proposition’s truth is not established or even 
necessarily desired. The idea also seems to presuppose that the mental state of 
contemplation can only arise in beings that have language. Crediting this kind of 
mental state to non-human animals is difficult to hypothesize. To identify such 
thoughts, we seem to require acts of speech. In fact, unlike beliefs, this mental state 
needs verbal language in order to be expressed at all. Otherwise, without the 
possibility of linguistic assertion, there would be nothing to contemplate as 
unasserted.
How is any o f this relevant to substantiating a response-resemblance theory of 
religious appreciation? Recall from Chapter 16 that we are looking for a mental state 
that will avoid the horns of the intentionality-dilemma. We want to find a thought 
process that (a) evinces an awareness of its object but (b) does not require a belief 
about it. Now, we have just differentiated belief, and its associated act of assertion, 
from the contemplation of an unasserted proposition. This differentiation seems to 
meet the criteria we are seeking. So is this the kind of mental act for which we have 
been searching?
Unfortunately, no. The concept of “contemplation” is hardly muscular enough 
to fill out a response-resemblance theory. True, the thought process involved in 
religious appreciation is directed at, and awakened in response to, a particular 
mundane-sacred object, but the meagre contemplation o f a proposition about a sacred 
object cannot be genuinely called a religious reaction to it. It seems too indifferent, 
too passionless, to count as a psychological explanation of mundane-sacred judgment 
and m an’s propensity to voice this kind of utterance.
But we do find that the concept o f contemplation opens a way for describing 
other kinds of thought in terms o f the idea of entertaining a proposition. And that is
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helpful because the above analysis provides some explication of the concept of 
“thinking about” . When a religious man thinks about a mundane-sacred object, it 
may entail entertaining propositional thoughts of it. He has, before his mind’s eye, 
sentences in which the subject place o f the sentences is the mundane-sacred object. If 
he thinks of the mundane-sacred object, there is certainly no mental requirement that 
his thoughts about the object should also be beliefs about it. He can think of things 
that are pure fantasy (whether or not such fantasies are sanctioned by his religious 
community). As with contemplation, “thinking about” may be totally unconcerned 
with truth. Indeed, to test the veracity o f this, think of any fantasy or imaginary flight 
you have ever indulged in about some object or person. Its truth was irrelevant, was it 
not? Indeed, its lack o f truth may have been what was most important and exciting 
about it.
Now, this irrelevance of truth may be a solution to the problem of religious 
responses to mundane-sacred objects. By employing the concept of “to think about X 
as Y”, we might now be in a position to elucidate how it is that a mundane-sacred 
object comes to be described as “mourning” or “joyful”, because “to think about...” is 
clearly a species of thought that is distinct from belief. When a man thinks about (let 
us say) his future, he might envision it as prosperous or impoverished. And, he may 
come to the conclusion that one outcome is more likely than the other. But again, 
these propositions that he entertains are not necessarily asserted. He may merely think 
about X (his future on earth) as Y (prospering) when he in fact knows that it is 
impossible that X will be Y (say, if he is on death row scheduled to be executed in an 
hour). Here, whilst having this thought in his prison cell, he need not assert to himself 
that his future looks bright and hopeful. When he thinks of his future as flourishing, it
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may involve, for whatever reason, little more than the entertaining o f the proposition 
“my future looks prosperous” .
O f course, there is more to this kind of thought process. Merely entertaining a 
proposition is certainly not a sufficient condition for the concept o f “to think of X as 
Y”. To see this, consider the example of insults. If you think to yourself “My boss is a 
cow”, then you are doing a few things: you are expressing something about your 
mental disposition, since it would not be sufficient that you should have a disposition 
to entertain this proposition if you always immediately discarded it as a description of 
your boss. Indeed, if the insult is to be a genuine description o f the way you think 
about your boss, the insult must seem to you as somehow appropriate to him. 
Something about his character or physical dimensions seems to you suitably described 
as bovine. This does not mean that the insult has an asserted quality. Surely it would 
grossly fail to describe your insult to say that you are under the belief that your boss 
is, literally, a cow. Nothing so quixotic is happening. For when thinking about X as Y 
— especially in this kind of insult — we veiy often think about X (our boss) and then 
think of some description “Y” (he is a cow) as uniquely suitable to X. We choose it 
over calling him, say, a jackass. We accept the proposition without belief, even 
though its acceptance is also done rationally (by, for example, regarding the 
description o f him as a cow as more suitable than some other description), and even 
though, like belief, it exhibits the character of a disposition instead o f an action.
So, we say that it is precisely this kind of thought that is involved in the 
acceptance o f at least some mundane-sacred judgments. It appears, at least 
superficially, to explain a judgment such as “the Buddha’s footprint is joy” or “the 
roads to Zion mourn”. Here X is thought of as Y, and this description is at once 
unasserted and, yet, still considered appropriate to its object. From this suggestion, we
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are inclined to argue that this kind o f thought -  “To think of X as Y” -  is the mental 
process involved in all exercises of imagination, the mental state which we have 
suggested might break the horns o f the intentionality-dilemma. Imagination, so it 
appears, is essentially a thought process that is unasserted but which is entertained as 
suitable to its subject. And, religious appreciation, if it is indeed one o f the species of 
imagination, will then necessarily exhibit the basic features that this particular kind of 
thought process includes.
But will this argument prove satisfactory? To see if it will, we would do well 
now to consider more rigorously the concept o f imagination. So, in the next chapter, 
we shall digress into a conceptual analysis o f imagination before we return to its 
potential role in explicating religious appreciation.
233
CHAPTER 22
UNDERSTANDING THE IMAGINATION: 
SOME PHILOSOPHICAL REFLECTIONS
The concept o f imagination has exercised the minds of a number of eminent 
philosophers. What follows here, in this somewhat digressive chapter, is a brief 
review o f some o f the insights and arguments about imagination that will become 
relevant later to the response-resemblance theory o f religious appreciation. So as to 
avoid a debate about whether or not the thinkers, on whom I relied, have been 
correctly interpreted, let the reader simply ascribe anything he finds intelligent,
157important and well-known about the idea of imagination to those philosophers, and 
everything confused, odd, or mistaken to this author.
157 The books and articles from which these ideas derive are: Gilbert Ryle, The 
Concept, o f  Mind, chapter VIII (London: Hutchinson, 1949); Jean-Paul Sartre, The 
Psychology o f  Imagination (New York: Philosophical Library, 1948); Edmund 
Husserl, Ideas: General Introduction to Pure Phenomenology> (New York: The 
Macmillan Company, 1952); Hide Ishiguro, “Imagination” in British Analytical 
Philosophy, eds., Bernard Williams and Alan Montefiore (London: Routledge & 
Kegan Paul, 1966); Martin Buber, “Elements of the Interhuman” in The Knowledge o f  
Man (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, Inc., 1997); Roger 
Scruton, Art and Imagination, chapters 7 and 8; Richard Wollheim, Art and its 
Objects and The M ind and its Depths and "Imagination and Identification”, On Art 
and the Mind (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1974); Ludwig Wittgenstein, 
Zettle, sections 621-655 (Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1967) and Philosophical 
Investigations, part II, xi; Roderick Chisholm, Perceiving: A Philosophical Study, 
chapter I, (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1961); Peter Strawson, "Imagination and 
Perception”, in Experience and Theory, ed. Lawrence Foster and J.W. Swanson 
(Amherst: University o f Massachusetts Press, 1970); Mary Wamock, Imagination 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1976).
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The Varieties o f  Imagination
First, we should recall that the w ord "imagination" is an umbrella term for a 
num ber of separate but related phenomena. It can sensibly refer to any of the 
following occurrences:
Predicative Imagining -  when we express such sentences as “John is 
imagining tha t...”, “John is imagining what it would be like if ...”; “John 
imagines what it is like to ... .” (This category would also include Buber’s 
dialogical concept o f “imagining the real”.)
Adverbial and Adjectival Imagining — when we do something, with 
imagination modifying that action; or, in the adjectival sense, when 
imagination modifies a person, place or thing.
Picturing -  when we form an image o f something.
Perceptual Imagining -  when we use imagination to see something. Closely 
connected with this is a type of aspect seeing, when it refers to an activity of 
imagination rather than to an activity o f judgment.
As we discuss these species o f imagination, we shall find they may well bear on our
theory of religious appreciation. We have been, so far, too vague in claiming that
“imagination” is the mental state that might break the horns o f the intentionality-
dilemma, because we have failed to specify the kind o f imagination we are talking:
Picturing? Adverbial Imagining? Seeing-as? and so on.
Predicative and Adverbial/Adjectival Imagining 
In order to make our response-resemblance theory more specific, let us begin by 
briefly elucidating some o f the species of imagination, beginning with predicative 
imagining and adverbial/adjectival imagining.
When denoting predicative imagining, we predicate the act of imagining to a 
subject. We use language such as:
Romeo imagines kissing Juliet. (X imagines Y).
Don Quixote sees the windmill as a dragon. (X sees Y as Z).
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Romeo wonders what it would be like i f  he were to m a n y  Juliet.
(X imagines that P, what it would be like if P).
Don Quixote forms an image o f  Dulcinea in his mind. (X forms an image of 
Y).
In each of these kinds of sentence, the predicate confers an action of imagination onto 
a subject. Here imagination behaves as a verb.
The use o f imagination as a verb contrasts subtly with adverbial/adjectival 
imagining. In adverbial/adjectival imagining the subject’s action is not the act of 
imagination as such. But the subject’s act -  be it a mental or physical act -  is 
described as imaginative. The subject does something imaginatively. Here we use 
language such as: “The way Einstein arrived at the special theory of relativity was 
imaginative”; or, “The architect imaginatively used the materials available to him”; 
or, “He is imaginative on the football field”; and so on. In these sentences, 
imagination is being predicated on a performance o f some kind, rather than the 
performance itself being an act o f imagination. Adverbial imagination therefore 
qualifies and identifies the nature o f behaviour, perhaps similar to the way words such 
as “stupidly” can be used to modify certain acts in daily life. When we do something 
imaginatively we do it thoughtfully, yet our thought is not rigidly determined by 
standard theoretical reasoning: imaginative acts extend the normal or expected way 
of doing things by doing them creatively. In doing something imaginatively, we do 
more than is customary; we add our own innovation to timeworn procedures. While 
some actions may be judged to be foolish or whimsical, an action done imaginatively 
seems surprisingly inventive. In this way, the concept of the imagination is extended 
to modify such things as plans, people, hypotheses, artworks, actions and so on.
236
Picturing
In considering the varieties of imagination, the following question naturally arises: 
What is the distinguishing feature that all the acts of imagination have in common? At 
first glance, we might be tempted to say that the presence of images is what all acts of 
imagination share. Picturing, it is intuitive to think, is the primitive concept inherent 
in every instance o f imaginary flight. We are inclined to use this metaphor of 
“picturing” because the mental image appears before our mind like a portrait or 
photograph; it is as if we were witnessing a private mental drawing o f some real 
world, slightly faded perhaps, but produced as though it were a reproduction o f an 
actual sense-impression. We might call this idea the “image-theory” o f imagination.
No doubt, because of this unique human capacity to “picture” worlds not our 
own, we take our acts of the imagination -  in literature, in film, in drama, and so forth 
-  with immense seriousness, measuring and arguing over their powers of 
communication and vividness, and even instituting the study o f them in our school 
systems. Indeed, despite the inability to verify the truth o f such imaginary scenes, we 
human beings have a pronounced tendency to regard such images as possessing 
profound insights into life, value, and reality. This accreditation of significance to 
this mental phenomenon has rendered the concept o f an image a seminal concept in 
folk psychology and explanations of human behaviour. It is hardly a wonder that the 
idea of an image so often sneaks into explanations of imagination.
Yet, as with so many often-used concepts, this common-sense theory, upon 
closer scrutiny, exhibits philosophical puzzlement. According to Ryle and Sartre, the 
image-theory of imagination cannot distinguish the idea of imagery from the idea of 
sensation.158 According to Husserl and Sartre, it fails to note the intentionality of
l5KGilbert Ryle, The Concept o f  M ind, chapter VIII; Jean-Paul Sartre, The P sychology o f  Imagination.
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imagery.159 And according to Wittgenstein, it makes the image into a private object 
and, therefore, becomes something o f which nothing can be said.160 The upshot of 
these arguments, if you accept them, shows the idea o f “image” to be an insufficient 
explanation of imagination.
Still, pace  its inability to wholly explain imagination, we might nevertheless 
wonder about its nature.161 Undoubtedly, the concept of an image is prominent in 
imaginative thinking and therefore worthy of our philosophical contemplation. 
Regardless of whether the concept o f an image is insufficient to account for 
imagination qua imagination, it is still hard to deny that images are often acutely 
involved in the mental process o f imagination.
So let us ask: what is an image? How does this concept connect to the ideas of 
imagining and imagination? Does it also relate to concepts o f memory, perception and 
belief? At the very least, we know that imagery is somehow related to thought, and 
that there is a logical requirement for third person criteria with regard to the truth of a 
proposition that a man’s image “pictures” something. But we might still explore the 
positive characteristics of an image, widening our comprehension o f imagination.
Let us pause to wonder: what does it mean to have an image of some object? 
The Wittgensteinian assumption denying the possibility of a private language holds 
that we cannot look to traditional phenomenology for answers to this question. If we 
decide to reject a Cartesian or any other introverted method for disclosing the 
meaning o f psychological terms, we are forced to look to third person criteria for their 
meanings, and not inward to our Self. Under a strict introverted epistemology, such as 
phenomenology, the knowledge that we are able to glean from our own personal
154 Edmund Husserl, Ideas: G eneral Introduction to Pure Phenomenology.
16(1 Ludwig W ittgenstein, Zettle , sections 621-655 (Oxford: Basil Blackw ell, 1967) and Philosophical 
Investigations, part II, xi.
161 See Hide Ishiguruo, “Imagination”.
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images is, in fact, too instantaneous to offer any useful cognitive information. Such 
knowledge is not based on anything since, when left strictly to our own 
consciousness, we cannot be sure, much less check, that any two images are the same. 
Differentiation thus becomes impossible. Introverted knowledge fails to rely on 
features that would allow us to determine what the images are. In short, simply 
observing our images could never provide us with the kind of information that we 
would need to be sure of their identity. And that is the crucial problem with 
phenomenology more generally.
O f course, that is not to say that there are no interesting phenomenological 
descriptions o f inner things such as images. But they are not descriptions in the 
accurate sense. Such radically self-centred descriptions, o f necessity, could not offer 
us information about images in the manner of, say, a description of a physical object; 
they would not permit us to confirm the features of the inner object in the manner that 
a genuine description provides information about the features o f physical objects. 
Why? Because unlike a physical description, phenomenological descriptions of 
mental terms cannot be checked against anything but our own immediate experience. 
This leaves us without any criteria o f identity upon which we can rely. At best, 
phenomenological descriptions convey what the mental item might be like, hence 
acting more like metaphors than descriptions. In light of this, Wittgenstein thought 
that, in order to grasp the meaning of psychological words, we must avoid the 
temptation to go solely inward.162 Counter intuitively, we properly understand our 
psychological concepts only by looking outward toward others, by asking what are 
some of the features that must be present in order to say sensibly about another person 
that he has images (or some other psychological state).
162 P hilosophical Investigations , 243-275.
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Picturing and the Will
Yet, among those features that help us identify whether a man can be said to 
be picturing or imagining something is the stated presence o f his will,163 This feature 
of both imagery and imagining often helps us to distinguish them from other kinds of 
mental state. When a man expresses that his mental state is subject to his will -  when 
he says that the image in his mind appears when he calls it forth -  we are apt to say of 
him that he has an image.
Try to do the following: imagine the earth is flat; now, try to believe the earth 
is flat. Can you genuinely believe it on command, honestly counting this proposition 
among the things you now believe you know about the world? Most likely, you were 
able to comply with the first request, but not the second. This is because the presence 
o f the will has helped to distinguish your two mental states.
O f course this feature of the will is not always and only present in mental 
picturing. Indeed, man’s will can be at hand in other mental states as well — in certain 
sensations, perceptions, and beliefs, for instance. But, note, inviting another person to 
imagine or form a picture o f something makes particular sense in our language. And 
that is helpful for a philosophical understanding of the meaning o f the word 
“imagination” . Our ability to comprehend and obey this kind of language indicates 
something about the sense o f this psychological term because, immediately and with 
no problem, we can fulfil the request to picture something. Imagining or forming an 
image coheres with the imperative mood o f our language, and thus it enjoys a 
particular sense for us. Upon demand, you can summon an image before your mind’s 
eye. This tells us that, even when an image is involuntary, that feature of
163 Zettle.
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involuntariness is only a contingent trait of that particular image. Its involuntariness is 
not part o f its essence, of its definition, o f its logic.
Another thought experiment: let us say a man reads the second and third
chapters o f Anselm’s Proslogion. He follows the argument, step by step, and thence 
comes to the conclusion that, yes, Anselm has conclusively demonstrated that God 
exists. Is it not utterly unimaginable that such a man after deducing the truth o f the 
ontological argument could then choose not to believe in God’s existence? Such a 
conclusion would determine what he does and does not believe, would it not? After 
accepting the veracity of the argument, it is not as if he can one moment decide to 
believe in God’s existence, and then in the next moment not believe, and so on, back 
and forth believing and not believing in God at will. After proving God’s existence, it 
is as impossible to imagine him doing this kind of ping-pong with the idea o f God, as 
it is to imagine him choosing, and then not choosing, to see an object before his very 
eyes. Again, imagining is something m an’s will engages with, believing is not.
Indeed, it this conceptual distinction that has provided the fodder for 
theological explanations as to why, of necessity, we cannot prove God’s existence. 
Since, if we are able to demonstrate the being o f such a miraculous and awe-inspiring 
substance, then we undermine another key principle of the religious life: namely, our 
free will, our freedom -  our risk in choosing — to take the leap of faith. Only the 
possibility of God’s non-existence makes this aspect o f the religious life possible. For, 
assuming God’s existence could be proved, religious commitment and conversion 
would entail nothing more than dispassionately demonstrating the steps o f an 
argument — rather than the existential choosing, with fear and trembling, that G od’s 
presence be in one’s life.
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One might retort that you can imagine choosing to believe or not believe 
something such as God’s existence, just as you can choose to see something at will. 
For instance, we can wholly put out of our mind the evidence in favour of God’s 
existence and, thereby, not believe in God, even if we thoroughly believed in the deity 
only a moment ago. The same goes for the act of seeing an object. We can choose to 
close our eyes.
Yet the problem with that retort is that, in these examples, all we are doing is 
choosing to evade the evidence, whether that evidence is of a logical argument or of 
merely opening our eyes. We are simply doing something that enables us to steer 
clear o f a belief or a perception. We are not, in fact, discussing the belief as belief or 
the perception as perception. Our will is merely occupied with the actions that 
produce the belief or perception, and is not occupied with the belief or perception in 
themselves. And that is the critical difference. In itself, the request to believe or to 
see something is (usually) nonsensical. It makes little sense in our language, 
especially after we think something has been demonstrated beyond a reasonable 
doubt.
The phenomenologist or cognitive psychologist might still deny this reply, 
however. He could say that the construction of a sentence such as Picture that P 
means that the proposition P identifies a belief that is implied to be wrong. Images 
therefore do involve belief or intentionality, albeit belief in something wrong, which 
in turn means that, if belief is not subject to the will, as we just argued, then neither 
can picturing be obedient to the will because it hinges on the presence o f belief.
But, even if we accept the dubious contention that one can believe in 
something which one knows to be false, what the phenomenologist/cognitive 
psychologist is also forgetting is that there are at least two different uses to the word
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imagine. One use denotes a mental act; the other, a derivative use, refers to the act o f 
making a judgm ent on another person's beliefs. In the first use, a sentence of the 
form Picture that P does not mean Believe wrongly that P. When we ask someone to 
imagine something, we are not inviting that person to believe anything, falsely or 
otherwise. We are asking him to entertain or contemplate an unasserted proposition. 
He is not meant to commit to that assertion, just to consider it. But, in the derivative 
use o f the word, when we intend the word “imagine” to be a judgm ent on a belief, 
then we indeed are meaning something like Believe wrongly that P. This is the use 
the phenomenologist or cognitive psychologist is emphasizing in the argument above. 
He could also appeal to another derivative use, as when “ imagine” means a 
speculative belief: for instance, after a question about the whereabouts o f someone, 
you might reply with the speculation “I imagine that he is at home”. But these are 
only derivative uses o f the word “imagine” and, therefore, are not enough to deny the 
thesis that imagination and belief can be distinguished by the presence o f the will.
Yet, it could be added against us that there are certain senses to the word 
“belie f’ wherein man’s will plays a role. In certain contexts, you can sensibly request 
someone to Believe that P. For instance, a friend tells you: “Believe me that your wife 
is having an affair.” Here Believe that P is behaving as a command or request. It is a 
sentence that appeals to your will, because it is indicating that the informant is being a 
truthful individual. This context confers plausibility on the proposition, and, hence, 
makes it possible for you to obey the imperative sentence. Here “Believe that P” 
means something like “1 vouch for the truth that P”. There are also sentences such as: 
“I will believe you, just tell me, yes or no, if you had an affair.” Here again belief 
seems connected to a man’s will. He is choosing to trust his wife and that compels 
him to believe what she says. You might even describe the act o f faith as an act of
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“wilful be lie f’. Without evidence, a man may choose to believe in the Bible as 
inerrant, and, thus, he believes everything it says. This might be because he has found 
no reason against believing, so he has decided to believe simply because he wishes it 
to be true. Certainly that is an act of will, the kind o f which Pascal and William James 
once invited us to try, the will to believe in the truth of religion.164
Still, these instances do not seem to absolve the idea that belief and 
imagination have different relations to the will, and this difference helps to distinguish 
the concepts. Even in the above senses of belief‘ the concepts o f truth and evidence 
still act as a constraint on one’s choosing. It takes further evidence to move from one 
state o f belief (believing) to another state o f belief (not believing). This is not so with 
imagination. Regardless of the context, in imagination we can jump back and forth at 
will in imagining something. Using our earlier example, one moment we can choose 
to picture our wife having an affair, and the next moment choose not to imagine this 
gruesome scene. But, you cannot choose to believe this one moment, and the next not, 
without further changes in the circumstances (for instance, if the informant of your 
wife’s infidelity later turns out to be an abject liar).
The mental state of imagination also, for the same reason, seems to be 
distinguished from other mental states such as perception, sensation and desire. We 
cannot sensibly request that someone feel an earache. “Feel that your ear hurts” -  that 
order cannot be fulfilled. It is not something we can reasonably ask of someone, since 
the sensation is not obedient to his will. We can order, o f course, someone to do some 
act that would cause such pain. But that is entirely different. The sensation itself is 
not subject to his will, only producing the act that would cause the pain is.
K'4 W illiam James, “The Will to B elieve” in The Will To Believe and O ther E ssays in Popular 
Philosophy  (N ew  York: Dover, 1959); Jeff Jordan, ed., G am bling on G od : E ssays on P asca l's  W ager 
(Lanham: Roman & Littlefield, 1994).
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One might reply that this is only a contingent feature of human beings. There 
is nothing illogical about the idea o f a person that can will sensations (or perceptions 
or desires). But it is debatable. Can we actually imagine such a person? In describing 
a person who complies with a request to feel an earache, we invariably end up 
describing him as first doing something else. For instance, we say the person thinks 
or imagines the earache and then, as a result, feels the pain. But, here, the pain is 
merely the causal effect o f the mental act of thinking or imagining. The choosing, the 
willing, is on the level of thinking or imagining, and not on the level of sensation, 
perception or desire.
If such arguments are persuasive, then we can conclude that the concept of 
picturing images is distinguished from other mental states, such as belief, because of 
its special relationship with man’s will. Picturing an image, as with all species of the 
imagination, is an act a man can choose. It is subservient to his self-control, his 
willpower, his determination. It is not something he must necessarily endure and 
suffer. And, thus, a kind o f freedom  must be part of the nature o f man’s imagination.
The Rationality o f Imagination
Now, because we have distinguished imagination from belief, and because we 
instinctually associate the concept o f rationality with the concept of belief, we might 
wish to conclude that imagination is an irrational or, better yet, an a-rational activity 
of mind. In imagination, we do not give reasons for the descriptions of our images, at 
least not in the way we do with belief. Perhaps in this way, too, the mental act of 
imagination can be distinguished from belief. We could say: imagination is
connected to man’s will but it is independent o f his reason.
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Yet, sharper analysis o f the concept indicates that there is a peculiar rationality 
connected with imagination. To ask “Why?” is not a senseless question when it comes 
to imaginary descriptions. In light o f this, man’s imaginary activity seems to involve, 
at least, two features, which yield a kind of logic. First, when man imagines 
something he is, in principle, able to give an account or description o f its content; he 
offers unasserted propositions that tell us what his imaginary scene is about. Second, 
his unasserted propositions are often judged to be appropriate or inappropriate to the 
content of the imagination.165 Accordingly, we make a kind o f rational decision about 
what is and is not a correct unasserted proposition o f imaginary phenomenon, a 
process which is comparable to the rational procedures we go through in order to 
determine the truth or fallaciousness of a belief.
To see the grounds for the thesis that imagination is subject to a kind of
rational discussion, consider first that, even though we have associated images with 
acts of the imagination, it is, nonetheless, likely that the concept of an image qua 
image is distinguishable from the concept of imagination qua imagination. It is not 
just in mental items such as in imaginary picturing that we experience images. Think 
about the images involved in the mental act of memory. Here there is what could be 
called “memory images” as opposed to “imagination images”; there are also “dream 
images”. These different kinds of imagery confer some autonomy on the concept of 
image. That is, this concept o f image qua image cannot be reduced to one and only 
one mental experience; it is found in a variety of mental processes. Consequently, we 
cannot correctly argue that the idea of an image is a sufficient condition for
imagination. Now, this distinction, in itself, might justifiably lead us to define
imagination other than by the concept o f an image.
If>5 Roger Scruton, A rt and  Im agination .
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We might now consider the concept of thought. Exploring this concept, we 
might end up in a better position to elucidate more generally the concept of 
imagination by describing it as a variety o f thought. Indeed this suggestion would 
cohere nicely with the linguistic fact that we can often substitute sentences of the form 
“Imagine X” with sentences of the form “Think X 1' without any change in meaning, as 
well as without any further constraint on our freedom of will. It consequently appears 
that the act o f imagination, rather than being delineated entirely by the concept of an 
image, is more likely a kind of thought, a type of thinking that would be described by 
the two conditions mentioned above. That is, imagination is:
(a) an account containing unasserted propositions; and
(b) an account whose unasserted propositions can be judged appropriate.
Just as an insult can be appropriate or inappropriate to its subject matter, and thus is 
often not merely a random choice of language, so too can the descriptions o f an act of 
imagination be evaluated as particularly suitable to its subject. If  this description of 
the imagination is correct, then to say that a man imagines X  means something like: X  
is a thought capable o f  being described by unasserted but appropriate judgments. We 
would have to conclude, then, that a man’s imagination is connected both to his will 
and  to his reason.
But what does it mean to say o f a man that his imagination entails thought 
which is unassertedj It means his thought includes propositional content that is not 
believed. For instance, we would not say that a man imagines X when the 
propositions he presents about his imaginary scene are based on or deduced from 
what he believes he knows. We would not say he is imagining X when X is an 
empirical object that he is presently observing and examining, as, for example, when 
X is a tool being chosen for a medical operation. Nor would we say he is imagining
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X when he believes X to be true and he is studying its practical consequences, as, for 
instance, in the study o f a scientific hypothesis. And neither would we be correct in 
saying that a man imagines X when X is a prediction based on evidence and 
coherence with other believed knowledge, as when, for example, a detective 
anticipates on the basis o f evidence where he will find his suspect. The concept of 
imagination does not accurately depict what is happening in the agent’s mind in any 
of these circumstances. This is because imagination as imagination, containing as it 
does propositional content that is not believed, necessarily transcends commonplace 
beliefs and forecasts. That is what it means to say imagination is unasserted thought.
It might be replied that a man can believe that X is the way he would imagine, 
or had imagined, it to be. But, even so, this is not an act o f imagination when X is 
something a man believes or has reasons to believe. Imagination is a type of 
speculative thought. It neither asserts nor aims to assert that its propositional content 
is a description about the nature of the way things are. It is not an assertion about 
states o f affair.
Now, what does it mean to say of a man that his imagination is appropriate? 
We say this when the propositional content, which is not believed, is o f a special kind. 
That is, in imagination not just any unasserted thought will do. It must be fitting to the 
subject matter of the thought in the imagination, for imagination does not only mean 
“thinking about X as Y” . It is not ju s t speculation. It is a unique type o f speculation. 
We recognize this when we recall that, in imagination, there are two distinguishable 
phenomena at work. One phenomenon is what might be called the subject of the 
unasserted thought. This is the image or proposition that is imagined. The other 
phenomenon is what might be called the unasserted description o f the subject. This is 
how the image or proposition -  the subject of the imagination -  is described. Yet,
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pace  deconstructionism, not just any description will satisfy us. When a man imagines 
X, he is not merely engaged in a mental act of inventing descriptions about X that he 
would not be willing to assert. He is not just randomly and meaninglessly casting 
about for an account o f his imaginary-subject. Not any old stick will do.
For instance, if, before we read the Iliad, we ask someone, “Why did Achilles 
refuse to battle?” And he randomly answers us, “Because Achilles, the wimp, never 
fought before and was scared”. Then, upon reading the Iliad, we would be correct to 
think this person has offered us an inappropriate and ignorant answer; the answer fails 
to do justice to Homer’s imagination and the character o f Achilles; it does not 
accurately explain why Achilles, in the opening chapters, is brooding in his tent rather 
than slaying Hector. An appropriate answer would carefully search out in the text a 
description that one thinks is particularly suitable to the subject of Homer’s 
imagination. In this way, we say that imagination is a rational, process. There are 
appropriate and inappropriate answers to why-questions about imaginary scenes. To 
say Achilles is a coward is simply inappropriate.
Such rationality is manifestly exemplified in great artworks. Here the master 
artist, as he penetrates the subject of his broad imagination, is seeking to create an 
account o f that subject which is particularly fitting to it. Not just any description will 
please him. Mere propositions, he fears, may fail to capture the nature o f his subject 
matter; so he will try to find a correct unasserted proposition that does appropriately 
point to the subject’s essence. Only by finding an unasserted thought that is 
appropriate to the subject of his imagination will the artist accurately disclose its 
being. In the same way, we witness -  in the actual practice o f life -  art and literary 
critics often debating with one another, challenging each other over the 
appropriateness o f certain descriptions of artwork. Implicit in this activity is a basic
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assumption: the critics wish to bring what they say into harmony with the subject of 
the imagination. If this were not the case, the prevalent and observable practice of 
why-questions in criticism would be inexplicable.
Now, how do we decide what counts as an appropriate description? This is no 
small question. Out of this capacity for “appropriate” description -  or the belief that 
we have this capacity -  we distinguish among the acts of imagination: we say that 
some activities of the mind are “really” imagination while others are only fantasy or 
whim. These distinctions are born out of the assumption that there are appropriate and 
inappropriate descriptions related to the various contents of the imagination. But how 
do we make these distinctions?
Evidently the appropriateness is not connected to the concept of probability. 
We do not judge the appropriateness o f an unasserted proposition o f imagination 
because we think it is “more likely” . It is not an issue of causality. A story, for 
instance, is thought to be particularly appropriate to X, but that is not because one 
thinks the story is likely or true.
In these acts o f imagining, the unasserted propositions are entertained for a 
reason; but, importantly, the “reason” is not connected to truth or probability. It is in 
the subject matter o f the imagination wherein such reasons are derived. That is, we 
appeal to the content of the imagination when we give our grounds for our unasserted 
propositions. We do not look outside the imagination for causal explanations that 
make our propositions appropriate. And yet, because we also do not just randomly 
provide explanations, we are right to say that there is a logic to this activity of mind.
Whatever its nature, we can see that this rationality of imagination is o f a 
different sort than the kind o f rationality we find in belief. In imagination, rationality 
is practical. It is a variety of practical reason, for, unlike in the rationality o f belief,
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why-questions about the imagination invite replies that provide reasons why such- 
and-such was said , not believed. The reasons are internal to the imaginary activity; 
they refer to the imagination itself, irrespective of its truth or believability.
“Why did Achilles refuse to battle?” a student asks; the teacher appropriately 
replies: “Because, being a proud warrior, Achilles would not tolerate being insulted 
b y ...” This would count as an appropriate response, even though it is neither asserted 
nor believed. But, in the rationality of belief, the type of reasoning is not so practical: 
why-questions invite explanations about why something was asserted or believed, and 
not just said. In the rationality of imagination, the teacher’s reply to the student is not 
an assertion about something which the teacher believes to be the case in the actual 
world; the explanation refers to the imaginary world o f Homer’s epic, and its 
justification is found therein.
iSome Features o f Picturing Images
Recall that we have suggested that images -  or the act of picturing images -  
are not exclusive to the imagination. There are dream-images as well as memory 
images. We also proposed that picturing images could be a type o f imagining, since it 
is often involved in imagination. We still need to explain further what picturing 
imagery means, and how this mental process is related to the imagination.
We noted that the concept of thought was perhaps a better means o f explaining 
imagination than was the pure concept of an image. Still, we should note that there 
are some important analogies between the two concepts of image and thought. We 
might even want to say, at times, that an image is a kind of thought about some object. 
For example, an image of your childhood home is a kind of thought of how it used to 
look. In that regard, an image, like thought, has intentionality: it is an image about 
something. Accordingly, we can only picture images o f something that we can also
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think about. Furthermore, images, like thought, are susceptible to first-person 
philosophical analysis; that is, like thought, images seem to be something of which 1, 
the first-person, have immediate knowledge. The Self knows immediately and on the 
basis o f nothing else the character of its own thoughts and images, or at least so the 
Self is tempted to believe.
Moreover, we have mentioned that picturing images are subject to the will. So 
too is thought. Our thoughts are reactive to our will.
Also, thoughts and images are identified similarly through verbal language. 
Both consist principally in descriptions about one’s mental state. This appeal to 
language is the criterion we employ in determining if a man is having a thought or 
picturing something. To identify if he is having an image, we listen to what he 
describes. If we think he has an image of X, then we think that if  we ask him what is 
in his mind, he will give us verbal descriptions about X — the way it looks, the way it 
smells, the way it tastes. He would use language that in someway refers to the mental 
picture, and this use of language would be similar to how we would determine if he 
was having a thought.
All o f this shows that picturing images and having thoughts are not totally 
unrelated or dissimilar processes. But, we should also note some features of imagery 
that are not so prominent in the concept of thought. Indeed, in some ways, picturing 
images have more in common with sensations and sense-impressions than with 
thought. Below are four features of picturing imagery that are shared with sensations: 
images may have intensity, precise duration, an experiential component, and the 
language o f  sensory experience.166
100 The discussion o f  these features is derived from Scruton, A rt and Imagination, ch. 7.
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The Intensity o f  Picturing Images. Picturing images admit degrees of 
vibrancy, like sensations. Try to form an image of your childhood home. At first, the 
image may appear cloudy, almost distant, as though it were a dusty old photograph. 
Then, in the hope of capturing the image with superior intensity, you might be 
tempted to close your eyes, tightly squeezing them shut, as if this physical act would 
bring greater focus o f mind. Through this act of concentration, you hope to dust off 
your mental picture and reveal your old home in all its beauty. Indeed, with more 
concentration, it may appear more intense: the picture is now incredibly vivid and 
concentrated, as if you were again standing outside your old home, observing it in 
sharp detail. Now, such a commonplace practice of picturing images, which you may 
have observed in others, demonstrates some of the varying degrees o f intensity that an 
image is said to possess.
The Duration o f  Picturing Images. As with sensations, an image manifests 
itself at a specific moment, and it continues without change for a specific amount of 
time. It is an occurrence o f the mind that can be located in the temporal flow of 
events, having a mortality all its own. To recall this, let us imagine a woman standing 
on a street comer. Before her mind, she has a vivid image of something -  her ex- 
husband, say. His image hovers before her inner eye. But then something happens: a 
handsome man passes by on the street, and this new man distracts her attention. Now 
the image o f her ex-husband has faded. It is pushed aside with a new image. The 
picture o f the handsome man that walked by has now taken its place in her inner eye. 
So the old image is complete; a new one has begun; and she could, in principle, chart 
moment by moment the lifespan of the image of her ex-husband as well as the 
emergence o f the new image.
253
This feature of duration is integral to the idea of an image. That, of course, is 
not to say that the concept o f duration is totally absent from the concept of thought. 
When we contemplate a proposition, for instance, we have before our mind something 
that is delineated by chronological borders: a proposition can hover in front of the 
mind for varying lengths o f time, beginning at a definite time, lasting for a definite 
time, and ceasing at a definite time. But, except perhaps in cross-examinations or 
criminal investigations, we do not typically employ the idea o f duration as a way of 
understanding a thought. That is, it is not a normal practice to define the meaning of a 
thought by its precise beginnings, duration, and endings. It is also perhaps more 
difficult to demarcate the start o f a thought than the start of an image.167
The Experiential Component o f  Picturing Images. Images are expressed in a
way similar to how we voice our experiences, and the ways by which we refer to our
images seem to involve an experiential component that is more immediate than any
thought that is associated with the image. Just as when describing an image we often
say that, at one moment, we “had it” but that, at another moment, we “lost it”, so too
when describing our experiences we often say, “at this moment I was able to
experience it” but “at that moment 1 did not”. We often hear this kind of talk from
those who frequently meditate. In both mental states, we are conscious o f something -
be it an image or an experience -  that is or could be vanishing. That is, we can be
aware o f an image or experience we once had, even if at the present moment we are
unable to summon again the image or experience itself. We might at one moment
have a vivid image of our childhood homes -  and then later cease having that image
but, nevertheless, be able to remember the experience of that image. Now, this does
not seem to be a feature o f thought: can we be aware o f a thought we once had, even
167 For instance, i f  you say “Let me think, what did my home look like?” At what point did your 
thought o f  your home begin: when you said “Let me think” or just after? See Scruton, A rt am i 
Im agination , 102.
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while the thought itself is completely forgotten? By recalling the thought, do we not 
ineluctably again have the thought? This is not the case with images: we can 
remember our images without recalling them, just as we can remember our 
experiences without re-experiencing them.
Images and the Language o f  Sensory Experience. When we speak about our 
images, we inevitably describe them in terms of the language that we employ to 
describe our sensory experiences. If a man says that he has an image of his childhood 
home, he wilt describe it in terms of a visual image. It is as if he were seeing his 
childhood home, and, therefore, that kind o f visual language is what he uses to refer to 
the image. This use o f language -  our public expression o f imagery -  implies that 
experiencing an image is analogous to the experience o f seeing something. Indeed, if 
a man does not imply this sensory aspect of the image then we are not inclined to say 
that it is an image that he has. Our public expression would not allow this. We would 
say that it is something else in his mind, a thought perhaps.
As we shall now see, by noting all these features of an image -  its degree of 
intensity, its duration, its experiential component, and its language of sensoiy 
experience -  by grasping all this, we are in a better position to say something more 
specific about the relationship between picturing and the imagination, the topic of the 
next section.
Picturing and Imagination
We have made a distinction between the phenomenon o f picturing an image 
and the phenomenon of the imagination, as well as a distinction between an image 
and a thought. These distinctions, however, should not lead us to conclude that 
“picturing images” does not enjoy a special status in the act o f imagination, which, 
remember, we said was a kind of thought or speculation. Images can act like
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speculative thought, although with certain qualifications like those previously 
mentioned.
To show how “picturing an image” is related to the imagination, it is well to
keep the following distinction in mind:
A m em oiy image is a mental picture of something that has previously been 
experienced through the senses. Sometime in the past we have seen, heard, 
felt, tasted, or smelled X, and now we remember those experiences o f X in 
terms of a memory image.
But,
An imaginary image is a mental picture of something that has not been 
experienced. Here there is no memory of an X, but the invention o f an X — be 
it invented unconsciously in dreams or consciously in daily life. This kind of 
image also can, and indeed must, be described through the language o f the 
senses.
When we are in the act o f imaginary picturing, we are forming imagery that 
transcends our actual experience. We are going beyond what we have strictly 
encountered in life. This is not exactly so in memoiy imagery, where our image is 
demarcated by what we have encountered before.168 So, to sum up the relationship, 
we can say that the imagery of imagination is an unasserted thought that can be 
described appropriately or inappropriately, and is delineated by the features we 
mentioned above -  intensity, duration, sensoiy language, and so on.
All this together helps mark out the kind of relationship that “picturing 
images” has with the imagination. The apparent linguistic connection between the 
word “image” and the words “imagery” and “ imagination” also adds to our deeper 
intuition that the meanings of these concepts share family resemblances. Picturing 
images, when experienced as part o f the imagination, exhibit both the general features 
found in the image qua image, as well as the general features found in the imagination
168 This is the case even when our memory image is about an imaginary image w e experienced (or 
“sensed”) at som e previous time.
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qua imagination. Indeed, understanding these features widens our comprehension of 
what is occurring when we picture images in our imagination.
Once we see the relationship between images and the imagination, we then 
can draw further conceptual distinctions. For example, we can now demarcate the 
imagination o f  an experience from the imagination o f  an object. In imagining an 
experience, we form an image that corresponds to or reflects what we think an 
experience X is like; in imagining an object we form an image o f X that allows for 
description o f its features, whether or not X is an existent thing which we have, or 
could have, experienced. In imagining an experience, a man does not need to note the 
image’s features -  indeed it may not even have any — but he is able to call the image 
o f the experience to mind. He imaginatively “feels” what it is like to make love, say. 
The image of lovemaking is not so much an object o f his mind that he wishes to 
describe, as much as it is an experience that he senses, undergoes, or suffers. Here the 
image of making love is not ju st being thought; it is being felt, as if it were matching 
the actual experience. It is a kind o f knowledge by acquaintance.
But, in imagining an object, things are slightly different: it is as if a man were 
merely observing an actual thing, which has features that can be identified and 
described, just like an object in the real world. Nevertheless, however vivid the 
description o f the image, it is not necessarily felt. It is a kind of knowledge by 
description; that is, the man can give an account of the image without experiencing it, 
or ever having experienced it. His learning of language permits this ability. 
Accordingly, we can distinguish these two types of imagining by saying imagining an 
experience possesses an intensity that imagining an object does not. The latter can be 
remarkably vivid and verbal, but it lacks the force o f the former, which need not be 
vivid or verbal at all.
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Perceptual Imagining
So far we have looked at a variety of family-related phenomena brought under the 
name of imagination -  predicative imagining, adverbial and adjectival imagining, and 
picturing images. We now turn to the kind of imagination that relates to perception , 
and which may prove decisive in filling out our response-resemblance theory of 
religious appreciation. Some types of “seeing” can be said to require the imagination. 
For example, it is common in comparative religion courses to be taught that, if we 
wish to see how a man experiences his religious objects, we need both to learn and to 
imagine the circumstances of his life, his social upbringing, his conceptual 
framework, his emotional disposition. We need to see the sacred object as he sees it, 
and, in so doing, we shall come to appreciate his religious experience. Only when we 
“imagine the real” , to borrow Buber’s phrase, do we come to understand this religious 
person, only when we imagine our selves in his shoes, as it were, are we able to leam 
about the religious life o f man. This, at its most basic level, is how the dialogue 
between the scholar and his subject of study unfolds and provides us with knowledge. 
It first comes about through a kind of “imaginative perceptiveness”.
We can distinguish two types o f imaginative perceptiveness. One we might 
call “cognitive perceptiveness”; the other, “aspect perceptiveness” or “aspect seeing”. 
In cognitive perceptiveness, we say sentences such as: “Imagination enables John to 
see that X is Y”. That is, imagination facilitates his ability to see that, let us say, his 
friend is in a state o f mourning. Here, his friend is, in truth, mourning, and 
imagination helps John to construe this. In aspect perceptiveness, however, we say 
sentences such as: “Imagination enables John to see the Y in X” . That is, imagination 
allows him to see the sorrow in his friend’s expression, whether or not his friend is 
actually in a state o f mourning. His friend, in fact, may not be mourning at all; he may
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indeed be feeling cheerful. So here, John sees an aspect without necessarily attributing 
it as a property of the object. It is as if John were saying, “Yea, I can see how my 
friend’s face could be construed as mournful”. In cognitive perceptiveness, the 
imagination is used to form something like a hypothesis about a state of affair. 
Hence, we call it cognitive, since it refers to a kind of judgment, albeit a judgment 
that transcends the immediate evidence. But in aspect perceptiveness, in aspect 
seeing, the imagination is employed so as to reveal an aspect Y of some X, rather than 
to say that X is Y. This kind of perceptiveness does not relate to a judgment about X, 
but instead intimates the noticing of a characteristic of it. Here the Y, which one sees 
in X, is not necessarily believed to be there in X, as was the case in cognitive 
perceptiveness.
Perhaps think o f it this way: when confronting a mundane-sacred object, the 
religious man is not seeing that the road to Zion is the type o f object that tends to 
make people mourn, nor is he seeing that the road itself is mourning. Neither o f these 
is what makes up this type of imaginative seeing. More simply, imagination permits 
the man to perceive the aspect o f mourning in a mundane-sacred object, while not 
forcing him to commit to the additional judgment that the object itself is mourning, or 
that it tends to make people mourn. He is not, in other words, exercising cognitive 
perceptiveness. He is practicing aspect perceptiveness.
One may be tempted to say that aspect perceptiveness is, in fact, nothing more 
than adverbial imagining, and therefore a superfluous conceptual distinction. But this 
would be a mistake. Perceiving an aspect does not mean “seeing imaginatively”. This 
is because the act of seeing -  with one’s physical eyes -  is an involuntary action. 
Here “involuntary” is the operative word, for an involuntary action is not something 
that can be modified by the imagination in the way that, for example, utilizing the
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available tools to light a fire can be. To see this, ask yourself: When the doctor is 
testing your involuntary reflexes, tapping your knee, is it possible for you to respond 
to the tap imaginatively? Or, more likely, does your leg just kick up, no matter what 
you are thinking when he taps the appropriate spot? Well, it is the same with strictly 
seeing with the eyes: vision is not subject to the power o f your thought. Vision is 
either simply there or it is not. The eyes are either open or they are shut. But if 
eyesight were modified by the imagination, it would need to be obedient to your 
thought, since, as argued earlier, imagination is a kind o f speculative thought. 
Therefore, when we do add the extra ingredient of the imagination to our physical 
seeing, we are producing a different mental phenomenon: namely, we are engaged in 
cognitive or aspect perceptiveness. It is not just seeing, which somehow has 
imagination as an adverbial modifier.
Now, aspect perceptiveness stands a good chance o f being the mental 
experience we have been pursuing, the one essentially involved with mundane-sacred 
judgment. Rather than seeing the waves o f Hawaii to be sweet and holy, the religious 
surfer is seeing the sweetness and holiness as aspects o f the water; instead o f seeing 
that the cast of the Buddha’s footprint is joy, the monk is seeing it as joy; in lieu of 
the road to Zion being mournful, it is seen as mournful. At any rate, if this mental 
state is involved in our religious experiences, it would certainly account for our 
previous theory about the non-descriptiveness of mundane-sacred judgment, since this 
mental experience would not be associated with belief or the attribution of properties.
We, however, are getting ahead o f ourselves. Before we can proffer such a 
suggestion, we shall need to make further clarifications and arguments. We shall 
need to expand on what is involved in aspect perceptiveness, how it relates to 
perception, and indeed later, how it connects to religious appreciation.
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To begin, it is helpful to recall philosophical discussions about ambiguous 
figures. We all know Jastrow’s duck-rabbit: it is a drawing that can be seen as either a 
duck or a rabbit, but not both at the same time. The figure has led philosophers to 
note several peculiarities about it. For one, the visual experience is not solely the 
perceiving o f a resemblance of some kind between the figure and an actual duck, 
since perceiving a resemblance could also be done when seeing it as a rabbit. For 
similar reasons, the experience o f perceiving an aspect cannot be reduced merely to 
the seeing o f a likeness of appearance between the figure and a duck (or a rabbit). All 
this is because, in a nutshell, the relationship is not symmetrical between the figure, 
on the one hand, and the look o f ducks and rabbits, on the other. A symmetrical 
relationship would entail that, if X resembles Y, then Y resembles X. But no such 
relationship exists between the figure and the physical object. In this way, we come to 
the idea of an aspect o / th e  figure, which is what we compare with the duck (or 
rabbit). That is, we see a resemblance not between the figure and the object, but 
between a certain aspect of the figure and the object. Flow this happens is a seminal 
question in the philosophy of mind, and we shall not pursue it here.
A number of philosophical conclusions, though, have been drawn from the 
phenomenon of aspect seeing. One is that, pace classical empiricism, some visual 
impressions are not established by the image on the retina o f a person’s eyes, because 
the image on the retina is exactly the same when a person sees the duck in the figure 
as when the person sees the rabbit in it. Another philosophical conclusion is that some 
visual impressions cannot be entirely explained in merely Euclidean terms, given that 
the duck-aspect and the rabbit-aspect share the same points in space. Still another 
conclusion often drawn is that our expectations sometimes determine what we
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perceive. Our thoughts about a situation influence what we see in it, because, if we 
have no concept of, say, a duck, then we shall never see such an aspect in the figure.
Upon examination, aspect seeing is also distinct from the idea of seeing an 
“appearance”, an experience with which we might be inclined to compare it. For 
when we see an appearance, we are prepared to say things like: “I see that there is a 
resemblance between her and her mother”. Here the appearance is connected to 
certain beliefs about the object of comparison. We say, for example, “Yes, they have 
the same colour eyes, similar facial expressions, a way o f walking”, and so on. But, 
although analogous, seeing an aspect is not quite like that. We do not remark on the 
similarity o f appearance between an aspect of the duck in the duck/rabbit 
configuration and an actual duck, as if the two had similar eyes and facial expression 
and so forth. We cannot entirely reduce the experience to the terms “seeing that”. So, 
evidently, there is a unique “experience” associated with seeing an aspect, a kind of 
surprising feeling, as it were, which goes beyond beliefs, even beyond perceptual 
beliefs.
All these philosophical conclusions raise questions about the nature of this odd 
practice. In short, what are some o f the features involved in aspect seeing?
Som e Features o f  Aspect Seeing  
To which category of mind should we classify the experience o f aspect seeing? What 
are its seminal features? How is it related to the imagination?
These questions are not altogether easy to answer. Clearly, to see an aspect of 
some X is not a simple sensation. A certain amount o f thought seems embedded in 
this experience. It is unlikely that, when we see the “rabbit” in the figure, we are not 
at least thinking something about “rabbit-ness”. The idea o f the appearance or shape 
or behaviour o f rabbits somehow enters our mind, and thus we think about this aspect
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as if it could do something that rabbits do, such as hopping. This is perhaps similar to 
the way the concept of thought is involved in picturing images, because seeing an 
aspect also seems to include intentionality. There is something about or in the figure 
that we see. It has that “about-ness” quality to it.
Also, it has that other quality often present in thought, namely, the feeling that 
we immediately know the object that we are presently seeing. We do not confuse the 
aspect with something else; it is as if it is immediately known to us: That’s a rabbit, 
we say without hesitation, or That's a duck, we say confidently. But, when normally 
seeing things -  with our eyes alone -  we do not always have that immediate first- 
person sense of knowledge about what we see. That instant recognition is often 
missing until someone else informs us about that which we perceive, or that we think 
we perceive. So, like thought in general, there is a feeling of first-person privilege to 
the experience of seeing an aspect.
Having said that, however, there are also third-person criteria, which provide 
the basis that allows us to ascribe the experience o f aspect seeing to someone; that is, 
this experience has a shared language. Just as, via language, we are able — or think 
we are able — to identify whether someone is thinking, so too we look to the kind of 
descriptions that the person applies to the ambiguous figure to determine if he is 
seeing an aspect of it. We observe him, and if he is applying unasserted sentences to 
the perceived rabbit or duck, we conclude that he is indeed seeing these aspects. Or, 
similarly, we might look to his behaviour -  particularly, his emotional reactions such 
as amusement- to see if he is seeing the aspect. After interpreting his reactions, we 
confidently conclude that it is the expression of some thought, thoughts perhaps such 
as: Hey, a rabbit. Wait, a duck. Wow! How weird. All these thoughts meanwhile are
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also unasserted. They do not attribute any property to the figure; they do not fasten the 
man who “sees” the aspect to any belief about the physical nature o f the figure itself.
Another feature, which is related to the above characteristic, is that aspect 
seeing can have a certain logic. It is, to be sure, an experience that goes beyond what 
is believed or asserted, and which even goes beyond what is exactly given in 
perception, but it, nevertheless, has a particular rationality about it. Here one can 
make mistakes because the seeing of an aspect raises the issue of what is seen in the 
object. And that implies that there are appropriate, as well as inappropriate, things to 
be seen and said about the aspect. Accordingly, aspect seeing is subject to debate 
about whether what is seen is also “appropriate”. The conceptual distinction between 
“truly” seeing the aspect, as well as “falsely” perceiving it, is at work in this mental 
experience. Indeed, aspect seeing can be altered in light o f argument. Through 
reasoned discourse, you can be moved from seeing only the duck-aspect to seeing 
both the duck-aspect and the rabbit-aspect, or it can be argued that the purpose of the 
figure is to see just one aspect, or that you miss the point if you do not see both, and 
so on. In other words, by giving various descriptions of the aspects, we can persuade, 
justify and denounce certain descriptions of those aspects. The upshot, then, is that 
reasoning in terms o f appropriateness can be applied to aspect seeing. This further 
impresses on us the idea that aspect seeing is a kind o f thought.
Yet another feature o f aspect seeing is that, as with all the other species of 
unasserted thought, it is subject to man’s will. One can request a man to see an aspect 
o f some figure. Once he has seen the various aspects o f the figure, he can then often 
do so at will, now choosing to see the rabbit, now the duck, back and forth. But this, 
of course, does not mean that a man is always able to abide by the request to see the 
aspect -  only that it makes sense to ask this performance of him. In this regard, we
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should note that obeying a request to see an aspect might often prove more difficult 
than the request to picture an image, because aspect seeing is confined to the 
perimeters o f a figure or object in which the aspect is found, and this is not true when 
picturing an image before the mind’s eye, the borders of which are indeterminate. 
The aspect, unlike the mental image, is seen within a set frame, and this can establish 
obstacles to some observers when following the request to see some X in some Y. 
This is the case even within auditory boundaries such as in a piece of music: you 
might, for instance, ask, or even cajole, someone to try to hear the touch of sadness in 
the sound o f Bach, but they might only be able to hear its joy. They are limited by the 
borders of the music in a way they might not be when you request them to envision a 
purely mental image.
What does all this tell us? Well, the features of aspect seeing are shared with 
thought.169 Like thought, aspect seeing has intentionality. Like thought, it gives one 
the feeling that knowledge of the aspect is an immediate, first person experience. Like 
thought, there are third person criteria for judging if someone is seeing an aspect (in 
this case, the unasserted sentences he is prepared to say about the figure, as well as his 
behaviour). Like thought, it has a kind of rationality. And, like thought, aspect seeing 
is subject to the will. All this suggests that aspect seeing is a kind o f thought, as was 
imagination more generally. But, certainly, being a “thought” is not all that aspect 
seeing is. There are other features to this experience.
There is something quite sensuous about the experience. That it happens using 
sense organs is no small fact. Indeed, like imagery, aspect seeing enjoys some, but not 
all, features normally associated with sensual experience.
169 Scruton, A rt and Imagination, chapter 8.
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It has, for instance, the feature of duration. In principle, you can time the 
perception o f an aspect. You can note the exact amount of time it took you to see the 
duck-aspect before you then saw the rabbit-aspect, and vice versa. This is an 
important feature, since many people are often tempted to think of aspect seeing as 
simply interpretation. But we see that, given this phenomenon’s capacity to be 
precisely timed, aspect seeing is not mere interpretation. For the act of interpretation 
does not seem situated in time in this kind of way; we do not have the same kind of 
temporal borders regarding our construal of, say, a verse o f Shakespeare or the way 
we interpret a dream. An interpretation is not subject to such strict timing, as is the 
case when seeing the duck-aspect in Jastrow’s figure.
Another feature is that of vividness. As with visual experience more 
generally, seeing an aspect can, at times, stand out to a greater or lesser extent. True, 
this is not quite the same experience o f “intensity” that we encounter in the picturing 
of an image. But here too there is the potential of seeing the aspect in various degrees 
of detail, as if certain features of it were more illuminated than others.
Still another feature of the experience of aspect seeing, which reminds one of 
its sensuous character, is that it has irreducible elements composing it. Just as seeing 
the shape o f a circle and seeing the shape of a square are similar but irreducible 
perceptual experiences, so too seeing the aspect of a duck and seeing the aspect of a 
rabbit are related but yet irreducible experiences. That is, separate parts are what 
constitutes this experience. Because of this, seeing an aspect can be compared to 
seeing things like shapes and colours, all o f which present similar but separate 
elements of a particular kind of perceptual experience. Or, in other words, seeing red 
and seeing blue are both instances of seeing colour, but neither experience is the 
same. And so it is with aspect seeing: the perception o f the duck is like the perception
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of the rabbit -  that is, it belongs to the same category of experience -  but they are not 
the same experience. Like visual experience more generally, there is variety to seeing 
aspects. The conscious character of seeing the various aspects of the world does not 
share exactly identical features, even though they are all parts o f a wider and unified 
kind of experience.
For this reason, employing the term “seeing” to the experience of “aspect 
seeing” is not arbitrary. A conceptual relation exists between the act o f  genuinely 
seeing something and the seeing o f  the aspect o f  something. Aspect seeing poignantly 
refers to and is expressed by the language o f visual perception. When describing an 
experience o f seeing an aspect, a man says sentences such as: It is as i f  I  were seeing 
a rabbit. Here, in this experience, the “as i f ’ is conceptually crucial. He cannot say in 
what precise way the seeing o f the rabbit-aspect is similar to seeing a real rabbit. But 
through his language he does intimate to us that there is a resemblance. The likeness 
between the two experiences is given in the very linguistic expressions by which he is 
disposed to describe his experience. He does not assert any genuine seeing; he asserts 
as i f  he were seeing. And therein lies the critical difference between the two 
experiences, the one is assertion of seeing something, the other an as i f  seeing 
something.
To conclude, we should say that aspect seeing resides somewhere on the 
border between thought and sensation. It enjoys features o f both.
Picturing Images and Aspect Perceptiveness
Recall our discussion o f picturing images. We, too, argued that picturing an image 
shares many features we find both in thought and sensation. It has intentionality. It 
has a sense o f first person immediacy. It has, through language and behaviour, third 
person criteria by which outsiders determine its presence. It is subject to the will. It
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has duration. It is often expressed through the language that denotes sensory 
experience. It has an experiential component. And it has various intensities. In other 
words, like aspect seeing, picturing images exist somewhere between thought and 
sensation.
This leads to an intuition that there is a remarkable relationship, or analogy, 
between aspect perceptiveness and picturing images. But philosophers have not just 
pointed out that there are shared features involved in both experiences. They have also 
disclosed that the two mental experiences often supplement and aid one another. 
Indeed, we can distinguish two kinds of activity that inter-penetrates aspect seeing 
and picturing images. To see this, let us call the first activity “the physical to the 
mental relation between aspect seeing and picturing images”, and the second activity 
“the mental to the physical relation between picturing images and aspect seeing” .170 
They are conversely related and explained below.
The Physical to the Mental Relation. This relation between aspect seeing and 
picturing images is a two-part process. First, it so happens that we can sometimes see 
an aspect of something on a physical thing; for example, we see an aspect of 
something in a photograph. Then, if the aspect fades, it often happens that we 
continue seeing the aspect in the mind’s eye; that is, we picture its image as if we 
were still seeing the aspect of the physical thing. For example, imagine you are 
looking at a duck in a photograph. The image of the duck within the photograph 
comes before your eye. It is a clear visual impression derived from a physical object. 
There’s a duck in that photograph , you say to yourself. But then your sight o f the 
duck begins to fade because, let us say, the photograph itself is rapidly fading out, 
disintegrating in your very hands; the actual visual impression o f the duck on the
170 These are ideas derived from Scruton, A rt and Im agination, but these concepts -  “the physical to the 
mental relation ...” etc. -  are not his terminology.
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material photograph is therefore becoming less and less clear. Yet, surprisingly, you 
are still able to see the figure clearly as a duck, even though many of its features that 
were once plain to you no longer remain so in your actual visual field. How can this 
be?
The only answer is that your mind has now supplemented the disappearing 
features o f the visual impression with a mental image o f those features; the image, 
rather than what you are looking at, now possess those features o f the figure, thus 
allowing you to remain seeing the duck vividly even though the physical object from 
which you initially saw the duck has ceased to be clear. By picturing the image in 
your mind, you have now added to the physical world those characteristics that are no 
longer capable o f being seen. Thus, you began with something physical (the 
photograph that produced an aspect perception) and yet you effortlessly moved to 
something mental (the clear and unmistakable picturing o f that aspect). This tells us 
that aspect seeing and picturing images can profitably work together to capture and 
freeze a scene, and that they thus have a closer relationship than just shared features. 
They actually can supplement one another.
The Mental to the Physical Relation. This is the converse of the above 
relation. Here, we begin with a mental image; we are picturing it before our mind. 
Then, in order to express our image so that another person can also see it in his mind, 
we draw a physical picture and ask another to focus on a particular aspect of the 
picture. If the other can see the aspect, we say that he has also seen our mental image; 
if not, then he has failed to see what is occurring in our mind. For instance, suppose 
you have a simple mental image of a frowning face, with a triangular nose, and which 
is free-floating sideways on a white background. You tell your partner about this 
image but she does not understand what you are saying or imagining. So you reply,
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“Here look at this. My image looks exactly like this.” And you draw on a white piece 
of paper the following picture and say “Bend you head sideways”.
:>(
If your partner is able to see the aspect o f what you have just drawn, then she will 
discern that which you are imagining. In this way, what you were previously picturing 
in your head is now referred to a physical object, an actual picture o f which another 
person must come to see appropriately in order to know your inner image. But if  all 
she sees on the white page are random geometrical shapes, rather than the aspect 
those shapes can give off, then she has failed to see your mental state. So, in this case, 
knowledge o f your mental picture can only be gained through the perception o f an 
aspect of a physical thing. Thus, here you began with something mental (the picturing 
of some image) and you effortlessly moved to something physical (the aspect 
perception o f some thing). This, again, shows a noteworthy relationship between 
picturing images and aspect seeing, a relationship that goes beyond the mere sharing 
of features. It tells us again that the two experiences can aid one another.
Both processes -  aspect perceptiveness and picturing images -  involve 
intellectual and sensory attributes. This is what allows them to play off one another in 
the examples above. In aspect seeing, it seems to us as if we picture an image of 
something and instantaneously see it in some other object. Conversely, in picturing a 
mental image, it seems as if we see an aspect o f some object; and this aspect, even 
though imaginary, is the product of an almost-real sensory experience. This 
interrelationship between these processes therefore bolsters the notion that both 
experiences, on their own, belong to the same kind o f mental category: it may very 
well be that they both are found in the categoiy of the imagination. Both are species 
of a particular kind o f thought, a thought which is compounded with distinctive
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sensory features, and which recurs in various forms of human experience, but which 
is not properly described as illusions or hallucinations. On the basis o f their shared 
features and their interdependence, we can deduce that picturing an image and aspect 
seeing are two possibilities of the imaginary mind.
A Derridian View o f Aspect Seeing 
What processes are involved in the experience of aspect seeing? It seems self-evident 
that, at the very least, aspect seeing is intimately tied to perception. There appears to 
be a steady stream of perceptual concepts flowing through man’s experience of 
ambiguous figures, wherein his imagination forms part o f what he sees in the figures. 
This also seems to be the case in man’s encounter with aesthetic objects, where 
imagination again helps him perceive, for example, the joy or pain in a sound of 
music. And the same is conceivably true with regard to his appreciation of mundane- 
sacred objects, where possibly imagination aids a religious man in seeing the 
mourning in a road, the joy in a footprint, the sweetness in the ocean’s waves.
All o f these instances, wherein imagination is brought to bear on sensory 
experience, might invite us to reconsider the idea that aspects are properties, that there 
are some significant analogies, for instance, between aspects and simple properties 
such as colours. Indeed, this must be one reason why some philosophers may be 
willing to conclude that religious appreciation is, in fact, the perceiving o f properties 
of mundane-sacred objects. Under this theory, to call the cast of the Buddha’s 
footprint “joy” is a result o f seeing the property of joy in that sacred object. But this 
analogy would be hasty. We must first understand in what way the experience of 
aspect seeing is tied to everyday perception before we can argue that aspect 
perception is like seeing properties such as colours.
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Some might be inclined -  under a kind of Derridian or postmodernist 
inspiration -  to argue that all acts of seeing are or involve aspect perceptiveness. And, 
if this inclination were true, it could be deadly to our attempt to include aspect seeing 
in the category o f the imagination; for, given that we have argued that imagination 
extends beyond the content of sensory experience, we would have difficulty 
delineating the distinction between imaginative perception and normal perception, if 
the latter always included imaginative perception.
To be sure, it is an interesting idea that all our perception includes aspect 
seeing; at any rate, it would certainly make life quite a bit more fun. In our sensory 
experience of any object, so this argument seems to contend, we have the power to 
move from perceiving one aspect to another. And, thus, evidently there are no 
absolute criteria from which we can judge the “reality” from the “appearance” of 
those objects, for all is appearance, all is aspect, and all perception includes aspect 
perception. This is shown by the simple fact that it is regularly possible, through the 
power o f man’s immense capacity for thought, to experience a change of aspect even 
as we remain looking at the objects we immediately perceive. By thought alone, a 
man can make the carrots that he sees in his soup bowl alter into little beings 
swimming away from his spoon desperate to save their lives. He might even take pity 
on the orange creatures and refrain from eating them. But, if  he can produce such a 
weird experience from a sliced carrot, then there must have been another aspect o f the 
carrot out of which it changed. That is, the carrots in the soup had an aspect one 
moment in “normal seeing” but then changed into the aspect of desperate vegetable 
fear. How? Clearly, normal perception always includes aspect perception. Our 
decision about which aspect is “reality” is therefore sheer construction and social 
agreement.
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Okay. Now ignore the obvious question about how the above idea or “aspect” 
could possibly be true with aspect seeing permeating all perception and with no 
criteria by which to measure them. Instead, face another question. Does the fact that 
we can experience odd changes o f aspect really prove the point that all normal 
perception includes aspect seeing? Does it show that seeing the carrot as a vegetable 
and seeing it as a drowning little being come to the same thing? Everyday sensory 
experience often involves, at least at a minimum, a predisposition to believe in the 
existence o f the object entering one’s sensory field. Even if this predisposition proved 
unjustifiable, it would still seem true that in everyday life there often is a tight 
conceptual association between sensory experience and perceptual belief. And, if this 
is the case, then sensory experience -  quite unlike the aspect seeing o f desperately 
afraid carrots — is logically connected to the concept of belief. Accordingly, sensory 
experience is not obedient to m an’s will in the way that aspect seeing is. And so, they 
cannot be conflated. There is a conceptual distinction.
We have argued earlier that aspect seeing includes the concept o f unasserted 
thought. Given the argument above, this would mean that our everyday, normal 
sensory experience of, say, carrots in a bowl of soup, includes not merely belief that 
the carrots exist but also unasserted thoughts about them. We are always entertaining 
thoughts when we have sensory experiences. But, if unasserted thought requires 
language, then we would have to conclude that a being without a language -  say, a 
jackrabbit -  cannot see. That is a hard pill to swallow.
There is no denying that man does at times amuse himself with propositions 
about what he perceives, and he indeed does so easily and voluntarily. This 
commonplace behaviour, however, is not conceptually integral to sensory experience 
qua sensory experience. At a minimum, what is integral to sense impressions is the
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belief that ail object is present, and that that object can be described by some 
explanation. In contradistinction to the unasserted thoughts of aspect perception, 
however, such a belief involved in sense impressions is not subject to m an’s will. 
That is the critical point for, when we enjoy a change of aspect of some object, we 
imagine that the object ceases to exist and instead think of it as something totally 
different. The image becomes alive in what we see. When Prince Siddhartha, just 
before he set off to realize enlightenment, came upon the tempting women of his 
harem, he imagined that they did not exist and instead thought of them as rotting 
corpses. This was a religious change of aspect, a taking o f immediate sense 
impressions for something else. There was no “change of aspect” from some other 
aspect, but there was the realization or dawning of an aspect where, before his 
spiritual search, there was nothing but immediate sense-experience.
The Varieties o f Seeing-As 
Wittgenstein once suggested that many o f our philosophical problems arise because 
we have an unhealthy tendency to take one use of a term -  one picture of the way 
things are -  as the rigid standard by which to judge all the rest.171 We try to squeeze 
the many employments of a term into one paradigm. An example is the many ways 
we might fail to understand the term “to see X as Y”. When the argument is made 
that all perceptual experience includes aspect perception, we are failing to make 
distinctions in the various uses o f the locution “seeing-as”. O f which kind are we 
speaking? We cannot take all its meanings and shove them into eveiy act of 
perception.
“To see X as Y” can refer to a report of seeing a likeness of appearance 
between two things. “I see her as a ‘cat’ type person”, one might say. In this example,
171 Philosophical Investigations, 89-133.
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“seeing-as” has little to do with the belief in some state o f affairs inherent in the 
immediate sense-impressions.
The term “seeing-as” can also go beyond belief altogether, and refer to 
emotions and attitudes, as when, for example, the German National-Socialist 
philosopher, Martin Heidegger, saw  Americans as the katestrophenhaft, the site of
17^catastrophe, “the unrestricted organization of the average man”. " (Whatever that 
means.) Another example is my neighbour’s frequent statements to me that she sees 
her husband as selfish. Both these examples show that the locution can point to 
feelings and attitudes, and not to perceptual beliefs at all.
Seeing-as can also refer to various modes of interpretation o f imperceptible 
phenomena. For example, when we interpret the motives o f someone, we might say, 
“I see her laughter with the boss as crass affectation, while you see it as genuine 
amusement.” Here the term “to see X as Y” relates to a kind of hypothesis, a subtle, 
tentative search for truth. (Interestingly, in this example, there is no possibility of a 
double-aspect. Both interpretations cannot be true at once.)
Yet another use o f seeing-as occurs when “to see X as Y” denotes a kind of 
mental picture, as when we form a memory of something. “Looking over the course 
o f my life”, an old man on his deathbed might say, “I now see it as charged with 
meaning and direction, when while in the springtime o f my youth I saw  it as boring 
and ridiculous” . Here, again, the locution does not refer to perceptual belief. Like the 
examples above, the locution has nothing to do with immediate sensory experience.
All these examples show us that we need to be careful to distinguish 
what is m eant w hen philosophers say that all normal perception includes
177 Quoted in “A genealogy o f  anti-Americanism”, by James W. Ceaser. Summer 2003, online at: 
http://www.thepublicinterest.com .
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seeing-as. And we should, therefore, also note that "aspect seeing", when it 
refers to imagination, is only one other locution of "seeing-as".
Aspeci-Perceptiveness and Thought
Before closing this chapter on the varieties o f imagination, we ought to offer a little 
more comment on the nature of the “thought” that is involved in aspect- 
perceptiveness, especially since we shall soon be proposing it as an ingredient of 
religious appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment. We suggested earlier that aspect 
perceptiveness contained at least two mechanisms, thought and sensory experience. 
As with the concept o f imagery, we proposed that the concept of “aspect 
perceptiveness” was absorbed in the concept of “thought” because it possessed key 
characteristics that were definitive o f thought. We also suggested that the kind of 
thought that is involved in aspect perceptiveness is not so much a type of 
interpretation about a state of affair, but more likely an imaginative way o f thinking 
about an object. In other words, the perception of the duck in Jastrow’s figure is not 
to mistake the geometrical lines on the canvas as a real duck, but to see imaginatively 
the “duck” in those lines. Having said that, we must not forget that aspect 
perceptiveness, while certainly having intellectual content, is not only thought. We 
cannot dismiss the sensory qualities o f the experience, the concreteness o f this 
peculiar happening of life. And, indeed, the thought inherent in aspect perceptiveness 
cannot be independently and fully described from everything else that is involved in 
this experience.
This is an important point, for when perceiving the aspect of, say, a Sikh Gum 
painted on the walls of a Gurdwara, we cannot neatly split the thought and the sensory 
experience o f the painted Guru into two sharp compartments — even if  there are 
thoughts which control the way the picture is seen by a devout Sikh person, or even if
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his thoughts are what is seen in the picture. We can only intimate these interrelated 
components o f the mental experience o f the religious man. And, if we hope to 
describe the thought involved in the experience, we shall, at best, only point to certain 
analogies with interpretation.
Why is this?
Well, to see that the thought inbuilt within aspect perceptiveness cannot be cut 
off from the total experience and thus described independently, consider some of the 
following thought experiments. Suppose that my friend Gurpreet, a Sikh, is looking at 
a picture and sees it as the Guru Nanalc, the founder o f Sikhism. Under these 
circumstances, it appears correct to say that she is thinking of the picture as the Gum. 
Yet it appears manifestly incorrect to say that she has in her mind a proposition such 
as “This picture or pattern of lines is the Guru.” Why? Because she certainly does not 
mistake the picture -  the lines that make it up — literally as being the great Sage in 
flesh and blood. Rather, if she entertains a proposition at all, it is that the thing in the 
pattern of lines represents the Guru, and not the lines or pictures themselves.
Similarly, when I go with Gurpreet to the Gurdwara and she points at a 
painting and says to me “This is the Guru Nanak” -  to what exactly is she referring 
me? Clearly, the “this” in her proposition refers not to the figure or picture, but to that 
which is in it. The “this” cannot be taken referentially, but must stand as a substitute 
for an intentional object o f perception. If I were to take her meaning otherwise -  if I 
said, for example, “Oh, the Guru Nanak is a bunch o f colourful lines splashed on a 
wall in Southall.” -  she would rightly think I was obtuse, if not mad. The possibility 
of such a mistake can only imply that the thought that I have must be described in 
terms o f  the aspect that I “see” rather than what I see described by reference to the 
thought. So, while aspect perceptiveness certainly has a thought-ingredient, our
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understanding o f that thought hinges first on sensory experience. Similarly if my 
friend says to me “This is the Guru Nanak” and if my back is to the painting that she 
is pointing at, I might reply, “Which particular Guru Nanak? There are many pictures 
o f Guru Nanak on these walls.” Her only answer to me could be This Guru Nanak, 
tapping me on the shoulder, and pointing to a particular picture. Here again, the 
thought is secondary to, or at least dependent on, the immediate sensory perception of 
a particular thing. Without that sensory contact, the thought is meaningless.
The upshot, then, is that we cannot describe the thought independently of the 
perceptible object to which it refers. It seems demonstrably mistaken to interpret 
aspect perceptiveness under the formulation “to think of X as Y”, or even as “to see X 
as Y” , although there certainly are uses wherein they make sense. But these 
formulations do not fully capture what is happening in our experience o f seeing 
aspects. Instead, we might better describe this experience as “to see Y in a particular 
X”. Only in this way can we make sense o f a word such as “this” in a proposition 
such as “This is the Guru Nanak” when pointing to a painting.
Now this suggestion -  that the thought involved in aspect perceptiveness is 
intimately tied to sensory experience -  is not as radical as we might think. 
Remember, there is a sense in which “b elie f’ is intimately tied to everyday sensoiy 
experience, too. Kant has made a good case that certain beliefs are inherently related 
to sensoiy experience, indeed they make sense of them. When I see my friend at the 
entrance of the Gurdwara, I have a visual experience of her, but connected with this 
sensoiy experience is also perceptual belief, namely, a belief such as “There is 
Gurpreet” . My visual experience of seeing her irreducibly includes the belief o f her 
being there, of her present attendance in my present sensory moment. Yet, as with my 
thought in a visual experience of an aspect, I cannot specifically delineate this belief
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in her presence independently of its sensory character. It seems rather simplistic to 
claim that my perceptual belief is only “There is Gurpreet” . The visual experience is 
far richer and more complex than that, or any other, proposition by which we might 
wish to capture the belief. I see Gurpreet -  her black curly hair sneaking out of her 
headscarf, her broad smile, her waving arm. I see all that -  and more. The visual 
experience is a multifarious web of visual attributes. Accordingly, any attempt to 
proffer a complete account o f the perceptual belief associated with the visual 
impression simply cannot be produced. No proposition can capture the substance of 
what is seen. And yet, if we attempt to describe the belief, all that we can do in the 
end is appeal to the numerous visual appearances, the way she looks. In other words, 
we could only identify the perceptual belief through describing the sensory 
experiences. So, like aspect perceptiveness and its relation to thought, so too we 
cannot specify the belief independently o f the direct experience. It, too, is intimately 
tied with an immediate perception.
Given all this, we can conclude that, just as perceptual belief has an 
irreducible sensoiy quality, so does the thought involved in aspect perceptiveness. 
Neither is able to be fully and independently described. Yet both can be intimated. 
Something o f their nature can be described, even if it is only a partial description. 
With particular respect to aspect perceptiveness, we can, nevertheless, show its 
relation to other forms o f thought -  such as “thinking of X as Y” -  and this allows us 
to understand it as somehow a kind of “unasserted thought”.
To finish off, it might be said that aspect perceptiveness and its intellectual 
and sensory components are like the relation we saw earlier between imagination and 
belief. For, in the same way that imagination, if it were asserted, would become a 
belief, aspect perceptiveness is the integrating of a thought that would constitute an
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actual perception only if  it too were asserted. There is thus an “unasserted” nature to 
aspect perceptiveness -  and, as we shall see in the next few chapters, this nature likely 
shapes the makeup o f the experience of religious appreciation.
Conclusion
This brings to a close our (rather ponderous) detour into the concept of the 
imagination. It is hoped that a comprehension of the forgoing discussion will help us 
advance with more detail and sophistication our response-resemblance theory of 
religious appreciation, by allowing us to sidestep some o f the dilemmas that have 
continued to plague us up until now. In the following chapter, we shall show how 
aspect perceptiveness may very well be involved in religious appreciation. After that, 
we shall provide an explanation of the conditions o f religious appreciation more 
generally, the conditions that make the experience unique and different from all other 
kinds of religious experience.
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CHAPTER 23
IMAGINATIVE THOUGHT AND 
RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION
Recall the intentionality-dilemma from Chapter 16, the problem that set us on the long 
discussion of imagination. To avoid the dilemma, we have traversed a lot of 
philosophical ground looking for a mental state other than belief; a mental state that, 
like belief, stimulates emotional and intellectual responses to objects. Our discussion 
about the imagination brought to our attention that aspect-perceptiveness meets the 
criteria we have been seeking. Now it is time to discuss the kind of aspect- 
perceptiveness that is involved in mundane-sacred judgment. We will contend that 
there are indeed significant links between aspect-perceptiveness and mundane-sacred 
judgment. From this contention, we shall propose the not unfair conclusion that 
aspect-perceptiveness is an important feature of the experience of religious 
appreciation. And, if this conclusion proves correct, then the horns o f the 
intentionality-dilemma have been successfully split.
To begin our discussion, let us take an example of a mundane-sacred object, 
that of Gregorian chant. It is quite typical to hear religious as well as non-religious 
people describe this mysterious Catholic music as “melancholy” or “sad” or “heavy” 
or “mystical” or “haunting”. We find this kind of language applied to all sorts of 
religious music from around the world, such as to Tibetan chanting or the Islamic 
calls to prayer in Jerusalem. It is fair to say that when voicing such judgments about 
religious music the mental recognition of these mundane-sacred predicates -  the
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melancholy, the sadness, the heaviness, the haunting quality o f the music -  entails 
some kind of sensoiy experience. That is, one hears the mundane-sacred predicate -  
one hears the “heaviness” — in the sound of the music. Such language in itself 
suggests that the experience is like the examples o f “seeing as” that we discussed 
previously.
The analogies between seeing the aspect of the Guru Nanak in the picture at 
my friend’s Gurdwara and hearing the “haunting quality in Gregorian chant” are 
worth remarking upon. Both experiences, it seems intuitive to say, fit into the same 
category of mind, both have the same characteristics o f unasserted thought. Both 
seem to indicate the experience o f perceiving aspects. Both find their expression in 
language, in verbal communication, wherein a man applies everyday predicates to a 
visual or auditoiy object of the sensory world. And, barring a peculiar metaphysics, 
the man in both cases does not intend the descriptions to be taken literally. His 
judgments, if  they are to be understood at all, do not postulate that the Guru Nanak -  
the real man who lived long ago -  is the picture, the geometrical lines splashed on the 
wall. In the same way, we never think that Gregorian or Tibetan chant is actually sad, 
as if  sound waves could in reality feel emotions. Rather, such descriptions point us to 
the mental phenomenon o f unasserted thought.
Furthermore, as with seeing aspects more generally, m an’s will is also present 
in such judgments. It makes sense -  and indeed it happens — that a man can be 
ordered to see or hear the expressive quality of a mundane-sacred object, just as a 
man can be ordered to see the duck in Jastrow’s duck-rabbit. A religious teacher, for 
instance, can ask obedience from his disciple, demanding that he see or hear the 
mourning, the sadness, the joy in a road, a statue, a melody, or a mountain. 
Moreover, it does not matter that the student might not be able to hear or see what is
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required. All that matters is that the logic of this kind of judgm ent tells us that the 
request makes sense, [t fits into the intelligible uses of religious language. Similarly, 
it makes sense to try to persuade someone to perceive a mundane-sacred object under 
a certain description. This might happen, for example, when a religious man is 
seeking to proselytize another man. “To feel the soul o f the chant, try to hear the 
longing, aching, sorrow o f it” , one might say, in an effort to persuade another to feel 
the music religiously.
In this kind o f example of mundane-sacred judgment, it seems incorrect to say 
that the mode of thought involved is a kind of interpretative “seeing-as” , since in this 
example, the expressive judgment is not interpreting the mundane-sacred object as 
literally sorrowful. The thought associated with the judgment is not so cognitive; it is 
not aiming to be an objective description of a state o f affair. It also does not seem 
right to say that the point of the mundane-sacred judgment is to subsume the 
mundane-sacred object under a rigid set o f concepts because no music or road could 
ever literally fall under a rigid concept like “sorrowful” or “mourning”. Furthermore, 
it seems mistaken to say that the function of this judgment is to specify analogies 
because, while it may be true that its justification will appeal to analogies, its meaning 
will not (when we abandon the notion of truth-condition as the condition that provides 
its meaning). Having rejected the concept of truth-condition in the context of 
mundane-sacred judgment, we are left, so it would seem, with the comparison 
between mundane-sacred predicates and aspects. It may be only in this way that we 
will be able to fruitfully describe the conditions for the acceptance of this kind of 
mundane-sacred judgment that has emotional or psychological predicates.
We noted earlier that two aspects may be perceived in the same first-order 
features of a figure. The same seems to be the case with two contending
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interpretations o f a mundane-sacred object. Thus, the phenomenon o f a double-aspect 
may arise in mundane-sacred judgment. Indeed, in the context of many mundane- 
sacred objects, more than one interpretation may prove helpful in elucidating its 
meaning. As an example, recall Sri Aurobindo* s comments on Indian temple 
architecture:
One of these buildings climbs up bold, massive in projection, up-piled in the 
greatness of & forceful but sure ascent, preserving its range and line to the last, 
the other soars from the strength of its base, in the grace and emotion of a 
curving mass to a rounded summit and crowning symbol.173
Aurobindo offers us an analogical interpretation of the mundane-sacred object in that 
he draws our attention to analogies between its features and other concepts such as 
“soaring'’ and “strength” in order to express the mundane-sacred object. Such 
analogical interpretations are, so it seems, highly similar to the kind o f reasoning 
involved in double-aspects. For, on the one hand, Aurobindo may see the temple -  
the mundane-sacred object -  as emotionally vigorous and uplifting, citing x, y, and z 
features as justification for his judgment. But, on the other hand, another man may see 
the same temple as calm and stately, even as he also cites the same x, y, and z features 
to substantiate his judgment. Therefore both men may justify their judgments to one 
another by referring to the exact same first-order features.
Debating interpretations is, of course, a common practice in religious 
discourse. And here it would seem we are witnessing the phenomena of the double­
aspect within the religious realm, particularly in the realm of mundane-sacred 
judgment and religious appreciation. Indeed, such emotional uncertainty has often 
been appreciated and highly valued in regard to the interpretation o f many mundane- 
sacred objects. For instance, in a sacred book such as the Song o f  Songs, or in some of 
the poetry we find among the Sufis, or in some of the music of the Troubadours, or in
173 Summer 2002, online at: w w w .hindunet.org/srh_hom e/1996_ll/m sg00034.htm l.
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some o f the esoteric Tibetan texts -  in all these mundane-sacred objects - their authors 
often purposely obscured their intentions so as to make it ambiguous whether the love 
they expressed was religious or sensual. The love expressed in such religious texts 
seems intended to convey both the religious and the profane at once, as if there were 
no difference between the two.
O f course, such ambiguity, intended or otherwise, raises the question whether 
there is a “correct” interpretation of the mundane-sacred object’s aspect. At what 
point, in other words, do we cease making mundane-sacred judgments that are based 
on the same set o f first-order features? Or must we embrace pluralism?
One answer might be that the context will determine which o f  the 
interpretations are appropriate. Yet this reply will not do for the context itself will 
require interpretation. And thus, by pursuing this train o f thought, we would only 
push our original question backwards onto something else, that is, the context.
Thus, if we wish to avoid such a regress, perhaps we ought to conclude that 
the answer will not be connected to the quasi-interpretive idea of “seeing as”, as if 
there were a “right answer” . We shall need to accept that we cannot bring to a halt 
our worries over the right mundane-sacred judgment, even if we tried to show that the 
mundane-sacred object is literally “mourning” (or whatever). After all, the mundane- 
sacred judgment is radically different from the interpretation o f the general feelings 
and emotions o f human beings because, when considering the feelings o f a man, only 
one of the interpretations of his feelings will be correct, however many competing 
interpretations of his emotional state we may have. But, in the case of mundane- 
sacred judgment, the phenomenon of a double aspect of the mundane-sacred object 
may remain -  indeed may be intended to remain — obscure or ambiguous.
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Nevertheless, we still wish, or often wish, to know the thought that is 
embodied, as it were, in the perception and reaction to mundane-sacred objects. If a 
man advances a mundane-sacred judgment such as “The sacred river is mourning”, 
we want to grasp the thought being communicated. The mere thought that “the river is 
mourning” does not seem enough, since it is not clear how the road could mourn. In 
the same way, if we say that some example o f Gregorian chant is “sorrowful” , it is not 
clear to what entity we are attributing the “sorrow”. To the music itself? To its 
audience? To the composer?
Perhaps the best we can do is to define the thought inherent in the mundane- 
sacred judgment by way o f the experience that produces it. So, what we can say about 
this thought is that the experience of hearing the sorrow o f a mundane-sacred object is 
analogous to the experience of hearing the expression of sorrow in, say, another 
human being’s voice. In that respect, it is like “seeing as” . Hearing the sorrow in the 
sacred music, or seeing the joy in the Buddha’s footprint, is an unasserted auditory or 
visual perception o f sorrow or joy. What this interpretation suggests, then, is that the 
mundane-sacred object is not analogous to human emotion as such; but, when voicing 
such language, the religious man is undergoing an experience that is analogous to his 
ordinary perception o f such emotion. Thus, as in aspect-perceptiveness, we can 
explain the use o f mundane-sacred judgment under the category of “unasserted 
thought” rather than under the categories of belief and truth-value.
With this interpretation, there is no question of the religious man ascribing joy 
or sorrow as properties o f the mundane-sacred object, as if the object were being 
understood under the theories of “religious perception”. The religious perception, as 
talked about in earlier chapters, is really more analogous to aspect perceptiveness 
than to any direct or commonplace perception of an object’s properties. Exploiting the
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notion of aspect-perceptiveness also allows us to describe how a mundane-sacred 
predicate, such as “joy”, can have the same meaning when applied to a mundane- 
sacred object and when applied to human beings. It is, then, no different from the way 
the term “rabbit” has the same meaning when ascribed to an aspect and when used to 
pick out a real rabbit. Its meaning remains the same in both the aspect perception and 
in the actual perception.
If all these conclusions are true, then our response-resemblance theory, which 
encompasses them, may be our best interpretation of mundane-sacred judgment and 
religious appreciation. Now having offered our interpretation -  even if only in rough 
outline -  about the kind o f perception and mental state involved in this religious 
experience, it is time to consider some of the other psychological features embedded 
in religious appreciation.
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CHAPTER 24 
EMOTION AND RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION
We have hinted that the conditions for accepting some mundane-sacred judgments are 
a kind of felt response. Yet, we may wonder, at what point this response occurs? 
Certainly, religious appreciation o f a mundane-sacred object does not transpire merely 
after the object has been confronted with the sense organs; it seems to happen during 
the meeting between man and his sacred object. And indeed, given the similarity 
between religious appreciation and aspect-perceptiveness, it is not unfair to say that 
there is an experience which goes together with the hearing or seeing of a mundane- 
sacred object, and which cannot be separated from the immediate sensory contact 
with that object. Now we have identified the nature o f the thought o f this experience — 
or more precisely the “unasserted” or “imaginative” thought o f the experience -  but 
we still have not described the feelings, desires and reactions that might blossom out 
of this thought. Undoubtedly, feelings will often play an important part in religious 
appreciation. Indeed, if the confrontation with a mundane-sacred object has any real 
religious value, it may well be due to the emotions and desires that the object 
provokes.
The theories o f the last few chapters have suggested that the psychological 
state of imagination, with its accompanying reactions, are in some ways different 
from what arises out o f the psychological state o f belief. Indeed, the concept of 
imagination has been brought out in this dissertation precisely because of its contrast
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with belief, since relying on the concept of belief seems to consign the practice of 
mundane-sacred judgment to bizarre metaphysics, to the attribution of human 
psychological states to inanimate phenomena. That interpretive result is a little unfair 
to those who practice a religious way o f life, to say nothing o f what it means to those 
secular people who also voice mundane-sacred judgments.
Now, should it be the case that there are “religious emotions” whilst 
confronting mundane-sacred objects, then such emotions must be grounded in the 
imagination and not in belief.174 These religious emotions therefore will not be 
identified in the way we analyze emotions based on belief.175 Accordingly, our theory 
of religious appreciation will confer on these emotions a certain psychological 
autonomy.
But, as was pointed out in earlier chapters, there are undeniable problems with 
the phenomenological idea o f religious autonomy. Remember, we want to maintain 
our ability to claim that the religious response to a “mourning” road and the ordinary 
response to a mourning man are in some way similar. Otherwise, we shall fmd it 
impossible to explain the meaning o f the mundane-sacred object’s mourning; that is, 
we shall not be able to understand why that mundane-sacred predicate is applied to 
that inanimate object. But, again, the problem is that the reaction and the verbal 
behaviour of a man are grounded on a belief about that m an’s psychological state, 
while in the case of a mundane-sacred judgment about a road they are grounded on an 
“unasserted” or “imaginative” thought. This leaves us with an obvious question: how 
can the “religious emotion” involved in religious appreciation be comparable with the 
emotions that are founded on beliefs? Indeed, how can the latter be used to identify 
and clarify the nature of the former? By appealing to the imagination to explain
174 This assumes, again, that w e are not describing a religious tradition that deliberately and 
consciously ascribes feelings to what w e believe are inanimate objects.
175 This is something psychologists o f  religion might ponder.
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religious appreciation, are we on the verge o f wiping out the basic link o f religious 
appreciation and non-religious experience?
Stoics, phenomenologists and cognitive psychologists, as mentioned earlier, 
claim inherent connections between belief, emotion and desire. Many o f our emotions 
are identified, at least partly, in terms of our beliefs. From the assertion that a mother 
is terrified it follows that she believes that there is or might be something threatening 
her child. Typically, it also follows that she desires to keep her children clear of that 
harmful thing. Now this truth might lead us to conclude -  rather hastily -  that human 
emotion is a composite of belief and desire, in which all three — emotion, belief and 
desire -  are connected in a causal chain.
Yet, if religious emotions are not founded on belief, but instead on the 
entertaining of unasserted propositions, then how are we to construe the emotions 
found in religious appreciation? There can be no doubt that, when a decent human 
being stands in front of man in mourning, he will feel concern for his fellow man, and 
that concern will be connected to an awareness of a pitiful object. However, when a 
decent man stands before “the road to Zion” that is said to be “mourning”, will he 
have the same kind of awareness that is present when he confronts a man in sorrow? 
Unlikely. Any propositions that he contemplates about the road will have an 
unasserted quality about them. And this distinction, between the asserted proposition 
about a man in mourning and the unasserted propositions about inanimate mundane- 
sacred objects, raises the question about how the emotions stemming from these 
beliefs might be compared. Indeed, in the religious context, it may be the case that 
one wants to see the “mourning o f the road”, while in the ordinary context of life only 
sadists delight in the mourning of another human being. So, without the beliefs that 
are typical o f mourning, the religious man may have no desire to avoid seeing the
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mourning o f the mundane-sacred object. A Theravadin monk, for example, who 
meditates on a rotting corpse, indeed wishes to imbibe the harrowing aspect o f his 
sacred object. He wants to observe the dukkha, the suffering of it. But, again, this 
raises our question: if neither the belief nor the desire that is characteristic of
mourning or suffering is present, then in what way can the man of religious 
appreciation be feeling anything similar to what he feels in everyday, non-religious 
confrontations with mourning and pain?
To answer this, we might compare religious emotional reactions to ordinary 
emotional reactions in terms o f the outcomes of these psychological states. That is, 
we might continue to point out that normal, everyday emotions, such as the concern 
we feel for a man in mourning, entail, in most cases, a desire to relieve the condition 
o f our fellow man’s pain; but, in some religious cases, such as in the appreciation of 
“the road to Zion” or the meditation on a “rotting corpse” , a desire to observe the 
object and not to avoid or alter it might instead be provoked.
So, obviously, a comparison of the two emotional states in terms of their 
outcomes is hardly profitable in terms o f our question. Not only are the outcomes of 
these emotions often divergent, but also we cannot anticipate every reaction from 
these emotions, be they religious or otherwise.
Suppose, however, that the man o f religious appreciation, while “seeing” the 
mourning aspect o f the mundane-sacred object, begins to imagine what in that 
mundane situation of confronting a man in mourning he would also believe. He 
would, it would seem, be contemplating propositions that, in the mundane world, he 
would believe to be true. It seems possible, if not probable, that in this religious 
experience he is entertaining, along with his imaginative propositions about the 
mundane-sacred object, certain desires that would also, in more mundane
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circumstances, flower out o f those beliefs. In other words, just as he is 
“contemplating” propositions in his imagination, so too, we might say, he is now also 
“contemplating” the desires associated with those propositions. He entertains the 
desires, as a man might entertain the idea o f winning the lottery, experiencing those 
“lottery desires” that would unfold in him: the desire for a nice flat, for freedom from 
one’s boss, etc. In a similar way, the man o f religious appreciation imagines the 
mourning o f the road in the sense of “imagining what it is like” . He imagines the 
thoughts he would have in the face of human mourning and, in turn, establishes in 
himself the feelings and desires which these thoughts generate.
Consequently, when describing the religious emotions embedded in the 
religious appreciation o f a mundane-sacred object, it is helpful to speak o f a 
“mundane counterpart” to his emotional reaction to the mundane-sacred object. It is 
precisely in terms of this mundane counterpart -  such as the “normal” emotional 
reaction to a man in mourning -  that we can say the emotion he feels in response to 
the mundane-sacred object is the same as, or classifiable into, the emotion he would 
feel towards a living being in mourning. His feeling  towards what he sees in the 
mundane-sacred object is, like his perception o f it, only unasserted or contemplated.
Is the emotion he feels as intense as the emotion he feels toward a man in 
mourning? Surprisingly, the emotion may be more intense. Unlike the emotions that 
we have toward artworks, which often evoke milder feelings than in daily life, sacred 
objects are often expected to stimulate intense reactions. Fervour is -  depending, of 
course, on the religious tradition -  often valued. The mundane-sacred object is not 
truly appreciated if the observer is not fully engaged emotionally and intellectually 
with that object. Here one thinks of the dances o f the Hasidim around the Torah, or 
the intensity o f meditation on a Bodhisattva’s “qualities” depicted in a mandala. In
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this regard, the intensity of the religious emotion is a result not of the degree of belief 
in the m an’s thoughts, but instead on the level of imaginative involvement he has with 
his sacred object.
It is obviously the case that religious appreciation incorporates emotion, and 
that without emotion human beings would probably find their experiences of 
mundane-sacred objects rather dull, perhaps even without value altogether. The 
expression of a mundane-sacred judgment, therefore, seems to be more than the mere 
expression of a thought. It is quite common for someone, while looking at a 
mundane-sacred object, to comment that it inspires certain feelings — o f joy, 
mourning, heaviness, and so on. These verbal comments are, as we argued, not to be 
dismissed as metaphors. They often transpire in circumstances that prevent us from 
interpreting them as the mere expression o f  intellectual thoughts. A man who speaks 
with such emotional language wishes to describe his feelings in precisely that way, 
with that diction. Evidently for him, those emotions are an integral part o f his 
experience and, thus, give rise to his choice o f language. Indeed, given certain rituals, 
the man of religious appreciation will describe his feelings toward the mundane- 
sacred object in terms that can themselves be interpreted as a statement of feeling. For 
example, he may describe the object in a certain tone o f  voice
-  perhaps he will express his mundane-sacred judgment deeply and slowly, as if  to 
imply that not any tone of voice is appropriate for this grave occasion.
Now, regarding religious emotions, someone might say, “Yes, what you claim 
is all well and good. But what I want to know is what do the emotions o f  religious 
appreciation fee l UkeT’
Well, if we are assuming the truth of Wittgenstein’s private-language 
argument, then in answer to this question we can do no more than point to the
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imagined thoughts o f the experience and their relation to beliefs, to the language and 
desires that typically accompany them, to the physical symptoms o f the stated 
emotions, such as trembling or relaxation or palpitations, to the social behaviours that 
follow, and so on. In other words, to “know” the “religious emotions” we can only 
refer to the circumstances wherein they are found. We cannot make a 
phenomenological investigation into its “pure feeling”. It is this impossibility that 
renders the religious emotions allegedly “ ineffable” . Accordingly, if we attempt to 
define the emotions inherent in religious appreciation, then we can do no more than 
communicate thoughts, language, behaviour and circumstances.
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CHAPTER 25 
THE EXPERIENCE OF RELIGIOUS APPRECIATION
So far we have outlined the kind of thought and emotion that plays a part in religious 
appreciation, but we have not yet provided a more complete account about the nature 
o f the experience. We have only asserted that emotions resulting from  the imagination 
are components o f this religious experience and language. Clearly, though, there 
must be more to the experience than just imagination and its resulting emotions. 
Otherwise we would need to conclude that human imagination and religious 
appreciation are simply the same phenomenon. In truth, imagination is only one 
component in the wider experience o f religious appreciation. And, although it is a key 
component, there are yet other characteristics to this religious experience. Our task in 
this chapter will be to elucidate -  or rather to speculate about -  what these other 
features are. If our speculation proves to be correct, we shall have delineated the 
qualities that comprise the nature of religious appreciation. In the end, we shall 
suggest that the qualities composing religious appreciation are a combination of 
several features: imaginative or unasserted thought, as we noted earlier; often a sense 
o f enjoyment or passionate interest in a sacred object; a kind o f consciousness based 
on direct sensoiy contact with a sacred object; a logic o f normative rules that 
surrounds one’s responses and language to that object; and a non-utilitarian interest in 
the mundane-sacred object, an appreciation of it "‘for its own sake”.
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Religious Terms
Now our argument began in Part II with a discussion about the meaning o f mundane- 
sacred judgment. We suggested that the meaning o f at least a large number of 
mundane-sacred judgments could be defined by way of the conditions for their 
acceptance, similar to the way in which Hare elucidated the meaning of moral 
judgm ents176 and Scruton the meaning of aesthetic judgm ents.177 We came to 
conclude, after analyzing what the conditions must be, that the mental state of 
imagination was an important component in religious appreciation. Imagination 
seemed to be the only means by which we could salvage the meaning o f mundane- 
sacred judgment from bizarre metaphysical beliefs, to which few would, at any rate, 
concede.
Yet now, if we recall the many examples of mundane-sacred judgments given 
in the Introduction, we see that our response-resemblance theory did not offer a 
general explanation of their meaning. Indeed, given that mundane-sacred judgments 
are indefinitely being produced, it is not possible to give a complete account. 
Moreover, we have so far only dealt with those mundane-sacred judgments that use 
language from ordinary discourse. That is, we analyzed mundane-sacred judgments 
that employ terms such as “mourning” or “joy” and so on. But what about those 
mundane-sacred judgments that use more decidedly religious words, terms such as 
“sacred” or “holy” or “evil”, or terms such as in the Buddhist context “kusala” and 
“akusala”? How do we explain these “sacred words” that describe mundane-sacred 
objects? Do they likewise have the same meaning or same experience associated 
with them? Such more decidedly religious mundane-sacred judgments seem to
176 Richard M. Hare, The Language o f  M orals  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1952).
177 Roger Scruton, A rt and Im agination.
178 And, how do w e explain other such distinctly religious terms found in other languages?
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contain all the customary terms o f religious praise and scorn, and they seem almost to 
stand apart from the rest o f the terms that we find in mundane-sacred judgments. To 
be sure, a mundane-sacred judgment like “The River Ganges is holy” seems to have a 
more distinctly religious quality about it than a mundane-sacred judgm ent like “The 
River Ganges is mourning”, and this is by dint of the fact that the predicate “holy” 
does not also have the same kind of commonplace/secular use as does the word 
“mourning”. Indeed it is the unique presence of such words as “holy” in our wider 
use of language that prompts us to conclude, in the first place, that there is such a 
thing as “religious language”, and that “the religious” is an area o f concrete human 
experience. Yet, so far, we have not even bothered to analyze them in mundane- 
sacred judgment!
Let us, then, now ask: how do we construe the meaning o f these “special” 
mundane-sacred judgments? What do we make of a statement such as “The River 
Ganges is holy”?
Evidently all that can be said in response to these questions is that, if our 
previous discussion about the meaning of mundane-sacred judgments landed upon the 
correct procedure for elucidating their meaning, we might likewise attempt to explain 
the meaning of these more decidedly religious mundane-sacred judgments in terms of 
the states o f mind that are expressed by them. If we can successfully offer a theory 
that explains these special religious statements, we shall have in our possession the 
experiential conditions whereby mundane-sacred judgments in general acquire 
meaning.
We shall begin, then, by considering some of the immediate characteristics of 
mundane-sacred judgments that employ more religious-based terms. Obviously such 
language is often evaluative. The employment of terms like “holy” or “evil”, or
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“kusala” or “akusala” expresses respect or fondness or dislike at an object. It also 
appears that, when such religious judgments are made, there are distinctively religious 
attitudes associated with them. These “attitudes” are, as it were, expressed through the 
judgments that employ these terms. We might go so far as to say these attitudes are 
what determine the structure o f religious appreciation and its language. That is, they 
are what provide this language with its point.
Now it may be objected that the more decidedly religious terms are not only 
evaluative. They are also descriptive. To call a mundane-sacred object “holy” or 
“evil” is not just to appraise it, it is also to say something about our feelings. A 
worldly thing that is said to be “evil” indicates not so much the nature o f the object as 
our feelings toward it; an action that is called “lcusala” says something about our 
feelings about that action. According to this theory, we express our feeling by 
describing the mundane-sacred object in terms o f the way we feel: we call it holy, 
glorious, wicked, sacred, and so on, because that is what the object excites in us. In 
this way, these words provide organization to our emotional states. For example, a 
mundane-sacred object may be described as both “glorious” and “holy”, but it is hard 
to imagine it being both “wicked” and “holy”, since the words seem to indicate 
divergent, almost incompatible emotions. Here, then, our choice o f mundane-sacred 
predicates seems to convey the compatibilities and incompatibilities of our feelings 
about mundane-sacred objects. Consequently, we are not merely dealing with 
evaluations o f objects, but also with descriptions of our subjective feelings about 
those objects.
But is that theory correct?
Well, that idea may be correct, and at some intuitive level it seems to be 
correct. Nevertheless, we cannot deny that the choice to use these “religious terms”
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hinges not so much on a desire to indicate one's own feelings, but more on a desire to 
say something about the character o f  the mundane-sacred object\ that thing standing 
outside ourselves. It seems self-evident that there is a distinction o f intention. If a 
man who uses mundane-sacred judgments means only to demarcate his personal 
feelings, then why does he choose that kind of religious language, which seems to 
speak of things outside himself? Why does he not use, say, the language of 
psychoanalysis, a language-game expressly developed for the purpose of describing 
one’s inner states? Undoubtedly, if  there are distinct feelings involved in mundane- 
sacred judgment, those distinctions are made possible by prior distinctions in the 
objects they describe, and not the other way around.
But, then, this raises another question. If the point o f employing religious 
terms is not solely to describe personal feelings, if these terms also ascribe a certain 
character to mundane-sacred objects, how do these evaluative judgments manage to 
express something specific about those objects to which they are assigned? What 
exactly are they saying about mundane-sacred objects?
The Q u a lity  o f  E n jo ym e n t and  P assio n a te  In te re s t 
To begin to examine this question, we ought to note some o f the ways religious terms 
are used. First, they frequently occur in interjections. It is not uncommon to hear 
people exclaim, “How holy!” or “What evil!” or “Jesus!” or even “God damn it!” 
when they come across objects in their life. Such exclamations have, for the most 
part, an evaluative use, conveying positive or negative attitudes towards the objects to 
which they are directed. Second, religious terms often seem to indicate enjoyment, 
pleasure or intense interest in an object. For example, it does make sense to say, in a 
non-religious context, “Drugs are fun, but they disgust me”, or “John is a kind fellow, 
but he bores me”. But it hardly seems right to say, “The River Ganges is holy and
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beautiful, but it disgusts me”, or “That object is definitely sacred, but it bores me”. 
Such statements would require special circumstances in order to make sense. At least 
ordinarily, the ascription of a word such as “holy” or “sacred” conveys a sense of 
attractiveness, a sense o f joy in that object, a desire for interjection, as it were. Such 
words tell us that the object is worth being around, that its presence is a pleasure. 
Accordingly, pleasure, enjoyment or passionate interest seems to play an important 
part in religious appreciation. And that seems to bear some relation to the fact that 
mundane-sacred predicates are so often connected to interjections.
The Q u a lity  o f  N o rm a tiv ity  
Now another use o f religious terms is that they often seem to indicate that the speaker 
is not indifferent to how others are reacting to the mundane-sacred object. If a man 
tells you the River Ganges is holy, then it is not a matter o f unconcern to him that you 
might disagree. Indeed, if you reply, “Actually, I think the Ganges is a dirty, 
disgusting river and not the least bit holy”, then you may very well come to suffer 
blows for your insult. Such an extreme example -  and there have been many such in 
history -shows that the use of religious terms in mundane-sacred judgments 
presupposes that the responses of others are typically viewed as important. By calling 
something “holy”, there is often the tacit assumption that you too should find it holy. 
And if you do not, then surely you must have failed to notice something about the 
mundane-sacred object. Otherwise you would have had the appropriate response. In 
this way, reasons start being offered for and against the various judgments about 
mundane-sacred objects. When a man asserts that X is holy (or not-holy), he may be 
required to give rational support, and not just a cause, for his judgment.
This fact suggests that embedded in religious appreciation is an almost 
Kantian “ought”, in which the voicing of a mundane-sacred judgment tacitly demands
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agreement from everyone. This interpretation may be a bit strong, however, since not 
all mundane-sacred judgments have the same degree of fervour associated with 
them.179 Even so, it is hard to deny that there is some normative force to all mundane- 
sacred judgment; religious appreciation does appear to include a connotation that 
there is a correct or appropriate response to any given mundane-sacred object. It is 
merely a matter o f observation that people often do debate their judgments about 
mundane-sacred objects, as if in voicing such language they are saying, “you too 
should respond to this object as I do”. To be sure, in uttering a mundane-sacred 
judgment, there is a kind of search for agreement. And this search, at times, may take 
the form o f logical persuasion -  by citing, as Aurobindo did with Indian temple 
architecture, certain features of the mundane-sacred object — or it may take the form 
of coercion, as when religious people resort to violence to convince others o f the 
rightness o f their own relationship to some mundane-sacred object. We might even 
hypothesize that the various rituals surrounding mundane-sacred objects are bom out 
of this prior necessity to establish an agreement in a religious community as to what is 
the appropriate response to those objects. Such rituals tell us -  all of us in the 
community — how we are to react to and speak about the sacred.
Now, given that, it is therefore persuasive to say: the concept o f  the 
"appropriate ” is embedded in the experience o f  religious appreciation. The feelings 
and responses toward a mundane-sacred object will be partly a result o f a man’s sense 
o f what is correct and acceptable, and this sense will imbue his understanding, 
interpretations, language and expectations about the mundane-sacred object. What we 
have here, then, is something o f  the “m oral” in religious appreciation.
,7l) It is doubtful, for instance, that a typical surfer w ill care much if  you disagree with his contention  
that the beaches o f  Hawaii are sacred.
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This normative, almost-moral quality to mundane-sacred judgment clearly 
raises the question of its relation to moral judgment. What are their similarities, and 
how are they distinguished? Clearly, present in both moral and mundane-sacred 
judgment is an attitude of disapproval against those who would violate or disagree 
with the moral or religious code being set out in the judgments. And, in both, this 
attitude of disapproval comes in various degrees of passion. The range of reactions, 
in both the moral and religious sphere, can spread from a “live and let live” 
acceptance of others’ judgments to righteous anger and the application of communal 
punishment.
Such reactions show that there are similarities between moral and mundane- 
sacred judgments. However, there are differences too. In religious appreciation, the 
experience does not turn entirely on the enforcement of 01* advocacy for a code of 
behaviour; it also aims at encouraging the capacity to enjoy or to feel a passionate 
interest in the mundane-sacred object. In other words, a mundane-sacred judgment 
does not merely say you should appreciate some object X. It says you should 
appreciate object X  because it stimulates. To see X  as I  see X  stimulates pleasure or 
passion, and so it may be stimulating fo r  you too. So, unlike the moral judgment, the 
mundane-sacred judgment seeks to educate 01* develop the capacity to respond to the 
world joyfiilly or passionately, to see some physical object -  rather than strictly an 
action -  under the spectacles of eternity, to see it as ultimate.
But now we may wonder what kind of “enjoyment” or “passion” is involved 
in religious appreciation. What does it mean to see an object, especially a physical 
object, as “ultimate”?
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The Qualities o f Uniqueness and Ultimacy
As we argued earlier, one answer to the question of what it means to call an object 
“ultimate” is that the enjoyment o f or passionate interest in a mundane-sacred object 
derives from regarding that object fo r  its own sake. Here the mundane-sacred object 
is ultimate. And to see something as ultimate means to see it as unique, as standing 
on its own as if infinite, as if containing never-ending value for the mere fact of being. 
Indeed, it is because of this “infinite value” that a secular man most likely chooses to 
use religious language when he comes across something breathtaking in his life. It 
serves as a way of isolating the object as something particularly special among the 
world’s manifestations.
Borrowing notions o f the aesthetic object, we can define the interest in a 
mundane-sacred object “for its own sake” as a desire to continue to have sensory 
contact with an object, when there is no further reason fo r  that, desire in terms o f  any 
other desire in which the experience o f  the mundane-sacred object may satisfy, and 
where the desire originates from  a concept o f  ultimacy about the mundane-sacred 
object.
If we want to understand what it means to regard something as an end in itself, 
we need only imagine a man who desires one thing in his life — say, prestige. If 
prestige is all he desires, then he will end up valuing, say, his profession or his wife 
only in so far as it or she brings him prestige among his fellows, since the admiration 
o f others is all he desires. By contrast, if he appreciates his work or wife fo r  its or her 
own sake then clearly he appreciates it or her as something ultimate. His profession 
or wife possesses, as it were, infinite value. No amount o f approval or disapproval 
from others can rob him of their importance. And so it is with all things valued for 
their own sake.
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The regard o f the mundane-sacred object as unique and ultimate is the impulse 
to observe and confront the sacred object, rather than to use it. It is the desire to be in 
its presence rather than exploit it for the presence of something else.
In this respect, religious appreciation is like aesthetic appreciation, and 
mundane-sacred judgment is like aesthetic judgment. Just as aesthetic judgment 
hinges on a description of a scene or a melody without reference to an interest beyond 
that scene or melody, so too does mundane-sacred judgment consist o f a reaction to 
what is seen or heard in the mundane-sacred object, not in order to achieve some 
further end for it, but to draw attention to that object. As with a great artwork, the 
mundane-sacred object brings our attention and desires to a stop, as it were, by 
focusing on a particular thing.
We ought to emphasize, if we have not done so before, that, in religious 
appreciation there is an element o f  the “aesthetic". Like the aesthete before his 
beloved artwork, the man of religious appreciation faces the mundane sacred object as 
if “all else lives in its light” . The holy object is not valued because there is no reason 
for wanting it, but -  like great artworks -  because there is no other reason but itself 
for which the object is wanted. As in aesthetics, the desire for the sacred object is not 
based on a need, but on a conception o f it as an end in itself.
Now the “end in itse lf’ quality o f mundane-sacred objects is not all there is to 
religious appreciation, o f course. A dog that stops and stares blankly at some object is 
no more experiencing religious appreciation than it is having an aesthetic experience. 
It is not enough that some animal merely sees an object in order for it to be 
experienced as a mundane-sacred object. It is not even enough that the animal sees it 
without any further interest. Simply to stare at something is not religious
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appreciation. To have an experience o f religious appreciation invariably includes 
thinking about the sacred object, even if  only to think, “That’s sacred” .
And, because the experience requires some conception o f the object, it is clear 
that religious appreciation involves a thought, as we argued in the last chapter. 
Indeed, regarding something as a mundane-sacred object is grounded with a 
simultaneous conception about it, in that the conception provides some reason for the 
desire to continue confronting it. That conception is grounded in some variety of the 
imagination.
The Sensuous Quality
So far we have characterized religious appreciation in terms of three features. One, it 
involves a sense of what is appropriate, not unlike the normative quality which we 
find in moral attitudes. Two, religious appreciation involves enjoyment or passionate 
interest in an object, not unlike aesthetic attitudes, which are characterized by 
“pleasure in” aesthetic objects. Three, it includes conceiving and appreciating an 
object for its own sake, as if it possessed ultimate value. Besides those three 
intellectual and emotional features, however, we also need to note the sensuous aspect 
of religious appreciation. Indeed the main, and perhaps most interesting, quality of 
religious appreciation is the perception of the object itself, the fusing of man’s 
religious thoughts with his sensory experience of the world.
Let us say a man, after reading the Gospels, is inflamed with admiration for 
the character o f Jesus Christ, and let us assume that he has never seen a sculptural 
version o f Jesus on the Cross. But one day he comes across such an image. Is it not 
clear that he will now look and study the features of the suffering figure while 
contemplating the character of the great man of whom he read about in the Gospels? 
Combing his deep admiration for the character of Jesus with the suffering which he
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now perceives in the wooden cross before him, it is fair to say he will likely come to 
experience the character of Jesus in the appearance of the image. In this way, through 
religious appreciation, the sculpture o f Jesus on the Cross acquires a sacred aspect for 
this man. The thoughts o f Jesus commingle with the perception itself. His admiration 
o f Jesus, in other words, has become part of his raw impulse to see this particular 
object, since the mental object o f his admiration -  that imaginative conception -  is 
now manifested in the appearance of the physical object. Here, then, is an example of 
how the sensuous quality of religious appreciation comes to mix with those other 
features we mentioned earlier -  enjoyment or passionate interest, uniqueness, 
ultimacy, nonnativity, unasserted thought.
As we said, the sensory quality of religious appreciation possesses an essential 
relationship with m an’s imagination. In religious appreciation, we might say that a 
man’s unasserted thoughts -  for example, his contemplation about the suffering of 
Jesus as depicted in the Gospels -  are combined with, or suffuse, the perception o f an 
object (such as a sculpture of Jesus nailed to a cross). As we pointed out earlier, 
thoughts o f absent objects can be associated with a perception, as when, for example, 
someone chooses to see an image o f a face in the passing clouds, or when one comes 
to see a sculpture as depicting the agony o f Jesus Christ.
Make no mistake about it. Although, in this religious experience, the response 
towards mundane-sacred objects generates the thoughts and emotions typical of 
imagination, they are not trivial, just as our responses to great artworks are not trivial. 
The objects of religious appreciation — the sculptures, the rivers, the mountains, the 
sacred foods, the scriptures -  seive as a physical point in the sensory world on which 
diverse thoughts and emotions are focused. It is, in part, man’s imaginative capacity 
which allows him to fill his physical, sensory world with religiosity. That is to say, it
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is his ability to take what is not there — the nailing o f the real Jesus to a cross some
two thousand years ago — and see it in what is there — in a sculpture in a Cathedral.
But, again, it is not imagination alone which allows him to do this. It is also
the raw physical object. To obtain a fuller grasp o f this unique sensory quality o f
religious appreciation, it is helpful to look at what Buddhist philosophers have taught
us about the mind and the sensory world. Consider what has been written about the
three successive meditative stages o f nimitta or “mental signs”, and how nimitta may
relate to, or illuminate, the idea of religious appreciation. What is nimitta? Rupert
Gethin, of the University o f Bristol, describes it like so:
The concept o f nimitta is most easily explained with reference to meditation 
on the coloured disks. To undertake this kind o f meditation the mediator 
should first prepare a disk of the appropriate colour. He should then set it up in 
front of him and, sitting down, begin to try to place his attention on the disk. 
The “initial” or “preparatory sign” (parikamma-nimitta) is the gross physical 
object. After some practice, the meditator will no longer need the actual 
physical object to contemplate, but will be able to visualize the object in his 
mind directly; the object o f meditation is now the “acquired sign” (nggaha- 
nimitta). As the meditator investigates and explores the acquired sign, there 
eventually arises the “counterpart sign” (patibhaga-nimitta). The arising of the 
counterpart sign is concurrent with the attainment o f access concentration. 
Whereas the acquired sign is a mental visualization of the physical object 
exactly as it appears -  an eidetic image -  the counterpart sign is a purified 
conceptual image free o f any marks or blemishes. In the case of, say, the white 
or red disk the mind becomes completely absorbed in the concept of 
“whiteness” or “redness” . The arising of the counterpart sign is compared to 
the moon coming out from behind clouds.180
This brief description o f one form o f Buddhist meditation may help us clarify the role
of the sensory world in religious appreciation. If we compare the experience o f
“religious appreciation”, and its focus on the “mundane-sacred” physical object, with
the “parikamma-nimitta” , the consciousness associated with the observation of a
“gross physical object”, we find that their differences clarify how the sensory world is
not only a feature o f religious appreciation but also a crucial, defining feature o f it. In
180 Rupert Gethin, The Foundations o f  Buddhism  (Oxford; Oxford University Press, 1998), 182-183.
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Buddhist meditation, concentration on a physical object, such as a coloured disk, is 
but an initial stage along an ever more refined path toward inner and non-sensory 
mental clarity. But the man o f religious appreciation, unlike the Buddhist mystic, is 
not so concerned with some mental abstraction such as “whiteness” itself, perceived 
solely in the self, rather he rejoices in the external white object before his eyes — with 
all its blemishes! He does not desire to go beyond that stage. He does not see it as a 
means. The psychological motive o f religious appreciation is not concerned, as it 
were, with Euclidean purity, o f the pure circle resting in front o f the mind’s eye, but 
instead focuses its attention on those concrete, sensory things that make up our 
everyday life. Here, in this religious experience, the negation or minimization of the 
sensory world results in the misunderstanding of the whole of religious appreciation.
So this experience of religious appreciation cannot be reduced wholly to 
“imagination” or any other purely mental category, like a “pure” vision of some inner 
object. Religious appreciation is too fixed on the physical world.
Religious-Based Terms Revisited
Now, having outlined the main features of religious appreciation, let us conclude with 
the question from which this chapter began. How do we make sense of the more 
decidedly religious terms found in mundane-sacred judgment? Our theory of religious 
appreciation ought to explain the meaning of this language. It is all well and good to 
say that religious appreciation includes general features -  such as an interest in an 
object for its own sake, normative force, a sense of enjoyment, and so on -  but that 
does not help us explain why there are so many different mundane-sacred judgments 
employing so many different religious (and mundane) terms. The River Ganges is 
Holy and The River Ganges is sweet and The River Ganges is Evil may all be 
“mundane-sacred judgments” , but clearly they cannot be substituted for one another.
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Each carries some distinct meaning, and thus some distinct experience. These terms 
have particular connotations, which are learned in different situations, possibly even 
under different experiences. They reflect, as it were, different tastes, and the different 
tastes simply mean that different objects are being appreciated. Accordingly, it would 
appear that terms such as “holy” and “lcusala” and “evil” and “mourning” and so on, 
draw our attention to distinct properties of mundane-sacred objects. And since there 
are so many mundane-sacred objects, and so many ways o f describing their 
properties, 110 general theory of religious appreciation could possibly account for all 
this linguistic meaning and existential experience.
However, borrowing an insight from Wittgenstein’s theory of aesthetic terms, 
we might be able to meet this challenge. It is conceivable that religiously-based terms 
were and are learned firs t as interjections. Only later are they converted into 
adjectival form. Assuming that, all mundane-sacred predicates -  be they religious 
terms like “holy” or mundane terms like “mourning” -  come with an associated non- 
descriptive meaning, that is, an immediate, primitive experience, as with all 
inteijections. This experience is the one we have been describing. Our confusion 
may only rest on the descriptive appearance of mundane-sacred judgments, because 
once the adjectival form comes into use, once the interjections are translated into 
apparent declaratives, the implication immediately arises that we are facing a 
true/false descriptive statement. In this way we are mislead into thinking that these 
words refer to properties, or that these statements are making statements about things 
that can be true or false. And this mistake will be further bolstered by the fact that 
each term will be learned in the distinct area where it is appropriately applied: to call 
something “holy” immediately excludes it from the class o f all things “evil”, to call 
something “mourning” immediately excludes it from the class o f things called “joy”,
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to call something “kusala” immediately excludes it from the class of things called 
“akusula”. Quite reasonably, such distinctions might lead us to think that different 
properties are being denoted by these terms.
But, if the origin o f this language rests in interjections, we are mistaken to 
think these terms refer to properties since it is not even essential to suppose that a 
mundane-sacred predicate such as “holy” or “mourning” has a descriptive meaning, 
even if it does signify that a man’s appreciation of a sacred object is focused on 
certain general features about that object. It is perfectly possible that the various 
mundane-sacred predicates do not draw our attention to features that are present, but 
only to those realms in which the appreciated features may be discovered. They 
connect us to areas or objects where a certain kind of religious experience can be 
stimulated.
One may then ask: why do we have separate mundane-sacred predicates? The 
answer, perhaps, is because religious appreciation, hinging as it does on unasserted 
and imaginative thought processes, has a distinct character, which is dependent on the 
mundane-sacred object it happens to be contemplating. A mountain, a melody, a tree, 
a sculpture - ail these and more - constitute different areas o f religious appreciation, 
generating in turn often different linguistic responses. A m an’s religious appreciation 
of the Himalayas will be a different experience from his religious appreciation of a 
cast o f the Buddha’s footprint, and his religious appreciation o f his wife will be 
distinct from his religious appreciation o f his daughter. Each mundane-sacred object 
of appreciation will be connected, through his thought, to its own distinct area of 
concrete, real-life experience. This connection to tangible experience will dictate a 
man’s physical, intellectual, and linguistic responses to the mundane-sacred object. 
And, so, the character o f religious appreciation will be wholly determined by the
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sacred objects o f his world. But that does not mean that there is not a core 
experience, such as the one we have been describing, out o f which the fuller, more 
particular experience develops. What we have been discussing is merely the initial 
layer of a very wide religious experience of the things o f the world. So surely, any 
given experience o f the world, given all its uniqueness, enjoys further traits than the 
ones we have been describing.
But, in trying to answer the question o f why we have separate mundane-sacred 
predicates, we should always point to the fact that religious appreciation is a 
contemplative state o f  mind. When a man chooses language for a particular mundane- 
sacred object, he chooses words -  “holy”, “joy”, “evil” and so on -  to classify those 
objects of religious appreciation into different kinds. In order to divide up his 
experiences, he has access to a loose, flexible vocabulary. And this helps him 
demarcate the entire mundane-sacred phenomena that he comes across in his life. But 
that breadth o f language, from which he draws, in no way undermines the core 
experience of religious appreciation associated with his judgments. Whether calling 
something holy or evil, mourning or joy, there are certain qualities to his experience, 
those very qualities we have been describing: enjoyment o f or passionate interest in a 
sensory object; a conception of that object as possessing value “for its own sake”; a 
desire to have others agree with one’s judgments about the object; and an imaginative 
conceptual framework about that object, which is independent of belief and yet at the 
same time bound to the rational discussion.
O f course, readers of Kant will recognize the similarity between the features 
of this experience and the kind of features by which we ordinarily describe aesthetic 
experience. Indeed, that similarity, as stated in the Introduction, is the reason why we 
first named our experience after “aesthetic appreciation”, since, in the end, this
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religious experience, no matter what other features we add to it, shares the 
imagination, the passion, and the earthiness of our encounters with art and nature. It 
is, in short, the aesthetic dimension of religious experience.
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CHAPTER 26 
SOME FINAL REMARKS
One final set o f issues that we have not touched upon, but which is no less important, 
and which we ought to at least raise, concerns the relation of religious appreciation, 
mundane-sacred judgment and the mundane-sacred object to culture and to politics. 
What is the connection of the mundane-sacred to the cultural and political health of a 
society? How ought it to be connected? In what way does it relate man with man?
These are no small questions, and certainly deserve more space than a couple 
concluding remarks. Still, an initial thought is the idea that the concepts o f religious 
appreciation and mundane-sacred judgment severely undermine cultural relativist 
interpretations o f religion, and thus the political and cultural assumption upon which 
such philosophies are based. The foregoing ideas almost certainly destabilize the 
popular concept that the various religious and secular tribes comprising humanity 
subsist as if on isolated conceptual islands, wholly unable to communicate with one 
another because o f their radically different theoretical “frameworks” and 
“paradigms” . No doubt part of the impulse for seeing religious and secular people in 
this metaphysically apartheid manner derives from philosophy’s traditional and near­
obsessive concern with the otherworldly dimensions of religious language. If 
humanity’s greatest philosophical minds continually alarm us by pointing to the 
drastically different religious depictions of the ultimate, if they only concern 
themselves with the experiences o f mysticism and prayer and miracles, then it is a
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natural step for us to conclude that, yes, each of the different religions is worlds apart. 
And mankind (you and I) is therefore also worlds apart - conceptually, intellectually, 
morally.
With respect to religious appreciation, however, we have discovered a 
religious experience that seems to subvert this view. Why? Remember the basic 
constituents of religious appreciation. Religious appreciation hinges on objects o f this 
solid concrete world, on things that any of us who have eyes, ears, or hands can 
perceive, no matter the status o f our religious beliefs, no matter from what culture we 
come. So, at some level, the objects of this experience are open to evetyone. And, 
remember, too, that this religious experience is voiced by people who need not be 
classified as religious in any traditional sense; as we noted, even an atheist beach-bum 
may express something of this experience; even Bertrand Russell’s essay, A Free
t  / ' ? / • ■  * ♦ * * *M a n ’s Worship, c exhibits the basic features o f religious appreciation. So, again, at 
some level, this experience of the sacred is open to all of us, even if our prior 
metaphysical commitments add or subtract differing ingredients to or from it. Also, 
remember that mundane-sacred judgments about these things o f the physical world 
employ language gleaned from ordinary discourse; that is, words that everyone uses. 
This means that if man can leam a foreign language -  and man obviously can -  then 
he can also learn the meaning o f the words used to describe mundane-sacred objects 
in another culture. That is, any man can gain some semantic comprehension of what 
this experience is intending to communicate, no matter what his personal belief about 
that object. From that fact dialogue can blossom, as well as further understanding.
All three of these features of the experience o f religious appreciation -  its 
physical objects, its day-to-day language, and its presence among the traditionally
181 Bertrand Russell, A F ree Man's Worship and O ther Essays (London: Unwin Paperbacks, 1976).
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religious as well as the robustly secular -  reminds us of our shared humanity, our 
common aspiration to be enthralled by the world we all inhabit. This is a here-and- 
now experience — concrete, tangible, physical. Thus, when cultural-relativists 
interpret religion, claiming we are cut off from one another, suffocating in our cultural 
isolation, as it were, they are guilty of simplifying religious language and reducing 
religion solely to metaphysics and epistemology. But we have seen that there is an 
aesthetic dimension to religion. And this, the experience o f religious appreciation, 
may veiy well be the bridge of dialogue between and among us, the desperately 
needed common ground from which a broader and deeper understanding of one 
another can be built.
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APPENDIX
MORE EXAMPLES OF MUNDANE-SACRED JUDGMENTS
W hen... I prayed with my heart, everything around me seemed delightful and 
marvelous. The trees, the grass, the birds, the earth, the air, the light seemed to be 
telling me that they existed for man’s sake, that they witnessed to the love of God for 
man, that everything proved the love o f God for man, that all things prayed to God 
and sang His praise.
The Russian Pilgrim 182
Form is a revelation of essence.
Eckhart183
Forget all about the brush and ink. Then you shall learn the truth about landscapes.
Ching Hao184
The music of Cheng is lewd and corrupting, the music o f Sung is soft and makes one 
effeminate, the music of Wei is repetitious and annoying, and the music of Ch’i is 
harsh and makes one haughty. These four kinds o f music are all sensual music and 
undermine the people’s character, and that is why they cannot be used at the 
sacrifices. The Book o f  Songs says, “The harmonious sounds are shu and yung  and my 
ancestor listened to them.” Shu means “pious” and yung means “peaceful”.
Confucius185
When you see the type of a nation’s dance, you know its character.
Confucius186
182 R. M. French, trails., The IVav o f  a Pilgrim  (London: Society for Promoting Christian Knowledge, 
1941), 45.
183 Franz Pfeiffer, M eister Eckhart, trails. C. de B. Evans (London: John M. Watkins, 1924), I., 380.
184 Shio Sakanishi, trans., The Spirit o f  the Brush (London: John Murray, 1939), 95-96.
185 Lin Yutang, The Wisdom o f  Confucius (N ew  York: The Modern Library, 1938), 265
l8(’ Ibid., 264.
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Among the grasses 
An unknown flower 
Blooming white
Zen Haiku by Shiki187
There are two things in this world which delight me: women and perfumes. These two 
things rejoice my eyes, and render me more fervent in devotion.
Muhammad188
In many respects, Tibet was like any other human society with its share o f foibles and 
miscreants. But in another sense, not only for many modern people but also — 
poignantly enough -  for the Tibetans themselves, Tibet came as close as perhaps a 
human culture may to being a vajra world. The shocking splendor and magnificence 
o f its landscape; the warm and earthy character of its people; their seeming wholeness 
and rootedness in their lives; the brilliance o f Tibetan philosophy and ethics; and the 
color, vividness, and drama of its religion -  all communicate a life lived close to 
reality and drawing on it deep springs.
Secret of the Vajra World 189
As a tradition, far from being otherworldly, the Vajrayana directs attention to this 
world of sensory experience, o f happiness and sorrow, o f life and death, as the place 
where ultimate revelation occurs. The practice of tantra opens up an appreciation for 
ordinary life as the font o f inspiration, wisdom and liberation. I suggest to the reader 
that the color, energy and vivacity of Tibet are owing, in some significant way, to its 
tantric foundations.
Secret o f the Vajra W orld190
Unhappy is the land that has long lain sown with the seed o f the sower and wants a 
good husbandman, like a well-shapen maiden who has long gone childless and wants 
a good husband...
Zend-Avesta191
IS7 D.T. Suzuki, Zen and Japanese Culture (London: Routledge &Kegan Paul, 1959), 232.
,fiS W ashington liv ing , Life o f  M ahom et (London & N ew  York: Everyman’s Library, 1944), 2 3 1.
I8l) Reginald A. Ray, Secrets o f  the Vajra World: Tantric Buddhism o f  Tibet (Boston & London: 
Shambhala, 2002), I.
IW Ibid., 2.
171 Mircea Eliade, Essential Sacred  Writings From Around the World, 174.
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In general, rites begin with primitive practices, attain cultured forms, and finally 
achieve beauty and felicity.
Hsun Tzu192
Body is vehicle. Body is a temple in which Hari lives...
Siri Singh Sahib Bliai Sahib Harbhajan 
Singh Khalsa Yogi J i193
Shabbat is also a time o f joy, of good food and wine....
George Robinson194
All songs are a part o f Him, who wears a form of sound.
Vishnu Purana195
Music expresses the harmony of the universe, while rituals express the order of the 
universe. Through harmony all things are influenced, and through order all things 
have a proper place. Music rises from heaven, while rituals are patterned on the earth. 
To go beyond these patterns would result in violence and disorder. In order to have 
the proper rituals and music, we must understand the principles o f Heaven and Earth.
Confucius196
Silence is the language o f God: it is also the language of the heart.
Swami Sivananda197
The being o f m an... is the noblest being o f all made things.
The Epistle o f Privy Counsel198
192 Ibid., 234.
,l)3 “W hy are w e Sikhs?” Summer 2002, on line at: w ww.sikhnet.org.
194 George Robinson, E ssential Judaism , A C om plete Guide To Beliefs, Customs, A nd Rituals (N ew  
York, NY: Pocket B ooks, 2000), 84.
11,5 A.K. Coomaraswamy, The D ance o f  Shiva (Bombay: Asia Publishing House, 1948), 112.
196 Lin Yutang, The Wisdom o f  Confucius, 259.
197 Charles Andrieu and Jean Herbert, La P ratique de la M editation  (Paris: Albin M ichel, 1950), 360.
198 Dom Justin McCann, ed., The C loud o f  Lfnlaiowing, and O ther Treatises (London: Burns Oates and 
Washbourne, 1943), III,,122.
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He thought within himself that this world was far better than Paradise had men eyes to 
see its glory, and their advantages. For the veiy miseries and sins and offenses that are 
in it are the materials o f his joy and triumph and glory.
Thomas Traheme199
Hear, Goddess queen, diffusing silver light,
Bull-horn’d, and wand’ring thro’ the gloom of Night.
With stars surrounded, and with circuit wide 
Night’s torch extending, through the heav’ns you ride;
Female and male, with silv’ry rays you shine,
And now full-orb’d, now tending to decline.
Mother o f ages, fruit-producing Moon,
Whose amber orb makes Night’s reflected moon:
Lover of horses, splendid queen of night,
All-seeing pow’r, bedeck’d with starry light,
Lover of vigilance, the foe of strife,
In peace rejoicing, and a prudent life:
Fair lamp o f Night, its ornament and friend,
Who giv’st to Nature’s works their destin’d end.
Queen o f the stars, all-wise Diana, hail!
Deck’d with a graceful robe and ample veil.
Come, blessed Goddess, prudent, starry, bright,
Come, moony-lamp, with chaste and splendid light,
Shine on these sacred rites with prosp’rous rays,
And pleas’d accept thy suppliants’ mystic praise.
Orpheus: Hymn to the Moon200
Bertram D obell, ed., Centuries o f  M editations IV (London: P.J. and A.E. D obell, 1958), 21.
200 Onomacritus, The M ystica l Hymns o f  Orpheus, trans. Thomas Taylor (London: Bertram Dobell and 
Reeves & Turner, 1896), 24 ff.
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